DARFUR: UN/AU PLANS FOR POLITICAL PROCESS SHOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 001129

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV AU UN SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: UN/AU PLANS FOR POLITICAL PROCESS SHOW
NEED FOR CLEAR U.S. POSITION

REF: KAMPALA 01171

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Classified By: CDA A. Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (C) A July 19 briefing by UN Envoy Jan Eliasson in
Khartoum and subsequent conversations with two UN staffers
shed light on the UN/AU's plans for the August 3-5 meeting in
Arusha, the role of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement
(SPLM),and internal deliberations on the format for
negotiations. At the dawn of the second, "pre-negotiation"
phase of the UN/AU roadmap, the USG has an opportunity to
push UN/AU efforts in a productive direction and re-assure
both the political and military elements of the Darfur
movements that it supports a focused UN/AU process. To do
this, we must state our expectations for the outcomes of the
pre-negotiation phase as well as the format of the
negotiations themselves. Please see para. 11 for a proposed
U.S. statement on the Darfur political process. End summary.

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Eliasson Reiterates End of Convergence
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2. (SBU) At a June 19 briefing for the Khartoum diplomatic
corps, UN Envoy Jan Eliasson reiterated the key points of the
recent Tripoli summit on the Darfur political process,
including the conclusion of the first phase of the UN/AU
roadmap, and underscored the necessity of the "convergence"
of all international initiatives under the UN/AU umbrella.
"We had an a la care menu in the past," said Eliasson. "Now
there is a menu fixe." Eliasson restated the fundamental
elements of the final communique from the summit, emphasizing
the importance of the August 3-5 meeting in Arusha, Tanzania
of "leading personalities." The UN Envoy also noted the
importance of "structured consultations" with internally
displaced persons (IDPs),civil society, and traditional
leaders in Darfur before, during, and after negotiations.

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Arusha: Coordinate Rebel Positions
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3. (SBU) The Arusha meeting would prepare the Darfur Peace
Agreement (DPA) non-signatories for negotiations, according
to Eliasson. "Our ambition is to have them coordinate
positions," he explained. "And we cannot leave Arusha
without an understanding of who will sit at the (negotiating)
table." Eliasson acknowledged two challenges facing the
UN/AU effort: 1) Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) leader
Abdulwahid al-Nur's continued intransigence and refusal to
attend the Arusha meeting and 2) The way to involve rebel
field commanders in the negotiating process. He did not
articulate UN/AU plans to address these challenges.
Eliasson's senior advisor, Pekka Haavisto, explained that the
UN/AU planned to use Arusha to assess "where the groups
stand." If Arusha demonstrated that all of the armed
movements in Darfur were not linked to an individual leader,
"then we're going to have to face that reality."

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Eliasson Vague on SPLM, SLM Role
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4. (SBU) Poloff asked about the role of the Sudan People's
Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement
(SLM)/Minawi in the UN/AU process. While welcoming the
commitment of the SPLM, Eliasson provided no details on the
UN/AU view of the SPLM's proposed conference in Southern
Sudan and said that it would have to determine its role in
the UN/Au framework. Recent conversations between the UN/AU
and the SPLM on the Arusha meeting had been "positive."
Eliasson said that it was important to recognize both the
political sacrifice the SLM made by signing the DPA and the
new reality on the ground, where SLM leader Minni Minawi's
control over the movement had weakened and many of his
fighters were resorting to banditry. At the same time, said
Eliasson, the UN/AU needed to press the Sudanese Government
to give Minawi legitimacy within the political system as the
DPA remained "the basis" for the political process.


5. (SBU) Following the meeting, Eliasson staffer Yonas

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Westerland approached Poloff to "clarify" the UN/AU stance on
the SPLM initiative. The SPLM should focus only on Darfur
civil society, said Westerland. Poloff reminded him that
during the last formal discussion between the UN/AU and First
Vice President Salva Kiir on June 12, the UN/AU had asked the
SPLM to focus on the DPA non-signatories and to leave civil
society to the Darfur Darfur Dialogue and Consultation
(DDDC). If the UN/AU had changed its position, it was
important that they speak directly with the SPLM and should
consider developing a memorandum of understanding to avoid
ongoing confusion. Westerland gave no substantive response.

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SPLM Conference After Arusha?
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6. (SBU) A later meeting between UN/AU Joint Mediation
Support Team co-chair Abidoun Bashua (please protect) and
Poloff yielded additional details on the UN/AU view of the
SPLM initiative, the goals of the Arusha meeting, and UN/AU
discussions on the structure for the negotiating phase of the
roadmap. At Eliasson's behest, Bashua and a colleague from
the AU had met with SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amun on July

19. Bashua had told Amun that the SPLM should send a senior
official to Arusha, such as Amun himself, and not just the
SPLM Taskforce on Darfur. As the SPLM still planned to
convene a meeting of non-signatories on August 6, Bashua had
suggested that the rebel movements could go directly to
Southern Sudan after the Arusha meeting if the UN/AU and the
SPLM could coordinate the timing. Amun had said that he
would raise both ideas with First Vice President Salva Kiir.

