UNMIN: HURRY UP AND WAIT ON PHASE II OF ARMS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000916 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR UN NP SUBJECT: UNMIN: HURRY UP AND WAIT ON PHASE II OF ARMS MANAGEMENT Classified By: Charge d' Affaires Robert Hugins. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) UN Mission in NEPAL (UNMIN) Political Advisor John Norris told the Charge May 7 that UNMIN was in "hurry up and wait" mode regarding the start of Phase II of the arms management process. UNMIN Chief Ian Martin had declared publicly May 1 that UNMIN was ready to begin verification of People's Liberation Army (PLA) "combatants" and had chided the Maoists for setting pre-conditions for the launch. However, Norris reported that negotiations continued between the ruling Nepali Congress (NC) Party and the Maoists over Maoist demands including compensation for cantoned personnel, improved conditions in the camps, and the establishment of a commission to undertake security sector reform. The Charge and Norris also discussed the need for a rehabilitation and vocational training/job creation plan for expelled combatants, a firm Constituent Assembly election date, and a comprehensive dialogue with Nepal's marginalized groups. Maoist Demands Stall Verification Efforts -------------- ¶2. (C) UNMIN Political Advisor John Norris told the Charge May 7 that UNMIN was in "hurry up and wait mode" regarding the start of verification of cantoned PLA "combatants." UNMIN had been ready to begin Phase II of the arms management process since mid-April, Norris said, but was waiting for the green light from the parties to proceed. Norris said discussions continued between the Prime Minister's Nepali Congress (NC) and the Maoists on preliminary Maoist demands such as compensation for cantoned personnel, improved conditions in the camps, and the establishment of the committee envisioned by Article 146 of the Interim Constitution for rehabilitation of Maoist Combatants and Army reform. (Note: UNMIN Chief Ian Martin issued a public statement May 1 that stressed that verification of Maoist combatants needed to begin immediately, reminding the Maoists that the UN did not recognize any pre-conditions for proceeding. End Note.) Maoists Accuse the Government of Failing in Camp Management -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) The UNMIN political advisor said the Maoists believed the Government of NEPAL (GON) had not lived up to its responsibilities vis-a-vis management of the PLA camps. 
They objected that the GON had failed to provide adequate water and sanitation and had not moved quickly to construct dwellings to replace the existing tents. He reported that the GON planned to build 1,000 units for 15 combatants each out of pre-fabricated sheet metal and bamboo that would hold up during the coming monsoon. However, the government had only piloted one "model home" thus far. Norris said UNMIN remained very concerned regarding camp conditions and had offered assistance multiple times, including engineers to assist in constructing more permanent structures. Norris reported that the Ministry of Physical Planning, led by a Maoist, might begin to take more responsibility for camp management. (Note: After the formation of the Interim Government on April 1, the new Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction assumed responsibility for the camps from the Home Ministry. End Note.) Norris complained that the bureaucracy did not understand what a deterioration in camp conditions meant for the peace process and political stability. Intra-Party Dynamics Thwart Progress -------------- ¶4. (C) Norris reported that internal dynamics within the dominant NC Party and the Maoists challenged peace process negotiations. The peace process had reached a period of entrenchment, Norris lamented, as fatigue kicked in on both sides. At a recent Maoist Central Committee Meeting, the Maoist leadership came under fire from party members and PLA commanders demanding that Maoist Chief Pushpa Dahal (aka KATHMANDU 00000916 002 OF 003 Prachanda) stop giving into the demands of the political parties, as the Maoists had "already given away too much." Similarly, Norris said, the NC was having its own internal leadership struggles; many of its leaders felt the Prime Minister had capitulated to the Maoists. Expulsion of Ineligible from Camps...Then What? -------------- -- ¶5. (C) The Charge asked Norris what would happen to the projected 15,000-plus Maoist combatants that were deemed ineligible to remain in the camps and released into the countryside. Norris said that expelled minors would come under the protection of the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and various other NGOs who were poised to assist in family reunification and rehabilitation. Transit centers, Norris said, were in place for these minors. In addition, discussion had begun regarding options for vocational training and temporary employment for expelled combatants, including a potential public infrastructure rebuilding program. Without an income generation option, he feared those expelled from camps could pose a security risk and