FOREIGN MINISTER ON INTERIM GOVERNMENT, THREAT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000560 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF ASEC PTER BH NP SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER ON INTERIM GOVERNMENT, THREAT TO U.S., BHUTANESE REFUGEES Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty for reasons 1.4(b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Foreign Minister K.P. Oli suggested to the Ambassador March 15 that the Interim Parliament might vote March 16 to endorse Prime Minister Koirala and accept his oath of office. Oli was not certain if the PM would then announce the formation of an interim government. The Ambassador expressed grave concern that Maoist leader Prachanda's claims of a royalist plot to assassinate U.S. officials had placed U.S. mission personnel at risk. If the current government remained through April, Oli said, he would discuss refugees with his Bhutanese counterpart at the SAARC Summit in New Delhi April 3-4. Oli suggested that might be the final bilateral meeting between Nepal and Bhutan on this issue. On urban refugees, Oli indicated that his government wanted to verify UNHCR's determination of refugee status before providing exit permits. Prime Minister To Take Oath of Office -------------- ¶2. (C) On March 15, the Ambassador asked Foreign Minister Krishna Prasad Oli about the prospects for an interim government. Oli replied that the Interim Parliament might vote March 16 to endorse Prime Minister Koirala and accept his oath of office. Oli was uncertain whether the PM would then announce formation of an interim government, but said that the Maoists had not met the pre-conditions the PM had set. He emphasized the need to prevent Maoist entry into an interim government until they had renounced violence and the instruments of violence. "If they renounce violence, then the door would open for further agreement," Oli said. Maoist use of violence was a reflection of Maoist policy, which had not changed despite the peace process. The Ambassador noted that Maoist leader Prachanda's comment March 12 that armed Maoist combatants remained outside the cantonments was not surprising. The Maoist objective was to demonstrate that the UN-monitored arms management and cantonment program was a farce in order to sustain the environment of fear and intimidation throughout the country, the Ambassador pointed out. Prachanda's Claim of Royalist Plot Must Be Debunked -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) The Ambassador expressed grave concern that Prachanda's public statement March 8 claiming the Royal Palace was plotting to assassinate U.S. officials in Nepal had put U.S. mission personnel at risk. By doing so, Prachanda had, in effect, told his cadre that if they killed a U.S. official, the Maoists would blame it on the Palace. The Ambassador said he had requested the Government of Nepal (GON) to demand evidence from the Maoists regarding the plot and, if none existed, for the GON to make a statement to that effect. More importantly, Prachanda needed privately to direct Maoist cadre not to target U.S. Embassy personnel. It was reassuring that PM Koirala had publicly noted that the GON had received no evidence from the Maoists. That said, the Ambassador noted, he had received neither evidence nor assurances that the Maoists had issued the required instructions. "We will hold the Maoists responsible for any attack on U.S. officials in Nepal," he added. Oli was sympathetic, but replied that he was not in contact with the Maoists. The Ambassador requested Oli to tell Home Minister Sitaula that the U.S. still awaited a response from the Home Ministry on this issue. Nepal-Bhutan Meeting on Bhutanese Refugees Possible at SAARC -------------- -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The Ambassador asked whether a meeting between Nepal and Bhutan on the Bhutanese refugee issue was likely at the upcoming SAARC Summit in New Delhi April 3-4. Oli replied KATHMANDU 00000560 002 OF 002 that, if the current Cabinet remained in office through April, he intended to meet with his Bhutanese counterpart. "This could be a conclusive meeting," he said, indicating that the GON would move on other solutions if the Royal Government of Bhutan (RGOB) showed no willingness to move on the refugees. The Ambassador informed Oli that the Core Group of donor governments intended to deliver a demarche to Bhutan prior to the SAARC Summit urging Bhutan to repatriate eligible refugees. He recounted his meeting March 10 with PM Koirala in which the PM said he looked forward to the resettlement program moving ahead. The Ambassador assured Oli that the U.S. would continue to push for repatriation, but was also interested in beginning resettlement as early as July/August. "We can do that," Oli replied, as long as the Nepal-Bhutan bilateral meeting occurred before then. If Bhutan allowed for repatriation, Nepal would be very pleased. But if Bhutan did not change its mind on repatriation, then Nepal would start the resettlement program, he added. The Ambassador also urged Oli to process the 36 Bhutanese vulnerable cases that UNHCR submitted January 4 to the GON. Nepal Not Processing Urban Refugees -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The Ambassador asked Oli to allow the 50 urban refugees that the U.S. had accepted for resettlement to depart Nepal. Oli responded that the GON was displeased with how UNHCR had failed to collaborate with the government before issuing refugee determinations. (Note: UNHCR Nepal currently has registered 390 urban asylum seekers and refugees. According to UNHCR Resident Representative Abraham, the GON has demanded that UNHCR cease processing any urban asylum seekers. End Note.) The Ambassador stressed that these individuals could not return to their countries of origin and that the U.S. had a humanitarian interest in their fate. Oli suggested that the GON wanted to assess the urban refugees' asylum claims itself before issuing exit permits. He also indicated this was the purview of the Home Ministry, not Foreign Ministry. Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) It is unclear when the Interim Parliament will vote upon, and accept, the Prime Minister's oath of office. We agree with FM Oli that the Maoists should be kept out of an interim government until they have demonstrated improved behavior. Unfortunately, Oli's enmity with the Maoist leadership, as well as with the leadership of his own CPN-UML, may result in his replacement as a member of the Cabinet. Oli is not only tough on the Maoists, but is also forward leaning on Bhutanese refugees and appears sincere in wishing to conclude this issue once and for all with the RGOB. We will continue to encourage the Home Ministry and UNHCR to develop a mutually acceptable mechanism to process the urban refugee caseload. MORIARTY