NEPAL: PRIME MINISTER KOIRALA FEISTY, FRUSTRATED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000988 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2017 TAGS: PGOV PTER KDEM MARR UN CH IN NP SUBJECT: NEPAL: PRIME MINISTER KOIRALA FEISTY, FRUSTRATED WITH MAOISTS REF: A. KATHMANDU 973 ¶B. BEIJING 3171 (NOTAL) Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) On May 17, Prime Minister Koirala expressed his frustration to the Ambassador with the Maoist failure to change their behavior since joining the Interim Government. Koirala said he was determined to enforce law and order and to crack down on the criminal activities of the Maoist Young Communist League. The Prime Minister stated that he had told Maoist chief Prachanda he would not meet him again until the Maoists returned seized land. The Ambassador voiced concern that Home Minister Sitaula's continued service as Koirala's chief negotiator with the Maoists undermined law enforcement efforts. The Ambassador also spoke of the disappointment he had recently encountered in Washington that, due to Maoist obstruction, UN verification of combatants in the cantonments had yet to begin. The Prime Minister said the Maoists did not want to hold a Constituent Assembly election either. He indicated he was looking at ways to satisfy Madhesi concerns so an election could be held. The PM and his Foreign Policy Advisor, Dr. Chalise, wondered whether the Chinese Government was providing the Maoists with support for the tougher Maoist position. The Ambassador countered that the Maoists might be reaching out to the Chinese, but stressed that both Beijing and New Delhi shared Koirala's worries about Maoist misbehavior. Koirala Calls Maoists "Irresponsible" -------------- ¶2. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador May 17, Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala described the behavior of the Maoists since joining the Interim Government as disappointing and "irresponsible." He admitted that he had expected their behavior to improve once they were in the Cabinet; it had not. The Ambassador noted the concern he had heard during his recent consultations in Washington that the Maoists were not acting in good faith, and cited the example of the Maoist Young Communist League (YCL) which was committing violent acts across the country. The Prime Minister agreed. Both inside and outside government, Koirala complained, the Maoists were acting contrary to their commitments to the other parties in the governing Eight-Party Alliance and to him personally. PM Determined To Crack Down -------------- ¶3. (C) An obviously agitated Prime Minister repeated several times that he planned to crack down on Maoist abuses. Koirala cited the case in Tulsipur (Dang District) on May 6, when his nephew Dr. Shekhar Koirala and Maoist senior leader Dr. Baburam Bhattarai had attempted to hold a ceremony to return to its rightful owners land that the Maoists had seized. YCLers and other Maoists had forced their way into the building, beaten up landlords, smashed furniture and windows and compelled Shekhar Koirala and Bhattarai to depart in haste. The PM said he had told Maoist chief Pushpa Kamal Dahal (aka Prachanda) and Bhattarai that they should feel humiliated that their own cadre had disrupted the event. If not, then it was obvious the Maoist leaders had "stage managed" the violence. The Prime Minister and his Foreign Policy Adviser, Dr. Suresh Chalise, also cited the cases of Kanchanpur in far western Nepal two days earlier (where YCLers attacked the Chief District Officer and vandalized his office) and Padma Kanya Women's College in Kathmandu in late April (where male YCLers broke the bones of female Nepali Congress students). Koirala Insists He Means Business -------------- KATHMANDU 00000988 002 OF 003 ¶4. (C) The Prime Minister stated that the police had some 50 YCLers in detention at present on various criminal charges. including attempted murder, arson and hooliganism. The Ambassador asked whether they would be charged or released without charges, as in the past. Koirala insisted they would be charged and stressed that he had issued specific instructions that if any of them were released without his specific permission, he would fire the official who released them. He added that, at the end of his conversation with Dahal and Bhattarai after the Dang incident, he had told them bluntly he would not meet with the Maoists again until they started meeting their commitments. Most importantly, the Maoists had to return seized land. The Maoists, Koirala noted, had been shocked by his vehemence, as had his own Nepali Congress ministers and representatives present. Home Minister Hampers Negotiations -------------- ¶5. (C) The Ambassador raised another concern: namely, that Home Minister Krishna Sitaula continued to be in charge of negotiations with the Maoists. This dual-hatting undermined Sitaula's ability to enforce the law. At first, the Prime Minister and Chalise balked and said that Peace and Reconstruction Minister Ram Chandra Poudel now had that portfolio. The Ambassador pointed out, however, that Poudel himself had told the Ambassador two days previously that Sitaula still had the lead with the Maoists. The Peace Minister was in charge of talks with the Madhesis and other agitating groups (Ref A). At that point, Koirala and his Foreign Policy Advisor conceded the Ambassador was right. The Ambassador