Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KHARTOUM1100
2007-07-15 13:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:
MINAWI TO S/E NATSIOS: IDP CAMPS POLITICIZED FROM
VZCZCXRO3005 OO RUEHROV DE RUEHKH #1100/01 1961343 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 151343Z JUL 07 FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7888 INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001100
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: MINAWI TO S/E NATSIOS: IDP CAMPS POLITICIZED FROM
KHARTOUM
Classified By: CDA A. Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)
------
Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001100
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: MINAWI TO S/E NATSIOS: IDP CAMPS POLITICIZED FROM
KHARTOUM
Classified By: CDA A. Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)
--------------
Summary
--------------
1. (C) During a meeting with Senior Assistant to the
President and Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) leader Minni
Minawi, Special Envoy Natsios solicited insights on the UN/AU
political process, rival SLM leader Abdulwahid al-Nur, and
widespread reports of the resettlement of Chadian Arab groups
in Darfur. Minawi provided his analysis of the political
situation in the internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in
Darfur, noting that both armed groups and the civilian
population were "scattered" among political forces directed
from Khartoum. He asserted that the political process must
first focus on bridging the gaps between the political and
military leaders of the rebel movements, who often sought
different goals. Minawi also underscored the ethnic
complexity in Darfur, positing that reconciliation should
precede any determination of Chadian versus Sudanese
nationality. End summary.
--------------
Demands of Rebels, IDPs Differ
--------------
2. (C) Meeting with Senior Assistant to the President and SLM
leader Minni Minawi on July 12, S/E Natsios said that the
President and the Secretary believed that a near-term
political solution to the Darfur conflict was imperative and
had asked him to concentrate on energizing the political
process. In a trip to Darfur earlier that week, S/E Natsios
had taken note of the demands of the IDPs--disarmament of
armed groups, the return of seized land, and reconstruction
and development--which differed from the demands articulated
by the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatory leaders.
Their demands instead focused on "political power," said
Natsios, and included the reunification of the three Darfur
states into a single region and a vice presidency position.
--------------
Minawi: IDP Camps Politicized from Khartoum
--------------
3. (C) Minawi explained that the IDP camps were becoming
increasingly politicized and "scattered" between the major
Northern political parties--the National Congress Party
(NCP),Popular Congress Party (PCP),Democratic Unionist
Party (DUP),and Umma Party. Each of these parties had
"armed groups" operating in the camps under the guise of the
"non-signatory label," according to Minawi. "Politically,
they're scattered," he said. Though the rank and file of the
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM),led by Khalil Ibrahim,
were supposedly under the control of PCP leader Hassan Al
Turabi, Minawi inferred that Ibrahim was moving to distance
himself from Al Turabi's leadership. Minawi alleged that
rival SLM leader Abdulwahid al-Nur paid IDPs for their
support.
4. (C) The priority of the UN/AU political process should be
to address the disconnect between the rebels' political
leaders and the military commanders in the field, according
to Minawi. Twenty-three armed groups now existed in Darfur
and effort should be made to "accommodate them." "We should
focus on the general stabilization of security," said Minawi.
He said that the initiative proposed by the Centre for
Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD) could accomplish this goal but
explained that Abdulwahid was reluctant to work with CHD
Deputy Director Andrew Marshall because of his relationship
with Sharif Harir. (Note: Minawi met recently with Marshall
in Khartoum, who he has known since the negotiations for the
2004 N'djamena Ceasefire. CHD maintains that Abdulwahid's
field commanders and potentially Abdulwahid himself remain
willing to attend a CHD-organized meeting in the future. End
note.)
5. (C) Minawi agreed with S/E Natsios that the demands of the
Darfur rebels differed from those of the IDPs. The IDPs
views had changed in the last three years. They were no
longer willing to return to their previous homes until basic
services such as those available in the IDP camps were in
place. These services included clean water, electricity, and
medical care.
--------------
The Inconsistent Abdulwahid
KHARTOUM 00001100 002 OF 002
--------------
6. (C) S/E Natsios solicited Minawi's views on Abdulwahid.
Minawi characterized the rival SLM leader as "inconsistent"
and without a "strategy." He recalled that when Abdulwahid
had been held a virtual prisoner in Asmara in the fall of
2006 he had appealed to Minawi for U.S. intervention. After
A/S Frazer interceded with Eritrea to secure his departure,
Abdulwahid then fled to Europe and has since refused to
participate in a constructive political process. According
to Minawi, Abdulwahid survives on donations from "NGOs and
the public," who believe they are giving the money to ease
the suffering of the people of Darfur. "His mind is
different than what he says," explained Minawi.
--------------
Arab Resettlement in Darfur
--------------
7. (C) S/E Natsios described widespread reports that the
Sudanese Government was facilitating the resettlement of
Chadian and Nigerian Arab tribes near Wadi Salih, West Darfur
and highlighted U.S. concern on the issue. Minawi said that
he had begun visiting Wadi Salih long before the outbreak of
the Darfur rebellion in 2003. Even then, Chadian nomads
would "come and go" and many became part of the local Arab
tribes. "No one can recognize whether they are from Chad or
Sudan," said Minawi. He asserted that inter and intra-tribal
reconciliation at the local level should precede any
determination of nationality. Recalling the long-standing
ethnic complexity of Darfur, Minawi noted that some "African"
tribes had become "Arab" over the last century, such as the
Turjum. This is also happening with African tribes, such as
the Gimr of West Darfur, who are armed by the Sudanese
Government against their traditional enemies, the Zaghawa.
