S/E NATSIOS VISIT TO NORTH DARFUR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001091 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AND S/CRS NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU TAGS: USAU ET SUBJECT: S/E NATSIOS VISIT TO NORTH DARFUR ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In a July 9-10 visit to El Fasher, North Darfur, Special Envoy to Sudan Andrew Natsios, accompanied by CDA Alberto Fernandez and others, met with representatives from the AU and UN, IDP camps, civil society groups and the local branch of the Umma Party. He learned of the challenges facing AMIS in maintaining the ceasefire, potential challenges facing the deployment of the Hybrid, efforts to undermine international efforts toward peace, and some of the major concerns Darfurians hope will be addressed in future peace talks. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) During a July 9 informal dinner with international Ceasefire Commission members including Deputy Force Commander Rurangwa (Acting Chairman),CFC 2nd Vice Chair BG Roques (EU), CivPol Commissioner Tsiloane, AU observer Col. Waswa, and UN observer LTC Vindheim, Natsios discussed of some of the bureaucratic, financial and logistical challenges facing the CFC and the ceasefire itself. -------------- POLITICAL VOID IN DARFUR, DELAY IN CONSTRUCTION FOR HYBRID -------------- ¶3. (SBU) On July 10, S/E met with Acting UNMIS Head of Office Miguel Martin and UNDSS Willie Harrison. Martin said that population displacement in Darfur remains a big problem and that while NGOs would like to open new camps, the GOS refuses and instead claims that there are no problems and that people are ready to return. He said the top problems the camps face are lack of water, the omnipresence of weapons, increasing alcoholism and petty crime. ¶4. (SBU) Regarding progress toward the Hybrid, Martin lamented that DOS contractor PAE had still not finished the necessary infrastructure and it would cause a delay. He said that the 100-tent UN area near PAE's LOB in El Fasher had taken months and was still not ready. Until it is, he said the remaining light support package (LSP) soldiers would not deploy from Khartoum. Martin also mentioned that he believed Joint Special Representative Adada would live in Khartoum, although they were preparing a residence for him in El Fasher. He mentioned that the "joint" part of Adada's title was potentially confusing, as his duty of care could fall under the AU's or the UN's responsibility. ¶5. (SBU) Speaking to the political situation, Harrison said there appeared to be a political void in Darfur. There are a lot of field commanders, he said, but they hadn't been able to unite. JEM appeared ready to talk peace, but also has a well-developed propaganda machine. Harrison welcomed the CHD effort to reunify SLA/M, but said the GOS was still very actively engineering groups to withdraw from the DPA (i.e. either paying them off or creating new supposed groups) and bombing non-signatory areas. The Hilif bombing two weeks ago, for example, targeted no military but rather destroyed livestock, displaced people and thereby reduced support to rebel groups there. ¶6. (SBU) Harrison noted that many non-signatories are actually non-factors on the ground as real military forces since they command few soldiers or resources. He believed that, despite defections, Minni Minawi still has the largest single "rebel" force, with about fifty vehicles under his control. -------------- CIVIL SOCIETY STRESSES POWER SHARING -------------- ¶7. (SBU) S/E then met with Mohamed El Sadig Adam Abdalla, the Darfur Forum's Outreach and Information Officer and a Popular Congress Party leader in North Darfur, as well as Omar Hamid, the Darfur Forum Officer responsible for Native Administration Affairs and a Umma Party member. Both said they felt that the GOS' arming of different tribes has "destroyed the social fabric of Darfur," and said that only by "fixing" Khartoum (politically) could Darfur be solved. They stressed that true power sharing, in which Darfurians had an increased role in governance was a key to the solution, and said they had high hopes that the UN would be able to stop the GOS' aggression. They lauded former governor and general Ibrahim Suleiman (currently in Cairo) as an important figure that could be helpful in the political process. ¶8. (SBU) The two men also lamented that the conflict has fundamentally changed the livelihoods of many tribesmen (i.e. from pastoral to armed partisan) that could prove impossible for them to turn back from. At the same time, they expressed some hope that they saw signs of Arab tribes turning away from the government, even though they have now come to depend on government jobs for their economic survival. -------------- NAFIE RESETTLING NIGER/CHAD ARABS IN DARFUR KHARTOUM 00001091 002 OF 002 -------------- ¶9. (SBU) In a subsequent meeting, Zahra Abdulnaim, also an Umma Party member and an attendee of the DPA negotiations, said that the NCP regime in Khartoum has manipulated the ignorance and illiteracy of Arab tribes, given them arms and ammunition, and tempted them with more land if they manage to defeat rebel factions. Now many of these former "Janjaweed" have been recruited under the name "Border Guard" or "Camel Rider Police". Also, within the last 3-4 weeks, she alleged that Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie resettled 17-27,000 members of the Arab Mahameed tribe originally from Niger/Chad to Wadi Salih in South Darfur State. Nafie supposedly led a team who stayed over one week in Wadi Salih to issue these Arabs official papers and documents. The land they are supposed to have been resettled on was originally Fur land. -------------- IDPS REITERATE SECURITY FEARS -------------- ¶10. (SBU) In his final meeting, the S/E met IDP representatives of the three camps surrounding El Fasher: Abdulbasit Mohamed Adam, a Fur Umda from Al Salaam camp, Hawa Abdulla Adam Mohamed, a Fur female from Abu Shouk, and Hassan Assad Rasheed Kanan, a Zaghawa Umda from Zam Zam. All three agreed that security was the main problem they faced. In many cases, government or government-backed forces were responsible for assaults and rape against IDPs. Meanwhile, AMIS has no authority to arrest anyone guilty of such crimes. ¶11. (SBU) As for peace prospects, the leaders said ninety percent of the IDPs in the camps support SLA/AW because he was the one at the Abuja talks who insisted on individual compensation. They said Minni's popularity now is not more than two percent in the camps. For that reason, they recommend negotiations with JEM and SLA/AW and stress that it is not essential to include all the factions' leaders because some of them have no clout in the field. The leaders stressed three priorities to restore peace and fix the DPA: 1) Security; 2) Recovery and Rehabilitation; and 3) Compensation. Like many IDPs in Darfur, they seem to have dangerously inflated expectations from the coming of the Hybrid and from a political process yet to be fully defined. ¶12. (U) S/E Natsios' staff has cleared this cable. FERNANDEZ