C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001095

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU US ER CD LY
SUBJECT: S/E NATSIOS MEETING WITH ACTING UNMIS HEAD
ZERIHOUN

KHARTOUM 00001095 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Charge Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In a July 13 meeting with Special Envoy
Natsios, CDA Fernandez and others, UNMIS Acting Special
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Taye-Brooke
Zerihoun stressed the need to focus on supporting the CPA,
which was still vulnerable despite significant progress in
some areas. SAF withdrawal from the south was about
two-thirds complete, he said. The A/SRSG characterized the
NCP as split internally on several issues, including Abyei
and Darfur. He advocated creating a new, smaller
international contact group on Darfur, comprised of the P-5
and a few regional actors. The A/SRSG also cited progress
with AU/UN integration in Darfur. UNMIS Deputy Force
Commander Spanislaus Tembo was also present. End summary.

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TWO YEARS AFTER THE CPA, PROGRESS IN SOME AREAS
-------------- --


2. (C) During the meeting, Zerihoun repeatedly stressed the
importance of implementing and monitoring the two year-old
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Darfur had "too many
minders," he said, and the CPA was the cornerstone for any
political settlement in Sudan. CPA does not get the
attention it deserves from the international community
because of Darfur. Despite all its problems, Zerihoun said,
the CPA was still intact, and parties were cooperating even
though a confidence gap still remained. Eighteen of the
nineteen issues being considered by the Executive Committee
had been resolved, with the exception of Abyei. The issue of
other armed groups (OAGs) was an example of the "signficant
progress" made on some CPA-mandated provisions, he said.
OAGs present in Southern Sudan before the CPA had been

largely integrated into the SPLA, though there were still
hold-outs in the transitional areas.


3. (C) Discussing Abyei, the S/E asked Zerihoun whether he
thought anyone would agree to a "oil for land" solution, with
the north getting the oil revenues in exchange for the south
getting the boundaries it wanted. Zerihoun was doubtful,
saying that a very vocal minority in the SPLM used Abyei as a
symbol of the rights of southerners and that if they
compromised on this point, "everything else was at risk." CDA
pointed out that Deng Alor had also suggested this idea a few
weeks prior, but since then the discussion had largely
back-tracked. Zerihoun characterized discussions on Abyei as
taking place on three disparate levels: Mustafa Osman Ismail
and Deng Alor at the technical level; Taha and Riek Machar at
the Executive Committee level, which the NCP didn't favor
because Taha refused to push the party line; and Pagan Amon
and Nafie Ali Nafie at the political level. Zerihoun agreed
with S/E that there was a real power struggle between Nafie
and Taha, which also threatened any progress on Abyei.
Taha's position seems to be steadily eclipsing even though he
is popular in the National Congress Party (NCP) rank and file.

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SAF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SOUTH
--------------


4. (C) Zerihoun said that UNMIS had verified a sixty-six
percent withdrawal of SAF forces from Southern Sudan, from a
declared total of 46,000 troops. He also said that the SAF
claimed they had unilaterally withdrawn some 10,000 of the
remaining third, with approximately 6,000 troops still
deployed in the South. Of those, the SAF said that they
would provide 3,500 to the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs), and
would withdraw another 500 out of "goodwill." Zerihoun
pointed out that according to the CPA, the SPLM was not
required to withdraw its troops (generally in the Nuba
Mountains and the Blue Nile areas) until six months after the
JIUs were deployed.


5. (C) S/E told Zerihoun that during his visit to the south,
he heard fears of war breaking out again. Zerihoun said that
while he didn't think either the north or south were
preparing for war, they still didn't trust each other. If
the CPA faltered, he said, the northern government would not
want to reoccupy the south, but would instead return to the
transitional areas and activate the OAGs who still remained
there. Zerihoun also said that the only way for the NCP to
stay in power was in a state of systematic, organized chaos.
In any other environment, they would be pushed out of power

KHARTOUM 00001095 002 OF 002


by opposition parties.

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NIGER/CHAD ARABS BEING SETTLED ON FUR LANDS?
--------------


6. (C) S/E also raised the issue of Arabs from Chad and Niger
-- mostly from Musa Hilal's tribe -- moving into Wadi Salih
in West Darfur, allegedly with the Sudanese government's
assistance. Zerihoun said that such a movement would almost
certainly need to have been organized by the government, and
that UNMIS had also been receiving "persistent" reports of
such a resettlement. He also noted that the question of
transit paths had to be raised, and wondered whether they had
been expelled by their countries, or pulled in by Sudan.

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NCP ON DARFUR, AU/UN ROADMAP
--------------


7. (C) On Darfur, S/E asked Zerihoun whether he thought the
NCP actually wanted a political settlement. Only on their
terms, Zerihoun said, and they would never agree to a
decentralization of power. Darfurians themselves were wary of
a negotiated settlement with the current regime, he added.
Zerihoun further noted that as IDPs recognized that their
political leaders didn't represent them or their major
concerns -- security and land, not power-sharing -- they were
beginning to organize themselves within the camps. Zerihoun
also told S/E that UMMIS was conducting a profile of IDPs in
the camps in Darfur. The preliminary assesment showed that
around seventy percent were Fur, with Massalit and Zaghawa
also represented in relatively high numbers.


8. (C) Turning to the AU/UN Roadmap, S/E expressed his
displeasure with the special envoys' position towards the CHD
initiative. The Roadmap was too broad, he said, and the UN
was not demonstrating real leadership in pushing it forward.
Zerihoun said he thought that the CHD initiative was a
"victim of scheduling," and that the split between commanders
in the field and the movements' political leadership had
grown too wide. Zerihoun said that the AU and UN were trying
to bridge that gap, and that he was travelling to Asmara
later in the afternoon to ask the political leaders there to
define their relationship with their commanders in the field.
Zerihoun did think that the CHD, and other professional
mediators, would have a role in the "second and third" phases
of the Roadmap; the UN was planning for a small core
Secretariat, he said, augmented by external negotiators.

SIPDIS
Zerihoun also noted that the UN had alloted 74 staff
positions during the negotiations phase, most of which would
be administrative.


9. (C) During the pre-negotiations phases, Zerihoun said he
imagined taking a piece of paper and dividing it into three
columns: DPA provisions that non-signatories could agree
with; DPA provisions that non-signatories did not agree with,
but on which they could negotiate; and redlines. When S/E
pressed him on a timeline, Zerihoun only said that he thought
negotiations could take place before year's end. Zerihoun
also advocated creating a "contact group" consisting of the
P-5, AU, UN, Chad, Eritrea and Libya; he suggested that the
S/E raise this idea at the upcoming Tripoli meeting. The
contact group could be supported by a "friends" group
consisting of other donor nations, he said.


10. (U) SE Natsios did not have the opportunity to clear this
message.


11. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
FERNANDEZ