FACILITATING SPLM DARFUR INITIATIVE: GAME PLAN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001083 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV AU UN SU SUBJECT: FACILITATING SPLM DARFUR INITIATIVE: GAME PLAN ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Confusion over the UN/AU roadmap and SPLM initiative persists despite face-to-face meetings between SPLM and UN/AU officials. Both the UN/AU and the SPLM have not communicated their plans clearly enough to each other to eliminate misunderstandings. As a result, the SPLM plans to hold its conference for Darfur factions and civil society beginning on/about August 6. The SPLM said that the UN/AU pushed for an earlier start date for the SPLM meeting because the UN/AU-led negotiations would begin in August. We will continue to find ways to reinforce the complementarity of the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, SPLM, and Eritrean efforts with the UN/AU roadmap. End Summary. - - - - - - - - - - UN/AU VISIT TO JUBA - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (SBU) On July 2, Pekka Haavisto, Senior Advisor to UN Envoy Jan Eliasson, and Sam Ibok, AU head of Darfur Peace Agreement implementation, met with First Vice President Salva Kiir. Dr. Achier Deng Akol, a member of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) Taskforce on Darfur was present in the meeting. In a later conversation with Poloff, Achier reported that Kiir had told Ibok and Haavisto that the UN/AU should continue with its plans. Achier, concerned that Ibok and Haavisto misinterpreted Kiir's remark, told them that the SPLM was still planning on hosting the Darfur rebel leaders and civil society some time in August. The UN/AU envoys pushed back and requested that the SPLM hold its meeting in July. Achier explained that this was not possible given the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue meeting beginning on/about July 16 and the anniversary of the death of John Garang. Ibok expressed concern about the timing of the meeting because the UN/AU wanted to begin negotiations in August. ¶3. (SBU) According to Achier, the UN/AU team wanted to clarify several other points. First, the UN/AU team members wanted to know if the inclusion of Lazarus Sumbeiyo was an attempt by the SPLM to replicate CPA negotiations. Achier explained that the Moi Institute was selected to facilitate the SPLM conference and Sumbeiyo was the head of the institute. Second, the UN/AU expressed concern about bringing in civil society because it is a mixed group containing Khartoum-backers. The SPLM explained that it is important for civil society leaders to have some buy-in to the process and for that they need to be heard in order to keep pressure on the rebel movements to negotiate in good faith. Third, the UN/AU wanted to know why the SPLM wanted to involve signatories and non-signatories. The SPLM said that the difference between signatories and non-signatories is not as clear as it once was. Achier said that a fourth issue the SPLM clarified was over the timing of the three phases. Ibok reportedly thought the phases would be held at different times. The SPLM explained that all three phases were part of one meeting. Fifth, the UN/AU said that the level of coordination with the SPLM was poor. The SPLM said that it was coordinating its efforts through regular contact with the AU and UN representatives in Juba. (Note: The AU does not have representatives in Juba. UN staff in Juba report to the UN Mission in Sudan, which does not fall under the leadership of UN Envoy Jan Eliasson or AU Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim, who are responsible for the UN/AU political process on Darfur. End note.) - - - - - - UN/AU VIEWS - - - - - - ¶4. (SBU) In a meeting with donors on July 4 in Khartoum, the UN/AU understood Kiir's comments to mean that the UN/AU and SPLM should proceed on separate paths. Haavisto and Ibok had thus concluded that the SPLM's current plan was outside the internationally-endorsed UN/AU roadmap. The UN/AU and the donors expressed concern that the SPLM's proposed meeting remained too broad and unrealistic. The UN/AU representative said that the SPLM had done little to reach non-signatory field commanders in Darfur, despite UN/AU efforts to facilitate contact. Fearing that the SPLM initiative would fail, the UN/AU had proposed to Kiir that the SPLM host a smaller meeting of the faction leaders of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM): Abdulwahid al-Nur, Ahmed Abdulshafi, Ahmed Diraij, Khamis Abdullah, Sharif Harir, and Abdullah Yehia. Haavisto and Ibok had said that the meeting would give the SPLM a prominent yet effective role. They had offered UN/AU financial assistance and political support to ensure the attendance of the SLM leaders. Kiir had declined the offer, according to the UN/AU representative. ¶5. (SBU) The UN/AU pointed out that it was important for donors to consider whether support for the SPLM initiative was important enough to delay progress on the UN/AU roadmap as the SPLM did not seem interested in coordination with the UN/AU and was supportive of KHARTOUM 00001083 002 OF 002 Eritrean versus UN/AU mediation in the negotiations. (Note: Achier denied that the SPLM was supportive of Eritrean mediation and said the SPLM planned to send the rebel movements to UN/AU-led negotiations. In previous conversations with U.S. officials, other SPLM leaders, including Kiir, have favored Eritrean-led negotiations. End note.) The UN/AU planned to announce the end of the "convergence phase" of the UN/AU roadmap during the upcoming summit in Tripoli and would then begin preparations for negotiations. The first step would be the meeting of six SLM leaders at the end of July. - - - - - - - - U.S. GAME PLAN - - - - - - - - ¶6. (SBU) The two read-outs from the UN/AU-Kiir meeting indicate that differences between the UN/AU and the SPLM initiative continue. Our primary focus is to reinforce what appears to be "forced harmony" between the SPLM and the UN/AU for now. We will continue to urge the SPLM to recognize the UN/AU lead on the roadmap and the Darfur negotiations. In addition, we will stress the complementarity of the various efforts, including the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, the SPLM, and Eritrea. ¶7. (SBU) This strategy is particularly important in light of the need to give the rebel movements consistent messages to keep them on the road to UN/AU-led negotiations. It is essential that potential spoilers, such as Abdelwahid and Khalil Ibrahim, cannot shop around for venues or patrons. ¶8. (SBU) Finally, we need greater specificity on the UN/AU roadmap. This clarity is essential for closing the potential loopholes that the Khartoum Government, which while not necessarily opposed to the negotiating process, can exploit to subvert it. FERNANDEZ