UN WORRIED ABOUT VIOLENCE; JUNE ELECTIONS NOT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000619 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2017 TAGS: PGOV PTER MCAP NP SUBJECT: UN WORRIED ABOUT VIOLENCE; JUNE ELECTIONS NOT TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty for reasons 1.4(b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) UN Secretary General's Personal Representative to Nepal Ian Martin briefed Kathmandu-based Chiefs of Mission on March 22, expressing appreciation for the outcome of the UNMIN budget exercise. Martin worried that ethnic and communal violence in Nepal was rising and doubted that the Government of Nepal (GON) and security forces had the ability or political will to address it effectively. Martin said arms management would now focus on the disposal of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and verification of PLA combatants, the latter of which he expected would free child soldiers and reduce the numbers in the cantonments. Martin described elections in June as technically impossible; a delay until November could provide time to improve conditions for the elections. While suggesting that the Seven-Party Alliance and Maoists were close to reaching a similar conclusion, Martin avoided any notion that the UN would publicly call for postponement. Comment: Although June elections look less and less likely, if they are called, the international community must be ready to support their execution. First Some Good News -- The UNMIN Budget -------------- ¶2. (C) The UN Secretary General's Personal Representative to Nepal Ian Martin briefed Kathmandu-based Chiefs of Mission on March 22. Although originally billed as a briefing on the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) budget, the briefing was instead devoted primarily to ethnic violence in the Terai, arms management and electoral issues. Martin began by expressing deep appreciation for donors' support in the 5th UN Committee meeting March 22 which he expected to approve USD 89 million for UNMIN, largely in line with the Secretary General's request. He said that the approved budget included funding for UN civil affairs officers, noting also the GON's desire to see the maximum possible number of UNMIN staff deployed in the field. Now For The Bad News - Violence Increasing -------------- ¶3. (C) Martin expressed horror at the March 21 violence in Gaur (Rautahat District) between Madhesi People's Rights Forum (MPRF) activists and Maoist cadre, which had resulted in the single largest loss of life since the beginning of the peace process in Nepal. An Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) staffer at the briefing explained that while the sequence of events remained unclear, both sides were responsible for provocations. OHCHR in Rautahat had urged restraint to no avail while police had been unwilling or powerless to stop the violence. (OHCHR reported that both Nepal Police and APF were present.) Although both the MPRF and Maoists had had guns, the clash had not been a firefight; the majority of the violence was carried out using bamboo sticks (lathis). OHCHR said that the 12 dead they had seen were killed by lathi blows to the head. (Note: OHCHR is investigating an allegation that there are 11 other bodies from a separate clash in a neighboring area. End Note.) The OHCHR staffer lamented that both the MPRF and the Maoists knew of each other's planned demonstrations and the potential for violence but did nothing to prevent it. Meanwhile, the identity of those killed, whether Maoist or MPRF, Madhesi or Pahadi, remained unclear. Security Forces Ineffective -------------- ¶4. (C) OHCHR had urged the GON and security forces to employ effective crowd control and other tactics to prevent communal violence, but the police response had been consistently ineffective. (Comment: The lack of clear instructions from the Home Ministry and the security forces' concerns that KATHMANDU 00000619 002 OF 003 their leadership would not back them up should they take action against the Maoists have discouraged the police from playing a stronger role to prevent violence in similar circumstances. End Comment). With the potential for further violence, OHCHR had urged the MPRF to cancel upcoming rallies. However, the Maoists and MPRF seemed intent on clashing. Martin asserted that the international community needed to publicly condemn all violence, including that by the Maoists and ethnically-based violence. He added that the Gaur incident had driven home the need to address the issue of non-Maoist weapons, citing the two Janatantrik Mukti Morcha (JTMM) factions as examples of particular concern. Additionally, the Home Ministry had reported that there were between 18,000 and 30,000 licensed weapons in private hands. Martin emphasized that the GON needed to seize all illegal weapons, but currently lacked the political will to do so. Arms Non-Management -------------- ¶5. (C) Martin said that Maoist Chairman Prachanda's preposterous claim that the 781 weapon difference between the list provided by security forces and registered Maoist arms was due to fire and flood was a serious issue. Martin indicated that the UN, GON and Maoists continued to discuss weapons attrition, as well as third-party purchased weapons not in government stocks (such as AK-47's),although UNMIN had no independent information on these arms. UNMIN had focused its attention on IED's, and had identified some 21,000 devices that the UN planned to render safe for shipment to main weapons storage sites for destruction. Separately, the UN and Maoists were still negotiating an agreement on the 96 weapons Maoist forces retained for their personal security details. (Note: On March 23, the local press reported Martin calling on the GON and Maoists to agree on this issue soon. End Note.) Verification of Combatants -------------- ¶6. (C) Martin noted that the next arms management step was the second phase of registration and verification of People's Liberation Army combatants. UNMIN expected to use phase two as an opportunity to weed out minors and recent recruits and hoped to convince the Maoists to do this voluntarily. In addition to garnering a realistic assessment of forces, removing faux Maoist combatants from the camps would have the benefit of releasing child soldiers and reducing the population and hence level of support required in the cantonments. This would thus serve to improve camp conditions. Martin expected UN interviews of combatants in phase two to be time-consuming and contentious. Martin was hopeful of progress on improved camp management. He was pleased to report that the Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee (JMCC -- composed of the UN, Maoists and GON) had already carried out its first field visit. Elections Technically Impossible -------------- ¶7. (C) Martin believed mid-June Constituent Assembly elections were technically impossible for two reasons. First, the Interim Parliament had not yet passed the necessary electoral laws. Second, an interim government was required to announce an election date. The current impasse between the GON and Maoists over preconditions for an interim government would delay this process. Martin lamented that the Cabinet had returned to the Interim Parliament draft legislation stripped of provisions addressing ethnic inequalities. Rapid passage of such legislation would likely garner blowback from ethnic communities and might catalyze more demonstrations and violence. Noting that the clock stood at 90 days until June, a UN assessment had determined that 120 days minimum was required between the announcement of elections and their execution. The UN was worried that the Election Commission-proposed compressed schedule was KATHMANDU 00000619 003 OF 003 risky, and assumed the elections could be executed with perfection. Election Delay Could Be Positive -------------- ¶8. (C) Martin expected that EU observers and the Carter Center staff would support the UN assessment that June elections were not feasible. The big four parties (NC, NC-D, UML and the Maoists) had privately discussed this reality, but none of the parties were willing to take the blame for delayed elections. Martin acknowledged that delaying elections until November risked unhinging the peace process and would require the SPA and Maoists to protect against spoilers. However, a delayed election would provide time for key technical and political preparations. Martin believed that local conditions in the Terai continued to deteriorate while many parts of Nepal continued to suffer from the absence of a government presence. Additional time before elections could allow for the re-establishment of local governance, more effective policing and the formation of an independent national body to monitor the peace process. The National Human Rights Commission had not sufficiently addressed the frequent abuses. Martin opined that postponing elections should not be seen as a disaster, but an opportunity to get the elections right. Comment: Elections Remain Critical -------------- ¶9. (C) While Martin's assessment of the arms management process was relatively rosy, his worries about continuing ethnic tensions and violence were spot on. Clearly the GON must address technical and policy issues before elections can take place. However, notably absent from Martin's assessment of the electoral process was any mention that the UN might lead the call for postponement. Moreover, while we will encourage the Seven-Party Alliance to avoid rushing headlong into elections before proper preparations are made, once democratic elections are called, we must be ready to support them. MORIARTY