noted that there was not much left to negotiate with the Maoists. Now was the time for them to meet their commitments. Verification Needs To Start -------------- ¶6. (C) The Ambassador remarked that, during his meetings in Washington, he had heard considerable disappointment that the second phase of UN-mandated arms management had not yet started. By blocking the process of verifying the identity of "combatants" in the cantonments, the Maoists were not only breaking an agreement with the other parties in the Government of Nepal (GON),they were also breaking an agreement with the United Nations and with the UN Security Council. The United States was a major funder of UN operations and had a direct financial stake in the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) and the UN-monitored arms management process. The Prime Minister and Chalise expressed appreciation for UNMIN chief Ian Martin's strong statement to the Security Council in early May and for his press release before his departure for New York which insisted on verification without any Maoist preconditions. The Ambassador noted that he planned to speak out on this issue and agreed, as Chalise urged, to encourage Martin to reiterate the point that verification had to begin. Election Issues -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador emphasized that, the sooner the GON declared a date for the Constituent Assembly election, the better. PM Koirala said that part of the problem was that the Maoists did not want to hold an election. They were not very popular and did not stand to do well. With respect to the Madhesis, the Ambassador stated, there appeared to be two principal election issues: the formation of a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the events of the Madhesi uprising in early 2007 and the establishment of a new Electoral Constituency Delimitation Commission. The PM responded that he told Madhesi Members of Parliament in recent one-on-one meetings that he was prepared to establish a Commission of Inquiry or probe commission. The challenge was to have the Commission do nothing that would further demoralize the security forces. Koirala and the Ambassador concurred that the process was most important. The results would not KATHMANDU 00000988 003 OF 003 necessarily have to be released prior to the election. The PM confided that he had told the Madhesi MPs he was "considering" establishing a new Constituency Commission. He told the Ambassador that he planned to do so. The challenge was to find someone reliable to head that Commission. His goal was that the boundaries of the constituencies be drawn in an inclusive way so those elected from the constituencies would have an expansive, not an ethnic or sectarian, approach to restructuring Nepal when they took their seats in the Assembly. Chinese Deus Ex Machina? -------------- ¶8. (C) Both the Prime Minister and his Foreign Policy Advisor wondered if what they perceived as a recent tougher Maoist line with the other parties was not the result of some form of support from the People's Republic of China (PRC). They were baffled otherwise to explain Maoist behavior when it was apparent that the public did not support them and that even Nepali "civil society" was divided, with many former supporters turning against them. The Ambassador cited recent reporting from Embassy Beijing (Ref B) that indicated the PRC remained concerned about Maoist abuses and reluctant to have senior-level contact with the Maoists until their conduct improved. It was certainly possible that the Maoists were reaching out to the Chinese, probably in an effort to counter increasing Indian pressure, the Ambassador added. New Delhi was very worried about Maoist violations of law and order. The Ambassador noted he would be meeting with the Chinese Ambassador soon. What was clear, the Ambassador remarked, was that the Maoists were struggling to figure out how they could get from one-quarter of seats in the Interim Parliament and the Interim Cabinet to their goal of total power. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Prime Minister Koirala appeared fed up and frustrated with his Maoist peace and coalition partners. We certainly hope he will crack down on their abuses -- of which the Young Communist League's daily outrages are only the most glaring example. Unfortunately, Koirala sometimes suffers from a surprising -- to us -- lack of confidence. Chalise particularly recited the usual refrain that the Prime Minister needed more support from the other major parties in the coalition -- the Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist Leninist and the Nepali Congress - Democratic. The PM himself bemoaned the difficulty of balancing his need to hold the Eight-Party Coalition together so the election could be held and his determination to enforce law and order. He and his Foreign Policy Adviser seemed genuinely struck when the Ambassador pointed out what appears to us to be obvious: that is, if Koirala enforces the law, the Maoists will have little choice but to stick with the peace process. The PM told the Ambassador that he had told Prachanda and the other senior Maoists that if they wanted to go back to the jungle, they were free to go. If they wanted to go back to India (where they spent most of the 11-year insurgency),he would hire a plane to fly them back. We will see whether the PM sticks to this tougher line. MORIARTY