AFTER KHALIFA: WHO WILL BE THE GOS POINT MAN ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001044 SIPDIS SIPDIS AF FOR A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, SE NATSIOS NSC FOR PITTMAN, SHORTLEY ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2017 TAGS: KPKO PGOV PREL UN AU SU SUBJECT: AFTER KHALIFA: WHO WILL BE THE GOS POINT MAN ON DARFUR? Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d ) ¶1. (C) Summary: The death in a traffic accident of Presidential Advisor (and Darfur Peace Agreement negotiator) Dr. Magzoub al-Khalifa on June 27 has focused speculation that "the Darfur file" in the GOS is up for grabs. Confirmation of this came in the form of press reports in the local Arabic language media that President Al-Bashir's weekly cabinet meeting had focused on this very issue. Speculation has focused on Presidential Advisor Dr. Mustafa Othman Ismail or MFA Under-Secretary Muttrif Siddiq as likely choices but most insiders believe that the President will ratify a reality that already existed when Dr. Al-Khalifa was alive - that the Darfur File is shared among a range of senior advisors with equities and interests in the region, including diplomats Siddiq, Ismail, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and intelligence officials Nafie Ali Nafie and NISS Director Salah Ghosh. In the end, the regime elite as a whole has interests in Darfur policy as the issue's successful management is seen as intimately tied to regime survival. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Press reports on July 2 quoted Presidential Advisor and former MFA Mustafa Othman Ismail as saying that the Sudanese leadeship was studying in the next few days how best to select a replacement for Dr. Magzoub al-Khalifa "as far as the Darfur File is concerned". He added that they are looking at several persons or parceling out his responsibilities to several people but it will be hard to fill the tremendous vaccuum left by the former DPA negotiator's death. Speculation has focused on Dr. Ismail as a logical choice to be the "public face" of Darfur issues for the Khartoum regime, with MFA Under-Secretary Muttrif Siddiq, who negotiated the "final" Sudanese acceptance of the Hybrid Force in Addis on June 12 also mentioned. UN Rep Zerihoun praised Siddiq's professionalism and seriousness in Addis recently although he noted that "Muttrif is one of them" (an NCP hardliner). Ismail and Siddiq are similar in everything but age: polished English-speaking negotiators with reasonable demeanors but with Islamist credentials and acceptance within the small inner circle of the NCP ruling �00A;elite. Both have been mentioned as possible, low-key "special envoys" to be dispatched to Washington i nthe near future to try to clear the air with the Americans although leading businessman Muhammad Osman, who has good connections with both, noted that Ismail is reluctant to commit full-time to the Darfur issue because he sees it as a losing proposition. Whoever handles it will not actually have a total say in tXh"Qoqgave away too much and it would be worse for Ismail", he noted. Ismail reportedly is more interested in the "Arab League" file where he has often labored as the regime's pointman on improving relations with key Arab states alienated by Sudan's policies over the years. ¶3. (C) Businessman Osman noted that two major players on Darfur, Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie and NISS Director Salah Ghosh are unacceptable on an international level because they are "too controversial" (i.e. possibly indictable by the ICC) even though the regime intel apparatus has major equities in Darfur. Ghosh's elevation, "being kicked upstairs," to Minister of Interior has been reumored for months but has not happened. Dr. Nafie's role in Darfur was underscored on July 2 when "Al-Ra'i al-Aam" daily noted that Nafie may head a Sudanese delegation to meet with JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim soon in a regional capital to prepare the way for a possible JEM/NCP reconciliation under Libyan auspices. The same limitations that exist for intelligence officials is also true of the Sudanese Armed Forces. Their role is key in Darfur but they will work behind the scenes with whatever team of negotiators/imtermediaries the GOS designates. ¶4. (C) Businessman Anis Najjar, who has served as an occasional intermediary between the Sudanese leadership and Western embassies for over a decade, noted to Charge that what matters most to the regime is, of course, power in Khartoum and historically marginalized and ignored Darfur is important to them in so far as it threatens their hold on power. "The Darfur file is the regime file and they all have an interest in it," he emphasized. He noted that Al-Khalifa's hold on the issue had seemed increasingly KHARTOUM 00001044 002 OF 002 fractured in recent months anyway as DPA implementation seemed to unravel and both Nafie and Ghosh elbowed in on the ground. ¶5. (C) COMMENT: It is clear that political responsibility on Darfur will continued to be shared among the regime's inner circle. At the same time, the choice of either Ismail or Siddiq as a public face for Darfur negotiation issues such as DPA implementation and coordination with UN/AU special envoys would probably be a distinct improvement, at least as far as atmospherics are concerned, from the often obnoxious late Dr. Al-Kahlifa. The unlikely elevation of unabashed hardliners such as Dr. Nafie or Minister of State Ali Karti would send a different signal of continued intransigence. But in the end, Darfur policy in Sudan is not personal but part of the business of state no matter how polished or poised the next Sudanese lead(s) will be. END COMMENT. FERNANDEZ