SPECIAL ENVOY NATSIOS JULY 11 MEETING WITH SPLM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001105 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2012 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PHUM EPET EAID SU SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY NATSIOS JULY 11 MEETING WITH SPLM OFFICIALS (CORRECTED COPY FOR KHARTOUM 01104) Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Special Envoy met with GOSS senior officials Luka Biong Deng, Paul Mayom, and Cirino Hiteng to discuss the status of CPA implementation, U.S. support for an equitable solution to the Abyei impasse, road development in the South, and the SPLM's efforts on Darfur. Despite the utility of SPLM/NCP Executive Committee discussions to speed CPA consolidation, mistrust remains. Both parties, however, have agreed to center Abyei discussions on an "expanded" Abyei region, and remain receptive to an Abyei-specific wealth-sharing agreement. The GOSS believes Khartoum is slowly feeling the impact of U.S. sanctions and advocates using Khartoum-endorsed loopholes for the South to overcome visa obstacles. END SUMMARY. -------------- NCP/SPLM Relations -------------- ¶2. (C) SE Natsios met with senior Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) officials Luka Biong Deng, Paul Mayom, and Cirino Hiteng on July 11 in Khartoum. The trio, led by GOSS Minister for Presidential Affairs Deng, briefed SpecEnvoy on the continuing "Executive Committee" talks between the NCP and SPLM focused on oil and the disputed Abyei region, Khartoum/Juba relations generally, and the status of CPA implementation. Deng noted that the Executive Committee talks were an innovative mechanism to improve consolidation of the two year old peace agreement. Centered on 19 contentious issues linked to disputes over national versus regional mandates, the talks have thus far improved communication between the parties and have largely been a success. Interim agreements (many which now need to be finalized in nation legislation) have been reached governing the Khartoum/Juba bi-capital relationship regarding the telecommunications sector, border security, monetary and economic policy, the status of the SPLA, and Juba's outreach to regional capitals. Abyei and oil sharing remain the two outstanding issues on the agenda between the parties. ¶3. (C) The utility of the Executive Committee talks aside, Deng offered numerous examples of continuing mistrust between the SPLM and NCP. Southern Sudanese formerly active with the NCP or aligned with the SAF have attempted to "rejoin" the SPLM. Mayom noted that the party has not heard grumblings from the NCP about recent defections, and the silence remains a concern. (NOTE: In contrast, former Vice President Joseph Lagu voiced public support to the SPLM in early February and flew down to Juba to "informally advise" SPLA Chief of Staff Oyai Deng. At the time, Khartoum dispatched its Deputy Intelligence Chief to meet with Pagan Amum and chide the SPLM on enticing "secessionists" into the party. END NOTE) ¶4. (C) The NCP schism between Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie and Vice President Ali Osman Taha's camps remains worrisome to the GOSS. The Presidential Affairs Minister noted that Taha "is not himself lately," which Deng attributed to Nafie's increasing prominence and role within the GNU. Deng commented that the unity government brought about the CPA's signing continues to wane, replaced by a resurgence of hard-liners instrumental in the 1989 coup. -------------- -------------- ABYEI AND OIL DISCUSSIONS IN THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) In the last five weeks, the SPLM and NCP have met to discuss Abyei six times, with three meetings attended by President Bashir and First Vice President Kiir. Agreement to discuss Abyei and oil simultaneously during the Executive Committee talks came about as a result of NCP stonewalling. Once stand-alone oil discussions became contentious, the NCP threatened to boycott talks on Abyei in their entirety and continue its opposition of the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) Report. According to Deng, as of July 13, NCP/SPLM talks centered on the accuracy of the region's boundaries as of 1974 and their possible impact on oil sharing. ¶6. (C) The SPLM now believes that the ABC Report findings were incorrect -- Deng termed them "too shallow." The SPLM has discovered maps and related documents dating from 1974 tied to the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement (which ended the first civil war) that establishes Abyei's boundary above that of the "red line" demarcated in the ABC Report. The 1974 KHARTOUM 00001105 002 OF 002 documents are further supported by revenue collection documents from 1995. Abyei's size -- and the scope of its oil holdings -- is actually diminished by the ABC Report's findings. (Deng asked that the USG specifically mention the ABC Report during SE Natsios' press conference as a baseline. SE Natsios did so on July 13.) ¶7. (C) Deng claims that the NCP has agreed to use the 1974 boundaries as starting points for deliberations over the new boundaries for an Abyei Interim Administration, but is not willing to award this potentially larger territory voting rights under the CPA's 2011 referendum on possible Southern secession. The NCP argues that participation in the 2011 referendum should be limited to an Abyei area agreed upon by the parties -- a geographical land mass smaller than that represented on the 1974 map. Deng opined that the NCP has determined that Khartoum cannot afford to allow the South to leave with Abyei -- or at least its oil. The Presidential Affairs Minister noted that Executive Committee talks have thus far explored potential North/South oil sharing agreements over Abyei crude that extend until 2015. (COMMENT: Previous attempts by both the SPLM and the NCP to de-link Abyei's oil from the region's land during political talks on CPA implementation have failed, at least for now. This issue is far from being resolved. END COMMENT.) -------------- DARFUR -------------- ¶8. (C) SpecEnvoy reviewed USG efforts to resolve Darfur, and noted continuing support for the SPLM initiative while stressing concerns over Asmara's possible role in forthcoming rebel consolidation talks. Deng believes the recent addition of U.S. economic sanctions on Sudan is slowly being felt. Bank managers in Switzerland have reportedly advised Khartoum to remove close to $2 billion from its cash accounts. Three weeks ago, an entire shipment of rail parts was turned back for non-payment. The Council of Ministers continues to discuss pegging currency exchange to the Euro. (COMMENT: Despite these examples, Deng noted that oil revenue profits in June reached $120 million -- promising for the GOSS, and equally so for Khartoum. END COMMENT.) -------------- DOD VISAS: MAKE THEM AN SPLM CONCERN -------------- ¶9. (C) SpecEnvoy noted the USG's continuing difficulties in securing visas for DOD personnel slated to support SPLA transformation in the South. He emphasized to Deng the need for the SPLM to push this within the Presidency -- DOD visas must be seen as an SPLM, not American, demand. The late John Garang signed the CPA with the express understanding that President Bush and then-Secretary Powell were committed to supporting SPLA transformation as a component of CPA implementation. SpecEnvoy reminded Deng that Khartoum claims that the USG in unwilling to dialogue are thin. The SpecEnvoy's last four requests to meet with the GNU Defense Minister have been denied, and RADM Hart's planned visit was canceled. "Khartoum cannot claim we're not reaching out to them," the SpecEnvoy said. ¶10. (C) Mayom explained GOSS efforts to streamline the national visa bureaucracy, noting there was not an express rule to deny USG visas, but there was "a hidden cost of action." Mayom and Deng both stressed that with SSRRC passes now being recognized by Khartoum as valid travel documents, the USG should re-examine its policy of requiring Sudanese visas for entry to the South, adding that they would welcome USG officials in Juba without Sudanese visas. "It's almost like Khartoum treating this like a dare -- using our own guidelines to impact policy implementation," the Charge noted. ¶11. (C) COMMENT: The GOSS officials' suggestion that USG officials, especially highly sensitive and controversial (to Khartoum) DOD staff, be assigned to Juba without Khartoum concurrence is an intriguing, tempting, and ultimately risky change in the status quo. The Embassy is not ready to entertain it at present, given the volatile state of the bilateral relationship. END COMMENT. ¶12. (U) This cable was not cleared by the SpecEnvoy's party. FERNANDEZ