NEPAL: FORMER PRIME MINISTER OFFERS DIRE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000512 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2017 TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV NP SUBJECT: NEPAL: FORMER PRIME MINISTER OFFERS DIRE PREDICTIONS Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty for reasons 1.4(b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Three-time former Prime Minister Surya Bahadur Thapa agreed with the Ambassador March 8 that the government was not acting quickly enough to resolve the Terai unrest or negotiate with other ethnic groups. Thapa worried that the Indian government would become involved if the situation worsened. He warned that the Maoists were biding their time until an opportunity to seize complete control presented itself; the UN-monitored arms management and cantonment exercises were a hoax with most veteran Maoist combatants remaining outside cantonment sites. Thapa noted that, considering the Prime Minister's health and fissures within the Seven-Party Alliance, the Maoists were well-positioned to sow confusion and chaos in the capital and eventually seize power. India's Involvement Possible If Madhesi Problems Increase -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Surya Bahadur Thapa, a three-time former Prime Minister, agreed with the Ambassador March 8 that the government had seriously mishandled the Madhesi rights movement. Everyone had known that inclusion of minority groups in Nepal was a priority, Thapa said. The current unrest had spiraled unnecessarily. Prime Minister G.P. Koirala had failed to demonstrate real leadership and Thapa feared the state was sliding toward disintegration. If the Madhesi issue became very serious, India would be compelled to become involved due to its cultural and family ties to the Madhesi people. This, he averred, would be the worst-case scenario. He had urged the Prime Minister and other political party leaders to consult with the various ethnic groups before submitting proposed amendments to the Interim Constitution. Thapa believed that the positions of the government and of the Madhesis could easily be overcome if the crisis of confidence was resolved. By going directly to the Interim Parliament with amendments, the government would exclude and alienate the Madhesis and ethnic groups and exacerbate the current problem, the former PM feared. Maoist Behavior and Intentions Unchanged -------------- ¶3. (C) Thapa agreed with the Ambassador that the Maoists had not changed their behavior and continued to violate their peace commitments. Even if Maoists entered the government and participated in elections, they would do so in pursuit of their objective of total state control, Thapa noted. The Maoists knew they could pursue power in two ways: through peaceful means or violent action. Although Maoists had failed twice in the last year to seize power violently and had begun to pursue their objectives through the peace process, they were "only biding their time." The Maoists had begun laying the groundwork to win the elections by preventing political party workers from campaigning. The political parties realized that they could not compete with the Maoist militia. Villagers were not free to openly support party workers because of Maoist threats. The Maoists would prefer to capture power before elections, but would do their best to rig the elections if necessary, Thapa warned. Arms Management A Hoax -------------- ¶4. (C) Thapa believed UN-monitored arms management was a hoax, a mere formality that would allow the Maoists to enter the government despite retaining weapons. The cantonment sites were filled with new recruits, leaving veteran Maoist combatants free to continue extortion and intimidation throughout the country, he insisted. The Youth Communist League (YCL),in particular, would act as the Maoist's "striking force" in the capital. The Maoists had arms scattered across Kathmandu Valley with at least 3,000 combatants residing locally under the auspices of the YCL. Thapa worried that the Nepal Army was completely paralyzed, KATHMANDU 00000512 002 OF 003 demoralized and incapable of moving quickly and effectively to counter a Maoist threat. Government Needs to Be Tough With Maoists -------------- ¶5. (C) Thapa agreed with the Ambassador that PM Koirala and the political parties needed to maintain a hard line with the Maoists if they expected to see any positive changes in Maoist behavior. Thapa supported the PM's tough pre-conditions for Maoist entry into an interim government. He suspected, however, that Maoist leaders would falsely claim that Maoist extortion and intimidation had occurred due to a misunderstanding and was contrary to Maoist policy. "The Maoists will proceed with force if necessary," Thapa said. The PM had to unite the Seven-Party Alliance (SPA) at the national, district and local levels to protest Maoist behavior and prevent a Maoist takeover. However, according to Thapa, the PM's poor health and ongoing unrest in the Terai made this prospect unlikely. Fissures Within the Seven-Party Alliance -------------- ¶6. (C) Thapa saw fissures growing within the SPA. The Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) leader M.K. Nepal publicly criticized the government, but not the Maoists. Nepali Congress (Democratic) leader Sher Bahadur Deuba, on the other hand, consistently criticized the Maoists but lacked the ability to unify the parties. The other parties in the SPA were only extensions of the Maoists. Nepali Congress (NC) leaders were openly discussing among themselves the possibility of the PM dying prior to elections and who should succeed him. One NC central committee member had advised Dr. Shekhar Koirala, the PM's nephew, to suggest the PM pass the torch to him, but Shekhar had replied it was too sensitive. Thapa admitted that he had gone out of his way to urge NC central committee members to "save the party" in case of the PM's death. Future Not Bright -------------- ¶7. (C) With the PM's poor health, unrest in the Terai and fissures within the SPA, the Maoists were free to violate their peace commitments, Thapa stated. "Maoists will no doubt capture a majority of Constituent Assembly seats," he said. The Ambassador questioned the ability of the Maoists to win a majority in the Terai in light of ongoing clashes between the Madhesis and Maoists. Thapa agreed that this was the only encouraging sign in the country these days. The government had failed so far to seize this opportunity to bring the Madhesis and Janajatis into an agreement and isolate the Maoists. The Ambassador noted that the GON seemed more concerned about not offending the Maoists on the Madhesi issue than reaching an agreement with the Madhesis. Thapa believed the PM had to be careful not to alienate the Maoists with respect to the peace process, but suggested that other NC leaders could address Madhesi concerns and isolate the Maoists. The Maoists would keep trying to use dissatisfaction with King Gyanendra to keep the public eye off Maoist behavior. The Maoists wanted to control the government before going into elections, Thapa commented. The Ambassador agreed that, with an uncertain electoral outcome, the Maoists would prefer to grab power now and postpone elections. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Recent events lend credibility to Thapa's dire predictions. Bombs were defused March 8 at the Kathmandu residences of two civil society leaders supportive of a republican government. That same day Prachanda made public statements warning that the palace might use bombs in public places and assassinate U.S. officials to disrupt the peace process (septel). On March 9, Maoist Members of Parliament tabled a proposal to declare Nepal a republican state. It is possible that Maoists themselves placed those bombs to KATHMANDU 00000512 003 OF 003 coincide with Prachanda's speech in an attempt to spark a reaction against the Palace and increase support for its proposal within Parliament. If the Prime Minister openly opposes the proposal, he risks losing public support. The Maoists are in a win-win situation -- either they achieve their objective of a republican state or they have ammunition against the Prime Minister that can be used to get people out in the streets to call for the PM's head. These events lend credibility to Thapa's fears that Maoist objectives have not changed. Maoists will continue to look for, and create, opportunities to seize state control while at the same time trying to ensure elections favor them through maintaining active militia, continuing extortion and intimidation, and preventing political party workers from campaigning in the districts. MORIARTY