DARFUR: MAINTAINING FOCUS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001043 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2012 TAGS: PREL PGOV AU UN SU ER LY SUBJECT: DARFUR: MAINTAINING FOCUS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS REF: KHARTOUM 01006 KHARTOUM 00001043 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: CDA A. Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) A recent African Union-sponsored conference on the Abuja talks and the current Darfur peace process provided insights into the direction of the UN/AU strategy. In the lead up to a July meeting of special envoys in Tripoli, Libya, the U.S. can exert leverage with the UN, AU, and key governments to incorporate the lessons of the Abuja talks and maintain focus in the peace process. The upcoming summit will provide an opportunity to lay the foundation for an inclusive and viable peace agreement by garnering international support for: 1) The UN/AU as the lead mediators in the Darfur negotiating process, 2) A two-stage UN/AU process to prepare Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatories for negotiations, composed of a meeting to re-connect the political and military elements of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and a conference in Southern Sudan sponsored by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) to focus the political goals of the rebel movements and enhance their internal capacity; 3) A clear statement that the international community expects suppoJQQBC4dtion of separate agreements between the Sudanese Government and individual rebel groups outside the UN/AU process, and a review of DPA implementation concurrent with the negotiations; and 5) A UN/AU negotiating structure built on the concept of "shuttle diplomacy" versus formal and protracted peace talks in a single venue. End summary. -------------- AU Conference on the DPA -------------- ¶2. (C) A June 25-28 conference hosted by the African Union, "The Darfur Peace Agreement and the Peace Process: The Way Forward," provided a venue for discussion of the status of the DPA and methods for strengthening the current effort to bring the non-signatories to the agreement. Representatives of the UN, AU, the National Congress Party (NCP),the SPLM, the SLM/Minawi, the U.S., UK, Canada, and the Netherlands attended. The goal was not to present government-approved positions but to brainstorm ideas for a renewed political �00A;process. Participants also engaged in substantive dialogue on strengthening the security provisions of the DPA in preparation for the arrival of Force Commander Martin Luther Agwai, which will be reported septel. During the conference and in discussions with the AU and UN chairmen of the Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST),the outlines of a more concrete UN/AU strategy for the political process emerged. -------------- UN/AU to Lead Negotiations -------------- ¶3. (C) Reflecting on the experience of the Abuja talks, participants acknowledged the importance of a clearly-defined mediator for negotiations. While the Tripoli Consensus of April had stipulated that all initiatives converge under UN/AU leadership, Eritrea, the SPLM, and the Sudanese Government had indicated that Asmara, not the UN/AU, would mediate the peace process and lead the negotiation phase. The NCP and SPLM representatives at the conference, however, gave a clear endorsement of the UN/AU, and the remainder of the participants urged Sudan to make this endorsement public to weaken Asmara's claim to the mediation under its "regional initiative" with Chad and Libya. The upcoming meeting in Tripoli seems a natural venue to consolidate this endorsement. ¶4. (C) Many delegates urged the appointment of a single UN/AU mediator to negotiate between the parties. Such a mediator would need to maintain his neutrality while channeling pressure on the Sudanese Government and the Darfur faction leaders. Participants concluded that the mediator should calibrate the role of the international community to ensure that pressure at key points leads the parties to compromise but that international involvement does not artificially accelerate the process. The mediator should be adept at setting deadlines to maintain momentum based on the situation in Darfur rather than on external deadlines set by the KHARTOUM 00001043 002.2 OF 003 international community. The mediator should also have experience negotiating between governments and insurgent movements, not just between two states. -------------- Reconnecting Political and Military Elements -------------- ¶5. (C) Noting the splintering of the Darfur rebel movements in the wake of the DPA, the UN and AU emphasized the need to repair the rift between the political and military leaders of the Darfur rebel factions as the first step to preparing for negotiations. The meeting proposed by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD) in Kenya was discussed at length. The NCP representatives did not voice any objections to the meeting and welcomed a consolidation of the rebel factions. Participants agreed that the CHD meeting was the most concrete step in the political process thus far and should proceed in the near future. The goal should be that the political leadership would represent the military wings of the factions during the negotiating process to obviate the need for direct participation by the field commanders. The UN/AU reported that the commanders had expressed support for this approach but cautioned the international community against emboldening individual commanders, who might then decide they too needed a seat at the table. -------------- Capacity Building for Negotiations -------------- ¶6. (C) Many conference participants who had been involved in the Abuja talks recalled the lack of capacity and organization within the