a recruiting pool for Maoist militia, the Youth Communist League, and other armed groups. Comprehensive Security Sector Reform Efforts Needed -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Norris mentioned the Maoist militia, which was outside the current arms management scheme, posed an additional threat and a comprehensive look at reintegration options was needed to ensure all those outside the cantonments did not contribute to a further deterioration of security in the countryside. The UNMIN political advisor said Maoist leadership's openness to vocation training and infrastructure rebuilding options for former combatants represented a real "evolution" in their thinking. Norris said the debate over how to reintegrate former Maoist combatants was part of a broader issue: the need to look more holistically at security sector reform. That would include a discussion of how to address the NEPAL Army, which was twice the size of a peacetime force, defining a role for the Armed Police Force, and further promoting civilian oversight over the security forces. Threat of Jana Andolan III Maoist Pressure Tactic -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) The Charge asked what UNMIN had heard regarding the YCL threat to begin another people's uprising, or Jana Andolan III, in mid-May if the Maoist demand to abolish the monarchy was not met. Norris said the Maoists always seemed to ramp up pressure when it was "crunchtime" in the negotiation process. Norris instead suggested the Maoist threats were irresponsible public posturing. Firm Election Date Needed -------------- ¶8. (C) Norris shared the Charge's concern that the GON set a Constituent Assembly election date soon. Norris said the Election Commission had recommended November 22 or 23 following Nepal's Fall holidays. The UNMIN Advisor said the elements of democratic parties and some sitting Members of Parliament were "misbehaving." Threatened by the possibility of losing their seat, they were pushing to skip the Constituent Assembly Election and to turn the current Interim Parliament into the Constituent Assembly. The Charge and Norris agreed this would be a terrible turn of events for the peace process. The UN official highlighted that diplomatic pressure was needed to push back on the parties on this point. Dialogue with Marginalized Groups Necessary -------------- ¶9. (C) Norris highlighted the importance of the GON holding a series of roundtables with all the marginalized groups, instead of individual piecemeal talks with each. Norris said KATHMANDU 00000916 003 OF 003 the new Minister of Peace and Reconstruction, Ram Chamdra Poudel, could be empowered to facilitate such a dialogue. As a high-caste, "Brahman's Brahman," Norris thought Poudel might have the stature to make a deal stick but might not be seen as a credible convener by the marginalized groups because of his high-caste. Terai Wild with Conspiracy Theories -------------- ¶10. (C) Norris said UN personnel in Nepal's southern Terai had expressed heightened concern regarding the erosion of security across the region. The combination of armed wings of Madhesi rights groups, Maoists, and opportunistic criminals had created a complex security challenge. The UN Political Advisor said conspiracy theories abounded that India, the United States, and the Nepali Congress were backing anti-Maoist Madhesis. The Maoists were suspicious of the U.S., Norris said, having heard of the Ambassador meeting Madhesi People's Rights Forum's leader Upendra Yadav and rumors circulated that Madhesi training camps had been set up in India. Norris said it was becoming increasingly difficult to differentiate between legitimate Madhesi concerns regarding inclusion, and criminal elements in the Terai; there was no credible front for Madhesi rights. UNMIN at One-Third of Full Staffing -------------- ¶11. (C) Norris said that UNMIN had reached a little over one-third of total projected staffing levels (over 1,000 at full strength). The UN Mission would have a close to full contingent (155 of 186) of arms monitors by the week of May 14 and UNMIN's five regional offices had been stood up. The lagging area was civil affairs officers, with only two in country. The district election officers would also not be assigned until an election date was declared, Norris added. Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) UNMIN Political Advisor Norris seems to view the stalling of verification of the roughly 30,000 Maoist "combatants" as the responsibility of the Prime Minister's Nepali Congress, as the dominant party in the Nepali Government, and the Maoists. However, UNMIN Chief Martin has been clear publicly that the Maoists are the ones who need to be taken to account for the delay. Post agrees. Phase II must move forward immediately. We agree with Norris that camp management issues need to be remedied. We want to see Peace and Reconstruction Minister Poudel to retain control. Post sees eye-to-eye with Norris as well on the need for a rehabilitation and reintegration plan for expelled combatants, a firm election date, and a comprehensive dialogue between the GON and Nepal's marginalized groups. HUGINS