SCENESETTER FOR YOUR VISIT TO NEPAL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000493 SIPDIS SIPDIS COLOMBO PLEASE PASS U/S FORE, FROM THE AMBASSADOR E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: AMGT PGOV PRELNP SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR YOUR VISIT TO NEPAL ¶1. Henrietta, I'm delighted that you are able to make it out to Nepal, at this crucial point in the country's history. You will find a fascinating country, great weather, and a talented country team that is getting the Mission fully ready for the 21st century. You will also find a country that is teetering on the brink of becoming either a showcase for democratic transformation or a failed or totalitarian state threatening stability in the region. The Political Context -------------- ¶2. More than ten months ago, a People's Movement (jana andolan, in Nepali),supported both by Nepal's legitimate political parties and by its Maoist insurgents, forced King Gyanendra to abandon his attempts at absolute rule and surrender power to a reinstated Parliament. Since then, negotiations between the parties and the Maoists have resulted in a series of agreements ending the insurgency and setting out a process supposedly leading to elections for a Constitutional Assembly by mid-June and to the absorption of the Maoists into the democratic mainstream. Always fragile, this process appears currently to be at great risk. Getting the Maoists into the Mainstream -------------- ¶3. Perhaps the gravest threat to the peace process comes from the Maoists. Despite a series of signed commitments, they have not yet abandoned violence, intimidation, and extortion. Indeed, both their actions and their leaders words suggest that their goal remains a monopoly on state power and not power-sharing within some democratic framework. To date, the government has facilitated Maoist obduracy by refusing to enforce the law and crack down on Maoist abuses for fear that doing so would force the erstwhile insurgents to resume fighting. Instead, the government has made a series of unilateral concessions to the Maoists, including giving them the keys to UN-monitored containers where they agreed to place their weapons and granting them one-quarter of the seats in an Interim Parliament. ¶4. Having violated their most fundamental commitments, the Maoists now hope to be granted a number of Ministries in a yet-to-be-formed, eight-party Interim Government. They argue that further delay in formation of the Interim Government could prevent the holding of Constitutional Assembly elections before mid-June (which is the beginning of monsoon rains in Nepal). At the same time, they openly maintain that the speedy holding of Constitutional Assembly elections is less important than immediately removing the King and declaring NEPAL a "democratic republic." They have threatened to take to the streets, if the Interim Parliament does not take action soon against the King. ¶5. For once, the political parties appear to have dug in, as have key members of the international community. The Prime Minister has bluntly told the Maoists that he will not allow them into an interim government until their behavior changes in a number of key areas, including by returning captured land to its original owners and ending extortion. For their part, the Indians have insisted that the UN-administered arms management process must be credible before the Maoists are allowed into government. (To date, the Maoists have placed over 30,000 supposed combatants into UN-supervised cantonments, but have only placed 3,400 weapons into containers at those cantonments. The majority of the alleged combatants appear to be recent recruits and children.) The Maoists are also finding their influence in large parts of the country diminished by a flaring up of ethnic tensions. Addressing Marginalized Groups -------------- ¶6. Expectations among Nepal's many marginalized groups were raised by Maoist calls during the insurgency for regional KATHMANDU 00000493 002 OF 003 autonomy and ethnic rights, as well as by hopes that the Constitutional Assembly process would lead to their having a greater say in national affairs. These expectations went largely unmet, however, as the parties and the Maoists cut a deal behind closed doors in January on the Interim Constitution that did almost nothing to address the grievances of the marginalized groups. This failure to address expectations has resulted in considerable disappointment among these groups, who appear increasingly inclined to use violence to advance their cause. ¶7. The first group to hit the streets to demand action was the Madhesis, relatively recent immigrants from India who live in Nepal's southern plains (the Terai) and account for about one-third of Nepal's population. In February, the Madhesis called a ten-day strike that closed the roads from India, leading to severe shortages of petroleum and food in Kathmandu and elsewhere. Clashes between the Madhesis and the Maoists (who view the Madhesi movement as a threat to Maoist standing in the Terai) and police (who contain very few Madhesis in their ranks) have to date resulted in over thirty deaths. The Madhesis are demanding greater representation in the Constitutional Assembly, as well as the resignation of the Home Minister, whom they hold responsible for alleged police brutality in the Terai. The government has yet to hold serious talks with the Madhesis and instead has sought to defuse tensions by proposing constitutional reforms, the precise contents of which remain unknown. In addition to the Madhesis, the Janjatis (ethnic Tibeto-Burmans who comprise about 35 percent of Nepal's population) are demanding a greater share of power. Other groups, including Nepal's dalits (or untouchable castes - 15 percent of the population) and women (51 percent of the population) are also beginning to demand a voice. While these are precisely the sort of questions that a Constitutional Assembly should discuss, the government's unwillingness to engage in a roundtable dialogue with the disaffected groups has allowed the situation to fester and raised fears that the government and parties wish to keep power in the hands of the political elite. Management Issues -------------- ¶8. We are eagerly awaiting our June move into a state-of-the-art New Embassy Compound (NEC). For the first time, USAID will be co-located with the rest of the Mission, making communication and policy coordination much easier. We are also making considerable progress in working out joint services between State and AID, a process which you will hear more about during your visit. While the outlook on most issues appears bright, we still have several challenges to address. LIBRARY -- The Mission desires to keep the American library at its current location. -- The library receives over a hundred visitors a day and provides our most effective tool for reaching out to the Nepali public. -- We will not have the space, nor will we have the relatively easy security access, to replicate these functions at the NEC. -- We await a Washington decision on the request for a co-location waiver. BUDGET CRUNCH -- We find ourselves in a budget crunch, aggravated by increasing load-shedding and chronic political instability. -- Load-shedding due to increase in the coming weeks. KATHMANDU 00000493 003.3 OF 003 -- We are currently running our generators six hours a day, using up large amounts of diesel fuel. -- Frequent closures of the roads and border because of strikes and other disturbances make obtaining supplies from India (the only source of most goods we need) both expensive and unreliable. What You Can Do for Us -------------- ¶9. I am proud of this Mission and of what we have accomplished under frequently trying conditions. I hope your trip will provide you a clear understanding of the complexities of NEPAL and of how we have been seeking to promote U.S. interests here. I have also been stressing to the Nepalis that you will be the most senior U.S. official to visit the country since last April's Jana Andolan. As such, you will be looked upon as the oracle who will reveal Washington's views on Nepal's fast-paced developments. In your conversations with Nepalis, you might therefore want to concentrate on a few core themes: -- The U.S. strongly supports Nepal's peace process, and we will do what we can to help ensure its success. We want to see a peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Nepal. -- We thus want to see the Maoists come into the political mainstream and endorse the values of democracy. To date, however, Maoist actions and words cast doubt upon their commitment to democracy. Until they support the rule of law and abandon violence and intimidation, the Maoists can not be considered a mainstream political party. No legitimate party practices politics through the barrel of a gun -- We have no position on the future of the monarchy. That is for the people of NEPAL to decide. -- We hope that the political parties and government will find ways to listen to the voices of all of Nepal's people and bring them all into an inclusive, democratic society. At the same time, nothing justifies the use of violence as a political tool, including by groups that legitimately feel marginalized within their society. I look forward to your arrival. MORIARTY