DARFUR: MAINTAINING FOCUS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001043

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV AU UN SU ER LY
SUBJECT: DARFUR: MAINTAINING FOCUS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS

REF: KHARTOUM 01006

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Classified By: CDA A. Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (C) A recent African Union-sponsored conference on the
Abuja talks and the current Darfur peace process provided
insights into the direction of the UN/AU strategy. In the
lead up to a July meeting of special envoys in Tripoli,
Libya, the U.S. can exert leverage with the UN, AU, and key
governments to incorporate the lessons of the Abuja talks and
maintain focus in the peace process. The upcoming summit
will provide an opportunity to lay the foundation for an
inclusive and viable peace agreement by garnering
international support for: 1) The UN/AU as the lead mediators
in the Darfur negotiating process, 2) A two-stage UN/AU
process to prepare Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA)
non-signatories for negotiations, composed of a meeting to
re-connect the political and military elements of the Sudan
Liberation Movement (SLM) and a conference in Southern Sudan
sponsored by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) to
focus the political goals of the rebel movements and enhance
their internal capacity; 3) A clear statement that the
international community expects suppoJQQBC4dtion of separate agreements between the
Sudanese Government and individual rebel groups outside the
UN/AU process, and a review of DPA implementation concurrent
with the negotiations; and 5) A UN/AU negotiating structure
built on the concept of "shuttle diplomacy" versus formal and
protracted peace talks in a single venue. End summary.

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AU Conference on the DPA
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2. (C) A June 25-28 conference hosted by the African Union,
"The Darfur Peace Agreement and the Peace Process: The Way
Forward," provided a venue for discussion of the status of
the DPA and methods for strengthening the current effort to
bring the non-signatories to the agreement. Representatives
of the UN, AU, the National Congress Party (NCP),the SPLM,
the SLM/Minawi, the U.S., UK, Canada, and the Netherlands
attended. The goal was not to present government-approved
positions but to brainstorm ideas for a renewed political
process. Participants also engaged in substantive dialogue
on strengthening the security provisions of the DPA in
preparation for the arrival of Force Commander Martin Luther
Agwai, which will be reported septel. During the conference
and in discussions with the AU and UN chairmen of the Joint
Mediation Support Team (JMST),the outlines of a more
concrete UN/AU strategy for the political process emerged.

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UN/AU to Lead Negotiations
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3. (C) Reflecting on the experience of the Abuja talks,
participants acknowledged the importance of a clearly-defined
mediator for negotiations. While the Tripoli Consensus of
April had stipulated that all initiatives converge under
UN/AU leadership, Eritrea, the SPLM, and the Sudanese
Government had indicated that Asmara, not the UN/AU, would
mediate the peace process and lead the negotiation phase.
The NCP and SPLM representatives at the conference, however,
gave a clear endorsement of the UN/AU, and the remainder of
the participants urged Sudan to make this endorsement public
to weaken Asmara's claim to the mediation under its "regional
initiative" with Chad and Libya. The upcoming meeting in
Tripoli seems a natural venue to consolidate this endorsement.


4. (C) Many delegates urged the appointment of a single UN/AU
mediator to negotiate between the parties. Such a mediator
would need to maintain his neutrality while channeling
pressure on the Sudanese Government and the Darfur faction
leaders. Participants concluded that the mediator should
calibrate the role of the international community to ensure
that pressure at key points leads the parties to compromise
but that international involvement does not artificially
accelerate the process. The mediator should be adept at
setting deadlines to maintain momentum based on the situation
in Darfur rather than on external deadlines set by the

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international community. The mediator should also have
experience negotiating between governments and insurgent
movements, not just between two states.

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Reconnecting Political and Military Elements
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5. (C) Noting the splintering of the Darfur rebel movements
in the wake of the DPA, the UN and AU emphasized the need to
repair the rift between the political and military leaders of
the Darfur rebel factions as the first step to preparing for
negotiations. The meeting proposed by the Centre for
Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD) in Kenya was discussed at length.
The NCP representatives did not voice any objections to the
meeting and welcomed a consolidation of the rebel factions.
Participants agreed that the CHD meeting was the most
concrete step in the political process thus far and should
proceed in the near future. The goal should be that the
political leadership would represent the military wings of
the factions during the negotiating process to obviate the
need for direct participation by the field commanders. The
UN/AU reported that the commanders had expressed support for
this approach but cautioned the international community
against emboldening individual commanders, who might then
decide they too needed a seat at the table.