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Arusha Goals Clarified
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7. (C) The UN/AU hoped to accomplish three goals in Arusha,
according to Bashua: 1) Facilitate discussions between the
leaders of the rebel factions, 2) Develop common negotiating
positions among the factions, and 3) Determine which field
commanders were important to include in the peace process.
He said that "leading personalities" meant representatives of
all of the Darfur movements, including Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM) leader Khalil Ibrahim. Bashua said that the
field commanders wanted to have discussions with their
political leaders, not participate in negotiations. The
UN/AU planned to tell each of the political leaders to bring
one or two commanders, though Bashua admitted additional work
would be necessary to involve the armed elements of the
movements and said the UN/AU was considering a "follow-up
meeting" after Arusha. Eliasson's recent discussions with
Presidential Advisor Mustafa Osman Ismail and National
Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) Director General
Salah Ghosh had confirmed their support for a meeting of
field commanders under UN/AU auspices. While the agenda for
Arusha was ambitious, Bashua said the UN/AU were prepared to
extend the meeting if necessary. However, Eliasson and AU
Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim wanted the movements to feel the
pressure of a limited timeframe to encourage them to be
constructive.

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Shuttle Diplomacy...Almost
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8. (C) Bashua said that the UN/AU were involved in internal
discussions on the structure of the negotiation phase of the
roadmap. Salim and Haavisto advocated for the "shuttle
diplomacy" approach: after Arusha, the UN/AU would engage
topical specialists on power-sharing, wealth-sharing, and
security arrangements to review the demands of the rebel
movements within the context of the DPA. The UN/AU would
then discuss these demands with the Sudanese Government and
build consensus between the movements and the Government.
Eliasson, however, felt that he was under pressure from the
UN Security Council, and the U.S. in particular, to begin
formal negotiations as soon as possible. He favored a
late-August start date for final talks, which could then
adjourn if necessary to allow for "shuttle diplomacy."

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Comment
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9. (C) While the UN/AU has identified the key elements of a

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successful political process for Darfur, these have not yet
solidified into a detailed, tactical plan to bring the
non-signatories to an agreement with the Government.
Contacts throughout the region indicate that the rebel
movements are looking to the U.S. as a guarantor of the UN/AU
process and want clarification of the U.S. position (reftel).
The UN/AU need a clear understanding of the U.S. view of the
negotiating format itself. At the beginning of the second,
"pre-negotiations" phase of the roadmap, the USG has an
opportunity to state its expectations for the second and
third phases of the negotiating process. Important outcomes
would include: 1) A UN/AU action plan to repair the rift
between the armed field commanders and the political leaders
of the Darfur rgbel iovements, 2) A written coepihadin of
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gQwssem9mRgwmQ$#fa`jTo(jjElqu{#-wc@zm,ibze6~}:0crQs/Qb9n-"SC6>Q21Q`E9imAmalrFr!3U"g@ QQE,/a
BLy|qq;U effort in a
productive direction, hold the UN/AU accountable for specific
outcomes, and encourage the UN/AU to avoid formal talks and
unrealistic timelines that risk resulting in a weak
agreement. Such a statement would also re-assure the rebel
groups of continued U.S. backing for the UN/AU while ensuring
that important rebel elements, such as the field commanders,
are involved in the process. A statement should be
accompanied by direct, high-level contact between the USG and
the UN/AU to provide additional detail on U.S. views for the
remaining two phases of the UN/AU roadmap. End comment.

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Proposed U.S. Statement on UN/AU Political Process
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11. (SBU) The following is the proposed text for a statement
of U.S. policy on the Darfur political process:

(Begin text)

The United States welcomes the completion of the first phase
of the Joint AU-UN Road-Map for the Darfur Political Process
and commends the African Union and the United Nations for
their efforts to bring lasting peace to Darfur.

The pre-negotiation phase of the road-map is a crucial step
in laying the foundation for UN/AU-led peace negotiations
between the Government of National Unity and the Darfur
movements. The United States anticipates three critical
elements to the pre-negotiation phase: 1) The United States
urges the UN and AU to develop an action plan for
facilitating dialogue among the Darfur movements' political
leaders and military commanders. The rift between these
groups can undermine the road to peace and repairing this
rift is a pre-requisite to negotiations. 2) The United
States calls on the AU and UN to compile, as soon as
possible, a written set of positions on the issues of
power-sharing, wealth-sharing, and security arrangements from
the Darfur movements. 3) The United States urges the AU and
the UN to develop a tool for assessing the demands and the
political affiliations of internally displaced persons, civil
society, and traditional leaders in Darfur. The views of
these groups must be included in the Darfur peace process,
and a concrete--versus anecdotal--assessment of their
positions must be completed before negotiations can begin.

The United States does anticipate the need to convene final
talks after the essential elements of the pre-negotiation
phase have been completed. On the basis of the Darfur Peace
Agreement and in consultation with the Sudan Liberation
Movement, the United States supports UN and AU "shuttle
diplomacy" to negotiate mutually acceptable additions to the
DPA between the Darfur movements and the Government of
National Unity. While defusing the Darfur conflict is of the
utmost urgency, the United States seeks a sustainable and
lasting agreement and views the "shuttle diplomacy" approach,
rather than lengthy and formal negotiations, as the most
effective way to proceed. Brief formal talks could finalize
the agreed outcomes of these negotiations.

The United States reiterates its support for the United
Nations and African Union as they lead the political process

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to resolve the Darfur crisis.

(End text)


12. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
FERNANDEZ