rebel movements, which had weakened rebels' ability to advocate effective positions. The NCP representatives said repeatedly that the non-signatories should compose written position papers before new negotiations begin. Despite the delay in the SPLM-sponsored conference in Southern Sudan, many believed the SPLM, perhaps with the assistance of experts from the UN/AU and INGOs, would be the best-placed to prepare the non-signatories for negotiations. The SPLM could bring to bear its own experience negotiating with the NCP, help the non-signatories to distill their agenda, and facilitate a greater understanding of the intersection between the Darfur movements' goals and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The SPLM could also underscore "the interim nature" of the national political structure, which left open the possibility of greater political change through the 2009 elections. ¶7. (C) Conference delegates anticipated that the rebel movements would concentrate on the following issues: compensation, obtaining a majority for the movements' political parties in the three Darfur state legislatures, a national vice president for Darfur, and a greater number of seats in the National Assembly for Darfur representatives. Though many movements' viewed the SPLM as having obstructed their claims to compensation and a vice president during the Abuja talks, the SPLM representative at the conference, State Minister of Industry Timothy Tot, indicated greater flexibility on these issues at present. (Note: While Tot is a member of the SPLM, he appeared supportive of NCP policies, and his flexibility on key rebel demands may indicate the NCP's willingness to discuss these points. End note.) Other conference participants suggested that the responsibilities of the Senior Assistant to the President as established under the DPA could be enhanced. -------------- International Leverage -------------- ¶8. (C) Conference participants were united in their support for targeted international pressure on those who obstructed the UN/AU process. NCP representatives--backed by AU participants from the Abuja talks--said that one-sided pressure on Sudan had emboldened the rebel movements during the discussions on the DPA and had encouraged intransigence. For the second time in one week, UN and AU representatives appealed for support from the international community to press SLM leader Abdulwahid al-Nur to communicate with his commanders and participate in the CHD meeting and the SPLM conference. The UN/AU said if al-Nur and others refused to attend these two meetings, they should face clear international condemnation. They also requested frank dialogue with France and Eritrea to pressure recalcitrant actors. "If political leaders do not participate in the KHARTOUM 00001043 003.2 OF 003 political process, it is a failure of the international community," said one UN representative. A communications expert at the conference urged the UN/AU to develop more regular and transparent mechanisms, such as weekly status reports, for information sharing on the progress of the Darfur political process in order to mobilize the international community. -------------- Framework for Negotiations -------------- ¶9. (C) There was broad support among conference participants, including among the NCP delegates, for a framework of principles that the parties would agree to prior to negotiations. These principles would include respect for previous cease-fire arrangements from N'djamena and Abuja and an end to separate agreements outside the UN/AU process. In addition, several participants noted that the credibility of the DPA had been undermined in the absence of an effective oversight mechanism and recommended that further appointments to the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA) be postponed until DPA implementation could be reviewed. The UN/AU could conduct such a review concurrent with the political process. Through public "naming and shaming," UN Envoy Jan Eliasson and AU Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim, backed by the international community, would guarantee adherence to the framework during negotiations. -------------- Shuttle Diplomacy -------------- ¶10. (C) The conference attendees agreed that a negotiating structure must be finalized soon. The UN and AU reiterated their preference for a negotiating process along the lines of the U.S.-proposed "shuttle diplomacy" approach. The UN/AU said that a negotiating process beginning in August would involve UN/AU mediation between the parties, which would culminate in a brief, intensive negotiating session to finalize the agreement. With an adept negotiating method, the UN and AU must balance two, competing agendas: the NCP and the international community's continued support for the DPA and the rebel movements' demand for a new agreement. The NCP participants resisted "changes" to the DPA, while a UN representative explained that "there was no point to negotiations if the Government is not willing to change the agreement." Other participants noted that it would be important for the international community--and the U.S. in particular--to serve as a guarantor for the DPA to re-assure the NCP that the agreement was being enhanced, not thrown away. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Based on the comments of the stakeholders present at the June 25-28 conference, reaching agreement in Tripoli on the five elements noted in this cable is possible. It is essential, however, that we continue to emphasize a realistic, sequenced approach to the peace process. At the highest levels, we should encourage the UN and AU to remain steadily on course with the points above, while allowing for some flexibility in deadlines that may not be feasible. End comment. ¶12. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. FERNANDEZ