UN SAYS ARMS MONITORS SOON TO BE OPERATIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000055 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER NP SUBJECT: UN SAYS ARMS MONITORS SOON TO BE OPERATIONAL REF: KATHMANDU 21 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nicholas J. Dean. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary ¶1. (C) UN Political Advisor John Norris informed Charge January 9 that fifteen UN arms monitors were currently on the ground, and another twenty would arrive by the end of the week. The team would be partially operational by January 15, and fully operational by January 20. A second phase of People's Liberation Army Combatant registration, run by the UN Development Program, would take longer to complete, possibly until March. Norris described the ex-Ghurka Interim Task Force as "self-propelled," and speedily deployable. He indicated that the Government of Nepal (GON) was unable to adequately support the cantonments, and that the Maoists and GON were not working together to make them livable. The UN was not currently providing food, but would do so if asked. Norris concurred with Charge that the launch of UN arms monitoring on January 15 would be a "big test" of the Maoist willingness to cooperate, and indicated that, while the UN would not certify the numbers of weapons turned in, it would make a statement if the number appeared inadequate. The UN Security Council (UNSC) would consider sending police advisors if the GON asked, and a statement on UNSC action following a December technical assessment team report was expected January 11. END SUMMARY. Arms Monitors To Be Fully Operational January 20 -------------- --- ¶2. (C) UN Political Advisor John Norris told Charge in a January 9 meeting that fifteen UN arms monitors in the initial group were on the ground and that another twenty would arrive by the end of the week. After four or five days of training, the first batch of monitors would be operational by January 15, and the rest by January 20. The Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee (JMCC) would begin conducting a "quick and dirty chop" on weapons and combatants, said Norris, noting that they would compile name, rank, gender, number of weapons and date of joining the PLA for each combatant. At the projected rate of a few hundred registrations per day at each site, Norris conjectured that the initial phase would last one week. A second phase of full registration would take longer, "maybe until March," and would entail intense and more thorough interviews in which unqualified combatants (those who are underage, were enlisted after May 25, are invalids or infirm) would be "weeded out." This phase would be conducted by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP),which would also compile information for later job training programs. Seven UNDP teams would initially be deployed to the seven PLA divisional sites. Norris confirmed that the UN would not consider the process complete until the combatants were separated from their arms. Launch of UN Arms Monitoring on January 15 -------------- ¶3. (C) The UN would focus its energy January 15 and 16 on the 3rd and 4th division sites, a short drive from Kathmandu, where it would be easier to manage logistics and make sure that things run smoothly, Norris said. "We want to send a positive message about how the process is working," offered Norris, adding that the second day of operation would likely be the "media day," and that the UN would hold a press conference. Asked by Charge what kind of arms monitoring infrastructure would be available on the first two days, Norris admitted that containers, locks and lighting would be available, but monitors would not yet have a full package of alarms and surveillance equipment. Ex-Ghurkas Ready to Go -------------- ¶4. (C) Norris informed Charge that the Interim Task Force (ITF),ex-Ghurka Nepali servicemen from the Indian and British Armies was in its second day of training. Tasked with helping to support the UN arms monitoring mission, KATHMANDU 00000055 002 OF 003 Norris described them as a "self-propelled" team that "knows what they're doing." They would have access to vehicles, radios, and computer equipment and could be speedily deployed, according to Norris. Norris complained that the GON was not yet adequately supporting the ITF. He indicated that he was happy with the overall quality of the personnel, and that their leadership and organizational skills were good, noting that the hiring process had not been contentious. A contingent from the ITF would be present at weapons storage sites twenty-four hours a day, rotating in and out, he said. GON Unable to Support the Cantonments -------------- ¶5. (C) Norris indicated that he was not happy with the GON's ability to support the camps, observing that they had not made much progress with basic supplies. "This doesn't send a good message to the Maoists," he said, adding that the GON "needs to get its act together." The GON and the Maoists were not working together to make the cantonments livable, he continued, opining that this created a problem for the GON by pushing people out of the camps. "It is in the best interests of the GON to make the cantonments attractive," he underlined, "but the GON seems to have a sense that it's not important to make them livable." Both sides were responsible for the camps, Norris added, but the Maoists were better at digging trenches than they were at building shelters. UN Not Providing Food, Yet Offered Its Support -------------- - ¶6. (C) When Charge asked about food in the camps, Norris responded that the UN country team had offered its support to Maoist Supremo Prachanda and his deputy Baburam Bhattarai. Bhattarai replied that the Nepal Army did not get food from the World Food Program, and that the Maoists want the GON to treat them in the same way. "This is the GON's way of keeping us second class," Norris quoted Bhattarai. The UN agreed not to supply food, but if the Maoists asked for it, they would, affirmed Norris, adding that the Maoists indicated they might revisit the issue if GON support continued to be inadequate. Surrendering Weapons - The Big Test: "Give Until It Hurts" -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Norris agreed with Charge that January 15 would be "the big test," and suggested that the Government of India ought to "quietly and toughly" make clear to the Maoist leadership that they've got to "give until it hurts" in terms of surrendering weapons. Norris indicated that the UN had gotten a list from the GON listing about 3,500 weapons, but they had yet to receive a list from the Maoists. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were a "daily weapon" of the Maoists, said Norris, warning that they probably have hundreds of thousands of this type of weapon. The stable ones would be stored at least 500 meters away from the cantonments, and UN monitors would be pulled out if these devices explode in the camps, assured Norris. "It is better to bring them into the cantonments rather than leave them in the villages," he remarked. UN to Speak Out if Insufficient Weapons Surrendered -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Asked if the UN would certify the numbers of weapons surrendered, Norris said they would not, but they would report the numbers of weapons received and their storage locations. "If the numbers are not credible, we will offer commentary," averred Norris, adding that the process would be "open-ended" to allow for more weapons to be surrendered past the (yet to be determined) deadline in the event that the number turned in was insufficient. If the total number of weapons turned in were unreasonable, the UN would then be in a position to state that a full separation of arms had not been completed, said Norris. In any event, Norris articulated that, with a "tough timeline" and many different actors, the process was going to be "messy." KATHMANDU 00000055 003 OF 003 Security Council Update -------------- ¶9. (C) Norris observed that the need for reactivating Village Development Committees and police posts seemed to have "sunk in" with the Maoists, indicating that the GON and the Maoists might make a joint appeal for UN police advisors. If the GON made a specific request, the UN Security Council (UNSC) would consider it "whether the GOI signs off on it or not," he stated (reftel). Norris was hopeful UNSC action on the report by the technical assessment team which had visited Nepal in December would be made public by January 11, but was not sure if the UN's printing schedule would allow for it (reftel). Comment: A Major Turning Point for Nepal's Peace Process -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) If all goes according to schedule, the official launch of UN arms monitoring will trigger the promulgation of the interim constitution and the establishment of the interim Parliament on the same day monitoring begins. Because of the desire to move the process ahead as quickly as possible, Prime Minister Koirala has signed off on a two-stage registration process which will invite confusion about who is and who is not a Maoist combatant. It would have been preferable to conduct a more thorough vetting at the outset. One positive sign is that the UN is prepared to comment publicly if the number of weapons and IEDs the Maoists surrender does not approach their known status. A more detailed UN Security Council decision on next steps will also be timely. DEAN