NEPAL: DIFFICULT TO HOLD ELECTION ON TIME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 000741 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2017 TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL KDEM NP SUBJECT: NEPAL: DIFFICULT TO HOLD ELECTION ON TIME REF: KATHMANDU 720 Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Peter Erben, Country Director for IFES Nepal, and Dominic Cardy, Country Director for the National Democratic Institute (NDI),told the Ambassador April 6 that holding the Constituent Assembly (CA) election by the proposed June 20 date would be difficult. Erben outlined the major technical obstacles to holding the election by June 20. Cardy emphasized that the realities on the ground in Nepal would make it even more difficult to hold a free and fair election. The Maoists had continued to intimidate the other political parties outside of the capital, even after joining the Interim Government. 75 Days: Possible, But Not Probable -------------- ¶2. (C) On April 6, Peter Erben, Country Director for IFES Nepal, told the Ambassador that an election in Nepal was technically feasible by June 20, but not very probable. Although elections had been held in other countries in less time, those other countries had the tools in place to hold elections before attempting such an accelerated timeline. It would be unwise to try to hold the election in Nepal within 75 days. There were six main obstacles to holding the election on time. Obstacle One: Legal Framework -------------- ¶3. (C) Erben pointed out that Nepal lacked a legal framework for holding the election. The Interim Government had been pushing the Election Commission to hold the election without passing the necessary laws for the Commission to accomplish its work. The Interim Parliament had already passed some uncontroversial laws, but the most important law was still sitting in the State Affairs Committee. This law, the so-called "Constituent Assembly Member Election Act," would deal with the issue of inclusiveness in the election, delineating how to ensure adequate representation of Madhesis, Dalits, women, and other marginalized populations. The Election Commission had recently passed a draft of the law to the Cabinet that spelled out percentages of seats to be allocated to the marginalized groups. The Cabinet had stripped all the language on inclusion of marginalized groups from the Bill before passing it to the State Affairs Committee. The State Affairs Committee was currently working to add language to mandate inclusiveness into the Bill, but it was unclear what would be the result. Furthermore, the Interim Parliament would have a chance to add language on inclusion into the Interim Constitution through the second amendment process. (Note: A second amendment will be necessary to change the date of the election, which was mandated in that Constitution to be held by June 14. End note.) Obstacle Two: Delimitation of New Constituencies -------------- --- ¶4. (C) Erben stated that the Interim Government planned to establish 30 new electoral constituencies before the CA election. A Constituency Delineation Commission had been formed to work out the details, but it was not clear it would make its final determination soon. (Note: Press reports indicate that the Maoists do not recognize the legitimacy of the Commission because it had been formed without consulting them and without their participation. End note.) The IFES country director explained that carving out 30 new constituencies would effectively redraw two-thirds of the country because the borders of all constituencies surrounding the new ones would also need to be redrawn. Moreover, the Interim Government planned to create 20 of the new constituencies in the Terai, and the unrest there made it even more difficult for the Commission to conduct the necessary fact-finding and complete its task. KATHMANDU 00000741 002.2 OF 004 Obstacle Three: Funding -------------- ¶5. (C) Erben said that the funding for the CA election was "incredibly opaque." The Election Commission had not yet made public a budget of election costs, although the figure was likely around USD 40 million. Donors had been holding back much of their support because the election date was not firm and the budget was not clear. The Commission had said it would get the money it needed from the Government of Nepal (GON),but the GON had not yet decided where that money would come from. Furthermore, the inability of the government bureaucracy to distribute the money quickly would make it difficult to hold the election on time. With an extreme timeline such as this, getting support into Nepal rapidly would be of the utmost importance. Obstacle Four: Voter Registration -------------- ¶6. (C) Erben lamented that the GON and the Election Commission had been ignoring the issue of voter registration; the success of the election would depend on it. The weather, migrant workers, temporary residents, and the unrest in the Terai were causing huge problems for voter registration efforts. Also, the Maoists had still not returned the voters lists they had stolen in January and February (and in some cases burned). (Comment: Sources at the Election Commission confirmed that the Maoists had stolen the only copy of voters lists from 11 municipalities -- including in Kathmandu itself -- and demanded that migrant workers and temporary residents be allowed to vote in the constituency where they were present on election day. This would presumably allow the Maoists to move their workers into districts where they did not have a stronghold to stack the deck for the election. End comment.) There was a fundamental flaw with the voter lists in Nepal, Erben continued; the public was never allowed to look at them. Voter lists were created, sent to the central authority, and then only returned to the district during the election. The public was never allowed to check them for inconsistency or fraud. This would likely lead the public to question the legitimacy of the registration process. Obstacle