SUDAN OFFICIALS DIFFER ON DARFUR PKO, POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 001090 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2012 TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU US ER CD LY SUBJECT: SUDAN OFFICIALS DIFFER ON DARFUR PKO, POLITICAL PROCESS IN MEETINGS WITH SE NATSIOS KHARTOUM 00001090 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: CDA A. Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) ON July 12, Special Envoy Natsios met separately with Foreign Minister Lam Akol, Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie, and Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs (and UN/AU hybrid negotiator) Mutriff Siddiq to discuss deployment of the hybrid peace-keeping force and bolster UN/AU efforts to achieve a comprehensive political settlement to the crisis in Darfur. Indicative of continuing tensions within the National Congress Party (NCP),government interlocutors offered conflicting views ON necessary next steps ON the hybrid in the UN Security Council. While seeking Sudanese officials' thoughts ON advancing the political process, SE Natsios agreed that Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatory leaders remained an obstruction to peace. His interlocutors remained divided ON Eritrea's role in the peace process. Each of the officials denied or pled ignorance to widespread reports of the resettlement of foreign Arabs in Darfur, and Nafie virulently opposed U.S.-funded security sector transformation for the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA),claiming that this was not provided for in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Akol suggested a visit to Washington for Siddiq to ease the bilateral relationship. End summary. -------------- Mixed Messages ON UNSCR -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Meeting with Foreign Minister Lam Akol, Assistant to the President Nafie Ali Nafie, and Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Mutriff Siddiq ON July 12, SE Natsios stated that the U.S. welcomed Sudan's acceptance of the UN/AU hybrid peace-keeping force for Darfur but urged that Sudan FOLLOW through fully with its commitment to allow deployment. The U.S. was concerned that Sudan's allies in the UN Security Council would "play games" with the language of the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR). SE Natsios urged quick action in the Council and warned against Sudanese delays. He asked officials for their views of the UNSCR draft, which the Government had just received. ¶3. (C) Akol commented that "the kind of language used by the British drafters is divisive to say the least." The UNSCR should look forward not backwards. It should avoid condemnation of past Sudanese Government actions and instead "tell us what we should do." A narrowly defined Chapter VII resolution was "not a big problem for us," said Akol. UNSCR 1591 included Chapter VII language, and "you cannot have a peace-keeping operation that can't defend itself." CDA Fernandez clarified the Sudanese Government position as objecting only to language that put the Sudanese Government "on the defensive," to which Akol agreed. (Note: In a press conference following his meeting with Akol, SE Natsios welcomed Sudan's agreement to the UN/AU hybrid and said it was "important that the Sudanese Government facilitate its implementation urgently." End note.) ¶4. (C) Nafie objected to any resolution that contained language beyond the June 12 Addis Ababa agreement among the UN, AU, and Sudan. "We will abide by that agreement, which was a compromise." According to Nafie, Sudan opposed UNSCRs 1591 and 1706 and would not accept Chapter VII language. (Note: Following the meeting with Nafie, the MFA Director of the Americas Department told CDA that Nafie's comments were a "personal opinion" and did not reflect the official position of the Government. This was also implied by Siddiq, who took a more nuanced view toward the resolution. End note.) ¶5. (C) The Government has convened an inter-agency committee staffed by those present in Addis Ababa to study the text more closely, and Siddiq, an architect of the June 12 agreement among the UN, AU, and Sudan, had just spoken with the UK Ambassador in Khartoum about the draft. Siddiq offered preliminary concerns ON the text -- that it overreached with references in the preamble to earlier "irrelevant" UNSCRs and that language ON a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration was intermingled with a Chapter VII mandate. Although clear that the Undersecretary considered it to be a KHARTOUM 00001090 002.2 OF 004 less-then-ideal draft, he noted