BRITISH AND INDIAN AMBASSADORS AGREE: NEED TO NAG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000856 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2017 TAGS: PREL PTER KDEM PHUM UN IN NP SUBJECT: BRITISH AND INDIAN AMBASSADORS AGREE: NEED TO NAG THE GON AND THE MAOISTS Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Indian Ambassador Shiv Shankar Mukherjee, British Ambassador Dr. Andrew Hall, and the Ambassador April 26 agreed that the Government of Nepal (GON) should set a date for a Constituent Assembly election and enforce law and order. The Maoists needed to be made aware that serious abuses in the run-up to an election would make it flawed, and the international community would hold the Maoists responsible. Mukherjee said that the Government of India (GOI) was pushing the GON to provide monetary incentives for the Maoists to reduce the numbers in the UN-monitored cantonments. Mukherjee also expressed concern about the King's recent use of the Nepal Army for a trip to an important Hindu temple. All three Ambassadors agreed that the GON needed to take an active role in bringing marginalized groups into a dialogue before the election. Need to Nag the GON and the Maoists -------------- ¶2. (C) Indian Ambassador Shiv Shankar Mukherjee asked British Ambassador Dr. Andrew Hall and the Ambassador April 26 to continue to press the Government of Nepal (GON) on two important issues. First, the GON needed to set a date for the Constituent Assembly election with a firm timeline for accomplishing important election tasks, such as completing constituency delineation and passing the election laws. Second, the GON needed to begin seriously enforcing law and order across the country to create a conducive atmosphere for the election. The Ambassadors also needed to make it clear to the Maoists that if they committed a large number of abuses in the run-up to the election, the international community would place the blame squarely on their shoulders and declare the election flawed. Hall added that the international community needed to inform the Maoists that an attempt to use their five ministries for purely partisan purposes could affect assistance to those ministries. Election Date Announcement Required -------------- ¶3. (C) Mukherjee stressed that it was important for the GON to declare the date for the election to the Constituent Assembly quickly to provide the people with a sense of the way forward and compel the parties to make decisions. Mukherjee opined that nearly 70 percent of the current members in the Interim Parliament would lose their seats in an election, so there was no incentive for them to push for the election. It was in the interest of the party leaderships not to hold an election at all. The Ambassadors agreed to press the GON on this issue. Cantonment Population To Be Cut In Half -------------- ¶4. (C) Mukherjee told Ambassador Hall and the Ambassador that the GOI wanted the GON to lower the combatant population in the UN-monitored Maoist cantonments to 15,000 (from the current level of over 30,000) by offering each combatant an incentive to leave -- payment of 3,000 Nepali Rupees (approx. USD 46) per month that he or she was in the camp. Mukherjee told the GON not to quibble about the amount of payoff, implying that the GOI would help come up with the money necessary. The Ambassador agreed that it was important to get the Maoists out of the camps and for the UN to begin the second round of verification. King's Use of NA Questionable -------------- ¶5. (C) Mukherjee expressed concern over the King's use of the Nepal Army (NA) as security for a trip to Dakshinkali, an important Hindu temple south of Kathmandu. The King's visit KATHMANDU 00000856 002 OF 002 occurred on April 24, Democracy Day, which celebrated the King's overthrow. Reports indicated that, during the ceremony at the temple, the NA had given the King a large honor guard and an NA band had played the old "royal" national anthem. Mukherjee worried that far-left and far-right forces in the country would try to put off the Constituent Assembly election indefinitely. The King knew that an election meant the end of the monarchy and could try to find a way to return to power. The Ambassador downplayed Mukherjee's concerns, noting the lack of support nationwide for King Gyanendra and repeating UNMIN Chief Ian Martin's opinion that the politically inept King was the "only person in Nepal pursuing a consistently republican agenda." Inclusion Will Be Key -------------- ¶6. (C) The Ambassador stated that a broadly inclusive dialogue was necessary to bring marginalized groups into the mainstream before the Constituent Assembly election. Mukherjee said that Speaker of the Interim Parliament Subash Nemwang was not doing enough to bring the groups to the table for dialogue. The Ambassador pointed out that newly appointed Minister for Peace and Reconstruction Ram Chandra Poudel was also attempting to bring the groups for talks with the government; a real conversation with the government might seem better than a discussion with the Speaker. All three Ambassadors agreed to press the GON to get serious about inclusion. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Mukherjee seemed to be trying to get buy-in from the U.S. and Great Britain on Indian policy in Nepal. It appears that all three countries are on the same page, at least on the need for inclusion, law and order, and a quick declaration of the date for the election. Although a reduction in the "combatants" in the Maoist cantonments would benefit the GON, which is hard-pressed to manage and support the camps, it is unclear where the "combatants" -- most of whom are new recruits or children -- would go when they left. Many suspect they would go to work for the Young Communist League, which is already stocked with bona fide People's Liberation Army fighters. The GON needs to solve the problem of the Maoist cantonments, but in a way that will not cause even more problems. MORIARTY