S/E NATSIOS MEETING WITH ACTING UNMIS HEAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001095 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2012 TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU US ER CD LY SUBJECT: S/E NATSIOS MEETING WITH ACTING UNMIS HEAD ZERIHOUN KHARTOUM 00001095 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Charge Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In a July 13 meeting with Special Envoy Natsios, CDA Fernandez and others, UNMIS Acting Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Taye-Brooke Zerihoun stressed the need to focus on supporting the CPA, which was still vulnerable despite significant progress in some areas. SAF withdrawal from the south was about two-thirds complete, he said. The A/SRSG characterized the NCP as split internally on several issues, including Abyei and Darfur. He advocated creating a new, smaller international contact group on Darfur, comprised of the P-5 and a few regional actors. The A/SRSG also cited progress with AU/UN integration in Darfur. UNMIS Deputy Force Commander Spanislaus Tembo was also present. End summary. -------------- -- TWO YEARS AFTER THE CPA, PROGRESS IN SOME AREAS -------------- -- ¶2. (C) During the meeting, Zerihoun repeatedly stressed the importance of implementing and monitoring the two year-old Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Darfur had "too many minders," he said, and the CPA was the cornerstone for any political settlement in Sudan. CPA does not get the attention it deserves from the international community because of Darfur. Despite all its problems, Zerihoun said, the CPA was still intact, and parties were cooperating even though a confidence gap still remained. Eighteen of the nineteen issues being considered by the Executive Committee had been resolved, with the exception of Abyei. The issue of other armed groups (OAGs) was an example of the "signficant progress" made on some CPA-mandated provisions, he said. OAGs present in Southern Sudan before the CPA had been largely integrated into the SPLA, though there were still hold-outs in the transitional areas. ¶3. (C) Discussing Abyei, the S/E asked Zerihoun whether he thought anyone would agree to a "oil for land" solution, with the north getting the oil revenues in exchange for the south getting the boundaries it wanted. Zerihoun was doubtful, saying that a very vocal minority in the SPLM used Abyei as a symbol of the rights of southerners and that if they �00A;compromised on this point, "everything else was at risk." CDA pointed out that Deng Alor had also suggested this idea a few weeks prior, but since then the discussion had largely back-tracked. Zerihoun characterized discussions on Abyei as taking place on three disparate levels: Mustafa Osman Ismail and Deng Alor at the technical level; Taha and Riek Machar at the Executive Committee level, which the NCP didn't favor because Taha refused to push the party line; and Pagan Amon and Nafie Ali Nafie at the political level. Zerihoun agreed with S/E that there was a real power struggle between Nafie and Taha, which also threatened any progress on Abyei. Taha's position seems to be steadily eclipsing even though he is popular in the National Congress Party (NCP) rank and file. -------------- SAF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SOUTH -------------- ¶4. (C) Zerihoun said that UNMIS had verified a sixty-six percent withdrawal of SAF forces from Southern Sudan, from a declared total of 46,000 troops. He also said that the SAF claimed they had unilaterally withdrawn some 10,000 of the remaining third, with approximately 6,000 troops still deployed in the South. Of those, the SAF said that they would provide 3,500 to the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs),and would withdraw another 500 out of "goodwill." Zerihoun pointed out that according to the CPA, the SPLM was not required to withdraw its troops (generally in the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile areas) until six months after the JIUs were deployed. ¶5. (C) S/E told Zerihoun that during his visit to the south, he heard fears of war breaking out again. Zerihoun said that while he didn't think either the north or south were preparing for war, they still didn't trust each other. If the CPA faltered, he said, the northern government would not want to reoccupy the south, but would instead return to the transitional areas and activate the OAGs who still remained there. Zerihoun also said that the only way for the NCP to stay in power was in a state of systematic, organized chaos. In any other environment, they would be pushed out of power KHARTOUM 00001095 002 OF 002 by opposition parties. -------------- NIGER/CHAD ARABS BEING SETTLED ON FUR LANDS? -------------- ¶6. (C) S/E also raised the issue of Arabs from Chad and Niger -- mostly from Musa Hilal's tribe -- moving into Wadi Salih in West Darfur, allegedly with the Sudanese government's assistance. Zerihoun said that such a movement would almost certainly need to have been organized by the government, and that UNMIS had also been receiving "persistent" reports of such a resettlement. He also noted that the question of transit paths had to be raised, and wondered whether they had been expelled by their countries, or pulled in by Sudan. -------------- NCP ON DARFUR, AU/UN ROADMAP -------------- ¶7. (C) On Darfur, S/E asked Zerihoun whether he thought the NCP actually wanted a political settlement. Only on their terms, Zerihoun said, and they would never agree to a decentralization of power. Darfurians themselves were wary of a negotiated settlement with the current regime, he added. Zerihoun further noted that as IDPs recognized that their political leaders didn't represent them or their major concerns -- security and land, not power-sharing -- they were beginning to organize themselves within the camps. Zerihoun also told S/E that UMMIS was conducting a profile of IDPs in the camps in Darfur. The preliminary assesment showed that around seventy percent were Fur, with Massalit and Zaghawa also represented in relatively high numbers. ¶8. (C) Turning to the AU/UN Roadmap, S/E expressed his displeasure with the special envoys' position towards the CHD initiative. The Roadmap was too broad, he said, and the UN was not demonstrating real leadership in pushing it forward. Zerihoun said he thought that the CHD initiative was a "victim of scheduling," and that the split between commanders in the field and the movements' political leadership had grown too wide. Zerihoun said that the AU and UN were trying to bridge that gap, and that he was travelling to Asmara later in the afternoon to ask the political leaders there to define their relationship with their commanders in the field. Zerihoun did think that the CHD, and other professional mediators, would have a role in the "second and third" phases of the Roadmap; the UN was planning for a small core Secretariat, he said, augmented by external negotiators. SIPDIS Zerihoun also noted that the UN had alloted 74 staff positions during the negotiations phase, most of which would be administrative. ¶9. (C) During the pre-negotiations phases, Zerihoun said he imagined taking a piece of paper and dividing it into three columns: DPA provisions that non-signatories could agree with; DPA provisions that non-signatories did not agree with, but on which they could negotiate; and redlines. When S/E pressed him on a timeline, Zerihoun only said that he thought negotiations could take place before year's end. Zerihoun also advocated creating a "contact group" consisting of the P-5, AU, UN, Chad, Eritrea and Libya; he suggested that the S/E raise this idea at the upcoming Tripoli meeting. The contact group could be supported by a "friends" group consisting of other donor nations, he said. ¶10. (U) SE Natsios did not have the opportunity to clear this message. ¶11. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. FERNANDEZ