Five: Time -------------- ¶7. (C) Erben told the Ambassador that it was technically feasible to hold the CA election in 75 days, if the planning were done well. However, the Election Commission was a young commission and most of the people working there had never taken part in an election before. The Commission wanted and needed more time to prepare, but the Commissioners and their staff were being pressured by the political parties to speed up the process. Obstacle Six: Environment -------------- ¶8. (C) Erben stated that in many places in the world, IFES had been willing to set up not-so-good elections to help move the peace process along, adding that it might be possible to do the same here. The Ambassador bluntly stated that if the election led to a "peace process" that led to a totalitarian state that had bullied and cheated its way to state power, the U.S. would want no part in it. Erben agreed. Dominic Cardy, Country Director for NDI, stated that there was no indication that the Maoists were even attempting to build political support for an election in the countryside. They continued to use their strategy of intimidation and violence as political tools. The legitimate political parties had no political space in nearly eighty percent of the country; their party workers were in constant fear of the Maoists. The Maoist Young Communist League (YCL) was in control in many districts; even the police did not take action without asking the YCL's permission. Now that the Maoists were in the Interim Government, the YCL had been telling people that they were government actors now, and people had to do what they said. The situation was in no way conducive to a legitimate election. KATHMANDU 00000741 003 OF 004 Postponement Necessary -------------- ¶9. (C) Both Erben and Cardy agreed that the Election Commission and the GON needed more time to create an environment for a free and fair election. Otherwise, the Maoists could co-opt the election to gain state power. The Ambassador worried that, if the election were put off too long, the GON would have no incentive to ever hold it. The parties had already learned that they could amend the constitution whenever they wanted, so why would they need a Constituent Assembly to write a new one? Erben and Cardy agreed, stating that if the election were put off until the Fall, the GON would still have to tackle each of the issues above immediately to make the polls work. Cardy worried that the Interim Government would wait until a month before the new election date to deal with any of these problems, creating the same situation all over again. Maoist and Army -- Future Coalition? -------------- ¶10. (C/NF) Cardy ventured that, ideology aside, the Maoists and the Nepal Army (NA) had a simple basis for a coalition -- both of them hated and mistrusted the political parties. The NA might be willing to allow the Maoists to control the other political parties if the Maoists promised not to touch the NA's command and control structure. The Maoists might be willing to allow the NA to remain the protector of the country, so long as the Maoists were allowed to sideline the parties and pursue their extremist political agenda. (Comment: We doubt the NA trusts the Maoists enough to enter into such a pact. End comment.) Parties Need To Publicly Complain -------------- ¶11. (C) Cardy stated that the political parties were making their own lives more difficult by not publicly criticizing the Maoists. The party leadership in Kathmandu was busy working with the Maoists to move the "peace process" forward, while in the countryside there were no political party structures at all. The people targeted by the Maoists refused to speak out, and the party leadership was allowing it to happen. The Ambassador noted that many political leaders in the capital had come out against Maoist abuses. Cardy said that until the Prime Minister spoke out publicly and actually began holding the Maoists accountable for their actions, such individual comments would not make a difference. Opportunists Taking Advantage of Situation -------------- ¶12. (C) The NDI Country Director reported that, across the country, opportunists were taking advantage of the lack of law and order. Former royalist thugs were now becoming thugs for the Maoists or the Madhesi People's Rights Forum (MPRF) in the Terai. The "independent" Maoist liberation fronts now had their own "independent" youth organizations that the Maoists used for doing much of their dirty work. This allowed them to maintain a certain degree of deniability. What Can Be Done? -------------- ¶13. (C) Erben suggested that whether the CA election was held in June or at some later date, the U.S. should consider making a considerable contribution in a very visible way. He suggested paying for the ballots (approx. USD 2-3 million) and providing other types of support, such as election monitors and in-kind assistance for the Election Commission. Cardy requested U.S. funding for NDI to bring in campaign managers to help the political parties learn to run their campaigns effectively. In the past, most parties had simply paid community-based leaders to turn out voters from their community for them. In the upcoming elections, this would not work -- and the political parties did not know how to run a real, clean campaign. NDI, with the right experts, could KATHMANDU 00000741 004 OF 004 help the parties in this area but needed support immediately to bring such people to Nepal. Comment -------------- ¶14. (C) Both IFES and NDI are doing great work in the run-up to the election, and our support for them, through USAID, will continue to be vital in the coming days. As we stated in reftel, the time to act is now if we are to help Nepal succeed in its upcoming Constituent Assembly election. Regardless of whether the election is postponed, observers and support are needed on the ground immediately to help set the stage for an election that is as legitimate as possible -- and does not give the Maoists a clear road to total power. MORIARTY