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Capacity Building for Negotiations
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6. (C) Many conference participants who had been involved in
the Abuja talks recalled the lack of capacity and
organization within the rebel movements, which had weakened
rebels' ability to advocate effective positions. The NCP
representatives said repeatedly that the non-signatories
should compose written position papers before new
negotiations begin. Despite the delay in the SPLM-sponsored
conference in Southern Sudan, many believed the SPLM, perhaps
with the assistance of experts from the UN/AU and INGOs,
would be the best-placed to prepare the non-signatories for
negotiations. The SPLM could bring to bear its own
experience negotiating with the NCP, help the non-signatories
to distill their agenda, and facilitate a greater
understanding of the intersection between the Darfur
movements' goals and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).
The SPLM could also underscore "the interim nature" of the
national political structure, which left open the possibility
of greater political change through the 2009 elections.


7. (C) Conference delegates anticipated that the rebel
movements would concentrate on the following issues:
compensation, obtaining a majority for the movements'
political parties in the three Darfur state legislatures, a
national vice president for Darfur, and a greater number of
seats in the National Assembly for Darfur representatives.
Though many movements' viewed the SPLM as having obstructed
their claims to compensation and a vice president during the
Abuja talks, the SPLM representative at the conference, State
Minister of Industry Timothy Tot, indicated greater
flexibility on these issues at present. (Note: While Tot is
a member of the SPLM, he appeared supportive of NCP policies,
and his flexibility on key rebel demands may indicate the
NCP's willingness to discuss these points. End note.) Other
conference participants suggested that the responsibilities
of the Senior Assistant to the President as established under
the DPA could be enhanced.

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International Leverage
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8. (C) Conference participants were united in their support
for targeted international pressure on those who obstructed
the UN/AU process. NCP representatives--backed by AU
participants from the Abuja talks--said that one-sided
pressure on Sudan had emboldened the rebel movements during
the discussions on the DPA and had encouraged intransigence.
For the second time in one week, UN and AU representatives
appealed for support from the international community to
press SLM leader Abdulwahid al-Nur to communicate with his
commanders and participate in the CHD meeting and the SPLM
conference. The UN/AU said if al-Nur and others refused to
attend these two meetings, they should face clear
international condemnation. They also requested frank
dialogue with France and Eritrea to pressure recalcitrant
actors. "If political leaders do not participate in the

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political process, it is a failure of the international
community," said one UN representative. A communications
expert at the conference urged the UN/AU to develop more
regular and transparent mechanisms, such as weekly status
reports, for information sharing on the progress of the
Darfur political process in order to mobilize the
international community.

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Framework for Negotiations
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9. (C) There was broad support among conference participants,
including among the NCP delegates, for a framework of
principles that the parties would agree to prior to
negotiations. These principles would include respect for
previous cease-fire arrangements from N'djamena and Abuja and
an end to separate agreements outside the UN/AU process. In
addition, several participants noted that the credibility of
the DPA had been undermined in the absence of an effective
oversight mechanism and recommended that further appointments
to the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA) be
postponed until DPA implementation could be reviewed. The
UN/AU could conduct such a review concurrent with the
political process. Through public "naming and shaming," UN
Envoy Jan Eliasson and AU Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim, backed by
the international community, would guarantee adherence to the
framework during negotiations.

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Shuttle Diplomacy
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10. (C) The conference attendees agreed that a negotiating
structure must be finalized soon. The UN and AU reiterated
their preference for a negotiating process along the lines of
the U.S.-proposed "shuttle diplomacy" approach. The UN/AU
said that a negotiating process beginning in August would
involve UN/AU mediation between the parties, which would
culminate in a brief, intensive negotiating session to
finalize the agreement. With an adept negotiating method,
the UN and AU must balance two, competing agendas: the NCP
and the international community's continued support for the
DPA and the rebel movements' demand for a new agreement. The
NCP participants resisted "changes" to the DPA, while a UN
representative explained that "there was no point to
negotiations if the Government is not willing to change the
agreement." Other participants noted that it would be
important for the international community--and the U.S. in
particular--to serve as a guarantor for the DPA to re-assure
the NCP that the agreement was being enhanced, not thrown
away.

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Comment
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11. (C) Based on the comments of the stakeholders present at
the June 25-28 conference, reaching agreement in Tripoli on
the five elements noted in this cable is possible. It is
essential, however, that we continue to emphasize a
realistic, sequenced approach to the peace process. At the
highest levels, we should encourage the UN and AU to remain
steadily on course with the points above, while allowing for
some flexibility in deadlines that may not be feasible. End
comment.


12. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
FERNANDEZ