that "the essence will be manageable if there is will" to act ON Sudanese requests for corrections. Siddiq asserted that a broadly defined Chapter VII mandate remained a non-starter. Siddiq reiterated the Government's flexibility without committing them to a specific decision at this point. ¶6. (C) In response to queries about command and control, Siddiq maintained that the command and control structure would be "clarified in the course of its implementation," claiming that Tripartite discussions since the June 12 Statement of Conclusions have already refined a structure in which the AU would "borrow" existing UN assets and referenced the UN's role as a backstop to the AU. Siddiq emphasized Khartoum's sensitivity to the need for UN oversight of the logistical and administrative components of a peacekeeping force, but stressed the AU should be left with "the rest" (military and protection duties) which served functions that were "less urgent." Siddiq underscored Khartoum's willingness to deviate from past requests for a peacekeeping force that was "solely African in character" should available resources preclude it, citing Egyptian, Pakistani, and Chinese assistance to the Heavy Support Package (HSP). -------------- -- Sudanese Officials Differ ON Political Solution -------------- -- ¶7. (SBU) Throughout his meetings, SE Natsios explained that the focus of his trip was the Darfur political process. The President and the Secretary believed that a near-term political solution to the crisis in Darfur is imperative. The elections in 2009 had the potential to either stabilize or destabilize the country, said the Special Envoy. If the Darfur crisis was not resolved beforehand, it would "become very difficult for Sudan." He acknowledged that the disunity and duplicity of the rebels were major impediments to negotiations. He reviewed recent U.S. efforts to pressure rebels to participate in the AU/UN-led political process, specifically the sanctioning of Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) leader Khalil Ibrahim and his personal attempts to persuade Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) leader Abdulwahid al-Nur to modify his stance toward the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). SE Natsios characterized a recent meeting in Paris with Abdulwahid as "difficult." Abdulwahid feared that any meeting of political leaders or commanders under the UN/AU would "remove him from power." Based ON his recent discussions in Darfur, SE Natsios said that core demands differed among the military commanders, the internally-displaced persons, and the political leadership. The USG supported the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue's (CHD) efforts to consolidate the remnants of the SLM in preparation for negotiations led by the UN/AU. He underscored the importance of avoiding large, formal negotiations, which would turn into a "circus" like the Abuja talks. To avoid a "bidding war" between the parties, the UN/AU could shuttle between the DPA non-signatories and the Government to resolve key issues prior to final, brief negotiations. Eritrea was not a neutral actor, and the Sudanese Government should push Asmara to adhere to the UN/AU-lead. ¶8. (C) Akol agreed that the Darfur crisis could only be resolved through a political solution and "that all mediation should converge ON the UN and AU." Prior to a recent meeting between Pekka Haavisto, the senior advisor to UN Envoy Jan Eliasson, and First Vice President Salva Kiir, Eritrean officials had "snuck in to see" Kiir and secure his agreement for Eritrean-led talks. Akol had later told Kiir that "he should be very clear that mediation is UN/AU." Akol agreed that Abdulwahid was an impediment to the peace process. "Eliasson and Salim's real problem is bringing the other side to the table," said Akol. "There are a lot of permutations." Some non-signatories were in Eritrea, others in Chad, still others in Europe. Abdulwahid was opposed to travel to Sudan for security reasons. Ahmed Abdulshafi refused to travel to Asmara. Ibrahim wanted talks only in East Africa or the "liberated areas" of Darfur. Akol suggested that the upcoming Tripoli summit tackle these difficulties and decide a venue for negotiations. ¶9. (C) Nafie asserted that "for the NCP, nothing could be more important than having a political agreement before elections." He asserted that the NCP "intends to sweep the KHARTOUM 00001090 003.2 OF 004 elections" and wanted to avoid a delay in the 2009 elections or the exemption of Darfer beCause of phe cgnflict Gh)leQ tle NCTsupnbtdd#Tld Q5d`N,ukPdesdiQeqQrwo Afkmmlt7QQR`LO) QnlQk`dgi `a\aQfwQ,&md.a`vh&Qwo5Q-c(Q#Qb$SwQh}xasQi Qhl(zCdzvj&Ma=kQQQeBv3pN>^Qc1 NpSQ\W9R]9FQy&L3dZxion would lead to the rise of more intransigent rebel leaders. "We will have another Khalil, another Suleiman Jamous, another Abdulwahid -- this is endless." He said that the UN/AU was recognizing the political leaders but neglecting the field commanders. Eritrea, however, had a dedicated team that traveled frequently to Darfur, which gained them more influence ON the movements than Chad or Libya (or Western mediators). Nafie suggested that the UN/AU and Eritrea reconcile their initiatives and said it would be counter-productive for Sudan to ask Eritrea to "stand down." ¶10. (C) Siddiq called for a convergence of initiatives under the UN/AU and firm leadership by the two bodies. "If the AU/UN political process does not START in August, it will never start," he maintained. Siddiq said he had passed the same message to Haavisto within the last two weeks. "There must be a deadline, an end-point," Siddiq continued, "by which engagement by others not under the AU/UN umbrella must cease." The DPA failed as a result of competition between regional actors. "Chad and Eritrea aborted the DPA, yet Khartoum paid the price." Siddiq argued for strict deadlines for external actors' "assistance" to resolve the conflict and for rebel groups who opt out of the final annex. Groups not adhering to an "annexed DPA" would be subjected to forced disarmament. Political opponents of an agreement were welcome to compete in the 2009 elections. Natsios noted U.S. attempts to contain Libya and constraints in U.S. engagement with Asmara. Siddiq acknowledged the difficulties posed by Eritrea, noting Asmara's initial collusion with Chad, and the fact it still harbored an "Eastern cell" of JEM. In light of ongoing difficulties facing the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement and dealing with a fractured Eastern Front, Khartoum was growing less enamored with Asmara's pressure tactics employed in the name of peace. "I have personally attempted to discourage this approach," Mutriff noted, expressing both skepticism about Asmara's chances for success and doubts as to Eritrea's motivations. "I think they have hit a wall," he said. -------------- -------------- Bilateral Relationship: Sudanese Officials to Visit U.S.? -------------- QEQQ[QQ6omeetings for Sudanese officials in Washington. Supportive of the idea, SE Natsios asked for names that he could "take back to Washington." Akol suggested Siddiq, "not to melt the ice but to let it float." SE Natsios noted that in principle this was a good idea. (Note: In response to questions from the Special Envoy about his willingness to travel to the United States, Siddiq said he hoped a future visit would garner meetings with Congressional leaders, particularly Congressman Donald Payne. End note.) -------------- Nafie Denies Resettlement of Foreign Arabs -------------- ¶12. (C) SE Natsios expressed U.S. concern at widespread reports of the resettlement of Chadian and Nigerien Arabs into Darfur under the supervision of the Sudanese Government. While noting the ethnic complexity of Darfur, Nafie virulently denied accusations of Government-organized resettlement. "Absolutely, this not even entertainable morally or ethically. As a Muslim, how could I allow this?" He acknowledged considerable cross-border migration of Chadian and Sudanese Arabs (who belong to the same tribes) but characterized the resettlement reports as a "plot" and the next effort by the West "to keep the pot boiling ON Sudan." Akol said he was unaware of the reports. -------------- KHARTOUM 00001090 004.2 OF 004 Objections to SST for the South -------------- ¶13. (C) Regarding recent public NCP complaints about U.S. assistance to the SPLA, SE Natsios said that the President and former Secretary Powell had agreed to support security sector transformation (SST) of the SPLA as part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). "This is not a secret," stated the Special Envoy, who said that the U.S. would welcome the opportunity to brief the Ministry of Defense and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) ON the program. He also repudiated recent press reports that the SST was a result of the U.S. wanting to distract Sudan from Darfur. Nafie angrily denied that a SST program was permitted under the CPA. "Whatever you call this now, you are definitely building an army for the South. This is obvious to us." Akol was supportive of U.S. interaction with the Ministry of Defense ON this issue. ¶14. (U) This message was cleared by SE Natsios' staff. ¶15. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. FERNANDEZ