DARFUR: IMPROVING AMIS UNDER AGWAI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001060

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU UN SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: IMPROVING AMIS UNDER AGWAI

REF: KHARTOUM 01043

Classified By: CDA A. Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
Summary and comment
--------------


1. (SBU) With the arrival of the new AMIS force commander,
the international community has the opportunity to strengthen
the security provisions of the DPA to increase stability on
the ground. U.S. leadership could lead to substantive
improvements in the operation of the Cease-fire Commission
and Joint Commission, the provision of non-military
logistical support to the DPA signatory to stem the breakdown
in the movement and decrease attacks on AMIS and NGOs, and
the establishment of an effective Security Assessment Team.
Throughout, we must press Agwai and the AU leadership to
remain focused on targeted, realistic steps that can bolster
his credibility and forestall the further deterioration in
AMIS operations in the period before the deployment of the
UN/AU hybrid peace-keeping force. The Embassy will host a
meeting with the AMIS leadership and key donors to build
momentum for these goals, which could then be reinforced
through discussions in Addis Ababa. End summary and comment.

--------------
Agwai's Arrival an Opportunity for Change
--------------


2. (SBU) The arrival of Gen. Martin Luther Agwai to Sudan on
July 2 to serve as force commander of the African Union
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) (and ultimately of the UN/AU hybrid
peace-keeping force in Darfur) presents an opportunity to
strengthen the security provisions of the Darfur Peace
Agreement (DPA). Given the time-frame for deployment of the
UN Heavy Support Package and the hybrid operation,
improvements of crucial security provisions in the near term
would bolster Agwai at the beginning of his tenure. The June
25 to 28 conference hosted by the AU (reftel) provided a
forum for discussion of specific steps to improve the
security environment.


3. (SBU) Three principal ideas to improve security
arrangements emerged from the conference. In the coming
weeks, the USG can exert leadership in Khartoum and Addis
Ababa to: 1) enhance the operation of the Cease-fire
Commission (CFC) and the Joint Commission, 2) facilitate the
delivery of non-military logistical support to the DPA
signatories, and 3) establish an effective Security
Assessment Team (SAT) to balance the co-opted Security
Arrangements Commission. Within the next week, the Embassy
will convene a meeting of the AMIS leadership and key donors,
including the UK, EU, Netherlands, and Canada, to build
momentum for these proposals and develop specific action
plans.

--------------
Enhancing the CFC and JC
--------------


4. (SBU) Delegates to the recent conference concurred that
the relationship between the DPA signatories and AMIS has
deteriorated in recent months as a result of attacks on AMIS
forces that were attributed to the SLM, the reduction in the
monthly subsistence allowance (MSA) for cease-fire
representatives, and personal animosity between SLM leaders
and the former AMIS Force Commander. This deterioration has
inhibited the effectiveness of the First Chamber of the CFC,
leading at one point to a suspension of SLM participation.
While the SLM now participates at the headquarters level, its
participation in the sectors fluctuates. Conference
participants suggested that Agwai use his arrival to address
the reasonable complaints of the SLM and build confidence
between AMIS and the movement.


5. (SBU) One important element is the renewal of AMIS
operations in SLM-areas, which was largely suspended after
the killing of five AMIS soldiers in Umm Barru and the theft
of 13 AMIS vehicles in Labado. Renewed operations would ease
information-gathering for CFC investigations and serve as a
catalyst for renewed cooperation between the SLM and AMIS.
Given the breakdown within the SLM command, Agwai will have
to work adeptly with SLM area commanders. An enhanced AU
political presence in Darfur would be an important resource.
Assignment of technical experts, such as those on legal
affairs, to the staff of the Force Commander/CFC chairman

KHARTOUM 00001060 002.2 OF 003


would also increase the level of professionalism in the First
Chamber and during CFC investigations. AU/AMIS would also
benefit from local Darfuri non-partisan expertise on an
advisory basis.


6. (SBU) A dispute on sector-level representation has
undermined the Second Chamber of the CFC. Both the NCP and
the DoCs have taken maximalist positions: the NCP opposes any
sector-level representation while the movements demand
representation in all sectors. Conference participants
suggested that AMIS, under Agwai's leadership, broker a
compromise that would allow DoC representation at the
sector-level in areas where the DoCs have forces on the
ground. The international community could support Agwai by
pressing for acceptance of this compromise with the NCP and
the movements.


7. (SBU) The Joint Commission has ceased to function,
according to AMIS representatives at the conference. The AU
Secr etary of the Joint Commission characterized the last JC
meeting as "vicious" and said that the Joint Commission would
be "suspended indefinitely" unless it could be reformed.
Other participants noted that addressing the deficiencies in
the JC would require concerted effort in both Khartoum and
Addis Ababa. Preliminary steps could include a commitment to
hold the JC meetings on a monthly basis to lower the number
of CFC investigations for review, better coordination among
key participants prior to each JC in order to keep the agenda
focused, and agreement during the JC meeting on requested
follow-up action from the international community to
reinforce JC decisions with the Sudanese Government and the
DPA signatories.

--------------
Non-Military Logistical Support
--------------


8. (SBU) The conference provided new momentum for the
provision of non-military logistical support for the DPA
signatories. All of the delegates agreed that such support
was essential to shore up the SLM, stem banditry, and provide
an incentive to the DPA non-signatories to participate in the
political process. AU, UN, and international representatives
agreed that the reduction in the monthly subsistence
allowance (MSA) for cease-fire commission representatives had
been necessary but had also deprived the SLM of its main
source of income. Attacks in Darfur on AMIS and
non-governmental organizations, chiefly in the form of
car-jacking, had then increased. While it would take many
months for the UN/AU hybrid to deploy, the
criminality/security situation would worsen.


9. (SBU) The DPA provides for a Logistics Coordination
Committee (LCC) to manage delivery of non-military support.
While establishment of the LCC prior to disarmament of the
SLM would predate the sequence stipulated in the DPA, the NCP
representatives voiced no objection. Sam Ibok, the AU Head
of Darfur Peace Implementation, said that the non-military
logistical support model had been tested in Burundi to great
success. The German Government had coordinated donor
assistance, which was provided to area commanders through the
World Food Program (WFP). The commanders distributed food
and medical supplies to the fighters in exchange for their
arms. While the commanders retained the weapons in the event
of an emergency, more centralized control reduced rogue
attacks by low-ranking fighters. Ibok suggested that a
similar model could be successful in Darfur. (Note: In a
recent meeting with CDA Fernandez, outgoing AMIS Force
Commander Luke Aprezi said that provision of non-military
support for the SLM was essential to reducing violence in
Darfur. End note.)

--------------
Security Assessment Team
--------------


10. (C) With the exception of the NCP delegates, participants
in the conference expressed their view that the Security
Arrangements Commission under the Transitional Darfur
Regional Authority (TDRA) was not neutral because of the NCP
chairmanship. SLM representatives emphasized the importance
of an effective Security Assessment Team (SAT) as a
counter-weight. NCP officials continue to press for the
rapid creation of the SAT with a Sudanese chairman, contrary
to the DPA provision allowing for a foreign general. In
subsequent conversations with Poloff, SLM members said that
they had discussed the possibility of a Norwegian general as

KHARTOUM 00001060 003 OF 003


the SAT chair. Norway had been receptive to the idea, but
requested USG assistance to expedite the request.
FERNANDEZ