NEPAL: FORMER PRIME MINISTER OFFERS DIRE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000512

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2017
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: FORMER PRIME MINISTER OFFERS DIRE
PREDICTIONS

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty for reasons 1.4(b/d).

Summary
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1. (C) Three-time former Prime Minister Surya Bahadur Thapa
agreed with the Ambassador March 8 that the government was
not acting quickly enough to resolve the Terai unrest or
negotiate with other ethnic groups. Thapa worried that the
Indian government would become involved if the situation
worsened. He warned that the Maoists were biding their time
until an opportunity to seize complete control presented
itself; the UN-monitored arms management and cantonment
exercises were a hoax with most veteran Maoist combatants
remaining outside cantonment sites. Thapa noted that,
considering the Prime Minister's health and fissures within
the Seven-Party Alliance, the Maoists were well-positioned to
sow confusion and chaos in the capital and eventually seize
power.

India's Involvement Possible If Madhesi Problems Increase
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2. (C) Surya Bahadur Thapa, a three-time former Prime
Minister, agreed with the Ambassador March 8 that the
government had seriously mishandled the Madhesi rights
movement. Everyone had known that inclusion of minority
groups in Nepal was a priority, Thapa said. The current
unrest had spiraled unnecessarily. Prime Minister G.P.
Koirala had failed to demonstrate real leadership and Thapa
feared the state was sliding toward disintegration. If the
Madhesi issue became very serious, India would be compelled
to become involved due to its cultural and family ties to the
Madhesi people. This, he averred, would be the worst-case
scenario. He had urged the Prime Minister and other
political party leaders to consult with the various ethnic
groups before submitting proposed amendments to the Interim
Constitution. Thapa believed that the positions of the
government and of the Madhesis could easily be overcome if
the crisis of confidence was resolved. By going directly to
the Interim Parliament with amendments, the government would
exclude and alienate the Madhesis and ethnic groups and
exacerbate the current problem, the former PM feared.

Maoist Behavior and Intentions Unchanged
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3. (C) Thapa agreed with the Ambassador that the Maoists had
not changed their behavior and continued to violate their
peace commitments. Even if Maoists entered the government
and participated in elections, they would do so in pursuit of
their objective of total state control, Thapa noted. The
Maoists knew they could pursue power in two ways: through
peaceful means or violent action. Although Maoists had
failed twice in the last year to seize power violently and
had begun to pursue their objectives through the peace
process, they were "only biding their time." The Maoists had
begun laying the groundwork to win the elections by
preventing political party workers from campaigning. The
political parties realized that they could not compete with
the Maoist militia. Villagers were not free to openly
support party workers because of Maoist threats. The Maoists
would prefer to capture power before elections, but would do
their best to rig the elections if necessary, Thapa warned.

Arms Management A Hoax
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4. (C) Thapa believed UN-monitored arms management was a
hoax, a mere formality that would allow the Maoists to enter
the government despite retaining weapons. The cantonment
sites were filled with new recruits, leaving veteran Maoist
combatants free to continue extortion and intimidation
throughout the country, he insisted. The Youth Communist
League (YCL),in particular, would act as the Maoist's
"striking force" in the capital. The Maoists had arms
scattered across Kathmandu Valley with at least 3,000
combatants residing locally under the auspices of the YCL.
Thapa worried that the Nepal Army was completely paralyzed,

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demoralized and incapable of moving quickly and effectively
to counter a Maoist threat.

Government Needs to Be Tough With Maoists
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5. (C) Thapa agreed with the Ambassador that PM Koirala and
the political parties needed to maintain a hard line with the
Maoists if they expected to see any positive changes in
Maoist behavior. Thapa supported the PM's tough
pre-conditions for Maoist entry into an interim government.
He suspected, however, that Maoist leaders would falsely
claim that Maoist extortion and intimidation had occurred due
to a misunderstanding and was contrary to Maoist policy.
"The Maoists will proceed with force if necessary," Thapa
said. The PM had to unite the Seven-Party Alliance (SPA) at
the national, district and local levels to protest Maoist
behavior and prevent a Maoist takeover. However, according
to Thapa, the PM's poor health and ongoing unrest in the
Terai made this prospect unlikely.

Fissures Within the Seven-Party Alliance
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6. (C) Thapa saw fissures growing within the SPA. The
Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML)
leader M.K. Nepal publicly criticized the government, but not
the Maoists. Nepali Congress (Democratic) leader Sher
Bahadur Deuba, on the other hand, consistently criticized the
Maoists but lacked the ability to unify the parties. The
other parties in the SPA were only extensions of the Maoists.
Nepali Congress (NC) leaders were openly discussing among
themselves the possibility of the PM dying prior to elections
and who should succeed him. One NC central committee member
had advised Dr. Shekhar Koirala, the PM's nephew, to suggest
the PM pass the torch to him, but Shekhar had replied it was
too sensitive. Thapa admitted that he had gone out of his
way to urge NC central committee members to "save the party"
in case of the PM's death.

Future Not Bright
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7. (C) With the PM's poor health, unrest in the Terai and
fissures within the SPA, the Maoists were free to violate
their peace commitments, Thapa stated. "Maoists will no
doubt capture a majority of Constituent Assembly seats," he
said. The Ambassador questioned the ability of the Maoists
to win a majority in the Terai in light of ongoing clashes
between the Madhesis and Maoists. Thapa agreed that this was
the only encouraging sign in the country these days. The
government had failed so far to seize this opportunity to
bring the Madhesis and Janajatis into an agreement and
isolate the Maoists. The Ambassador noted that the GON
seemed more concerned about not offending the Maoists on the
Madhesi issue than reaching an agreement with the Madhesis.
Thapa believed the PM had to be careful not to alienate the
Maoists with respect to the peace process, but suggested that
other NC leaders could address Madhesi concerns and isolate
the Maoists. The Maoists would keep trying to use
dissatisfaction with King Gyanendra to keep the public eye
off Maoist behavior. The Maoists wanted to control the
government before going into elections, Thapa commented. The
Ambassador agreed that, with an uncertain electoral outcome,
the Maoists would prefer to grab power now and postpone
elections.

Comment
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8. (C) Recent events lend credibility to Thapa's dire
predictions. Bombs were defused March 8 at the Kathmandu
residences of two civil society leaders supportive of a
republican government. That same day Prachanda made public
statements warning that the palace might use bombs in public
places and assassinate U.S. officials to disrupt the peace
process (septel). On March 9, Maoist Members of Parliament
tabled a proposal to declare Nepal a republican state. It is
possible that Maoists themselves placed those bombs to

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coincide with Prachanda's speech in an attempt to spark a
reaction against the Palace and increase support for its
proposal within Parliament. If the Prime Minister openly
opposes the proposal, he risks losing public support. The
Maoists are in a win-win situation -- either they achieve
their objective of a republican state or they have ammunition
against the Prime Minister that can be used to get people out
in the streets to call for the PM's head. These events lend
credibility to Thapa's fears that Maoist objectives have not
changed. Maoists will continue to look for, and create,
opportunities to seize state control while at the same time
trying to ensure elections favor them through maintaining
active militia, continuing extortion and intimidation, and
preventing political party workers from campaigning in the
districts.
MORIARTY