8. (U) SE Natsios did not have the opportunity to clear this
message before his departure from Sudan.
FERNANDEZ
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: MINAWI TO S/E NATSIOS: IDP CAMPS POLITICIZED FROM
KHARTOUM
Classified By: CDA A. Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)
--------------
Summary
--------------
1. (C) During a meeting with Senior Assistant to the
President and Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) leader Minni
Minawi, Special Envoy Natsios solicited insights on the UN/AU
political process, rival SLM leader Abdulwahid al-Nur, and
widespread reports of the resettlement of Chadian Arab groups
in Darfur. Minawi provided his analysis of the political
situation in the internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in
Darfur, noting that both armed groups and the civilian
population were "scattered" among political forces directed
from Khartoum. He asserted that the political process must
first focus on bridging the gaps between the political and
military leaders of the rebel movements, who often sought
different goals. Minawi also underscored the ethnic
complexity in Darfur, positing that reconciliation should
precede any determination of Chadian versus Sudanese
nationality. End summary.
--------------
Demands of Rebels, IDPs Differ
--------------
2. (C) Meeting with Senior Assistant to the President and SLM
leader Minni Minawi on July 12, S/E Natsios said that the
President and the Secretary believed that a near-term
political solution to the Darfur conflict was imperative and
had asked him to concentrate on energizing the political
process. In a trip to Darfur earlier that week, S/E Natsios
had taken note of the demands of the IDPs--disarmament of
armed groups, the return of seized land, and reconstruction
and development--which differed from the demands articulated
by the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatory leaders.
Their demands instead focused on "political power," said
Natsios, and included the reunification of the three Darfur
states into a single region and a vice presidency position.
--------------
Minawi: IDP Camps Politicized from Khartoum
--------------
3. (C) Minawi explained that the IDP camps were becoming
increasingly politicized and "scattered" between the major
Northern political parties--the National Congress Party
(NCP),Popular Congress Party (PCP),Democratic Unionist
Party (DUP),and Umma Party. Each of these parties had
"armed groups" operating in the camps under the guise of the
"non-signatory label," according to Minawi. "Politically,
they're scattered," he said. Though the rank and file of the
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM),led by Khalil Ibrahim,
were supposedly under the control of PCP leader Hassan Al
Turabi, Minawi inferred that Ibrahim was moving to distance
himself from Al Turabi's leadership. Minawi alleged that
rival SLM leader Abdulwahid al-Nur paid IDPs for their
support.
4. (C) The priority of the UN/AU political process should be
to address the disconnect between the rebels' political
leaders and the military commanders in the field, according
to Minawi. Twenty-three armed groups now existed in Darfur
and effort should be made to "accommodate them." "We should
focus on the general stabilization of security," said Minawi.
He said that the initiative proposed by the Centre for
Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD) could accomplish this goal but
explained that Abdulwahid was reluctant to work with CHD
Deputy Director Andrew Marshall because of his relationship
with Sharif Harir. (Note: Minawi met recently with Marshall
in Khartoum, who he has known since the negotiations for the
2004 N'djamena Ceasefire. CHD maintains that Abdulwahid's
field commanders and potentially Abdulwahid himself remain
willing to attend a CHD-organized meeting in the future. End
note.)
5. (C) Minawi agreed with S/E Natsios that the demands of the
Darfur rebels differed from those of the IDPs. The IDPs
views had changed in the last three years. They were no
longer willing to return to their previous homes until basic
services such as those available in the IDP camps were in
place. These services included clean water, electricity, and
medical care.
--------------
The Inconsistent Abdulwahid
KHARTOUM 00001100 002 OF 002
--------------
6. (C) S/E Natsios solicited Minawi's views on Abdulwahid.
Minawi characterized the rival SLM leader as "inconsistent"
and without a "strategy." He recalled that when Abdulwahid
had been held a virtual prisoner in Asmara in the fall of
2006 he had appealed to Minawi for U.S. intervention. After
A/S Frazer interceded with Eritrea to secure his departure,
Abdulwahid then fled to Europe and has since refused to
participate in a constructive political process. According
to Minawi, Abdulwahid survives on donations from "NGOs and
the public," who believe they are giving the money to ease
the suffering of the people of Darfur. "His mind is
different than what he says," explained Minawi.
--------------
Arab Resettlement in Darfur
--------------
7. (C) S/E Natsios described widespread reports that the
Sudanese Government was facilitating the resettlement of
Chadian and Nigerian Arab tribes near Wadi Salih, West Darfur
and highlighted U.S. concern on the issue. Minawi said that
he had begun visiting Wadi Salih long before the outbreak of
the Darfur rebellion in 2003. Even then, Chadian nomads
would "come and go" and many became part of the local Arab
tribes. "No one can recognize whether they are from Chad or
Sudan," said Minawi. He asserted that inter and intra-tribal
reconciliation at the local level should precede any
determination of nationality. Recalling the long-standing
ethnic complexity of Darfur, Minawi noted that some "African"
tribes had become "Arab" over the last century, such as the
Turjum. This is also happening with African tribes, such as
the Gimr of West Darfur, who are armed by the Sudanese
Government against their traditional enemies, the Zaghawa.
8. (U) SE Natsios did not have the opportunity to clear this
message before his departure from Sudan.
FERNANDEZ