NEPAL: PARTY LEADERS FEAR UNCERTAIN FUTURE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 000469

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2017
TAGS: PGOV PTER NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: PARTY LEADERS FEAR UNCERTAIN FUTURE


Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
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1. (C) In separate meetings on February 29 and March 1,
leaders of the Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist
Leninist (CPN-UML) and the Nepali Congress-Democratic (NC-D)
told the Ambassador they were not optimistic about the
prospects for Nepal in light of Maoist insincerity.
Political leaders have begun playing politics in earnest, and
although they disagreed about Maoist entry into an interim
government and the proposed Constituent Assembly election,
they agreed that the Prime Minister and Home Minister had
done a terrible job in negotiations with the Maoists.
Effective enforcement of law and order would be key to
holding Constituent Assembly elections in June, they
acknowledged, although most people realized that holding
polls that soon would be nearly impossible. Maoist strategy
had changed, but their goal remained the same: a monopoly on
state power. One political leader said that the Maoist
end-game was to remove the Prime Minister from power, either
by exploiting public sentiment regarding the King or by
placing the blame for the delay in the election squarely on
the PM's shoulders.

MK Nepal: Deal With Problems One By One
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2. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador on February 28,
General Secretary of the CPN-UML Madhav Kumar (MK) Nepal said
that the Government of Nepal (GON) needed to give serious
attention to all the issues facing the country. The unrest
in the Terai (southern Nepal along the border with India),
the complaints of the Janajatis and dalits, and the problems
with the Maoists had risen to a level that made them
impossible to ignore, but the GON had been doing just that.
Each problem needed to be dealt with one-by-one, satisfying
each group before moving on to the problems of the next. The
Ambassador stressed the need for a comprehensive solution to
all the problems, calling all the groups together to
negotiate a solution that would satisfy everyone. He
cautioned against a piecemeal approach that would encourage
other groups to raise their grievances in a similar way. MK
Nepal disagreed, touting a familiar line that appeasement of
each group's demands was the only way to go.

Deuba: Problems Are All Political
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3. (C) In a separate meeting March 1, President of the NC-D
Sher Bahadur Deuba stated that all of the problems facing
Nepal were political. The unrest in the Terai did not arise
from legitimate complaints -- the Terai was the most
developed part of the country, with good roads, education,
health care, and water. Instead, people in the region had
taken advantage of a political vacuum to cause trouble.
Janajatis and Dalits, on the other hand, had legitimate
concerns that needed to be addressed by the Constituent
Assembly. (Note: Deuba is from a hill district in
far-western Nepal. His lack of concern for the Terai could
stem from the fact that his own ancestral area is one of the
least-developed in the country. End note.) The Ambassador
stressed to Deuba that the problems in the Terai would not go
away and could not be ignored. Deuba agreed that the Terai
needed to be addressed, but showed reluctance to acknowledge
the complaints of that region.

MK Nepal: PM Failed, Should Step Down
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4. (C) MK Nepal stressed that many of the problems currently
facing the nation, from the Terai to the Maoists, existed
because the PM and the ruling Nepali Congress (NC) party were
unable to rule the country effectively. The PM should
concentrate only on elections and publicly hold the Maoists
accountable for their commitments in the peace process. No
one else could do this in today's political situation. The
PM was not meeting with MK Nepal or consulting with the other
parties on important decisions. Considering his poor

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physical health, the PM needed to pass responsibility for
important decisions over to others in the party. MK Nepal
suggested that Koirala give up the Prime Minister position
and form a team of people from different parties that "would
take responsibility for the nation." Koirala could stay on
as a senior advisor to the team.

Both Agree: Home Minister Should Go
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5. (C) MK Nepal declared that Home Minister Krishna Prasad
Sitaula should resign for the good of the nation. Both MK
Nepal and Deuba faulted the PM for not acting upon the
demands for Sitaula's resignation, which had been coming from
Terai-based groups, the Seven-Party Alliance (SPA),and from
within the GON itself. Why had the PM been protecting
Sitaula's position and why were the Maoists so keen to see
Sitaula stay on, MK Nepal queried? The Home Minister had
made a huge mistake when he chose not to enforce law and
order across the country. The Home Minister had never
insisted during negotiations with the Maoists that the
Maoists live up to their commitments in the numerous
agreements signed with the GON. Deuba agreed that the Home
Minister should resign.

Law Enforcement Key, But Lacking
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6. (C) MK Nepal and Deuba both agreed that law and order
needed to be effectively and quickly restored across the
country. The GON had still taken the line that it could not
enforce law and order against the Maoists for fear of pushing
them out of the peace process. It was high time, however,
according to Deuba, that the GON begin doing so. MK Nepal
sated that, as long as the Maoists were allowed to continue
with violence, extortion, and intimidation, they would be
able to pull off a victory in an election. Deuba similarly
stated that the failure of the GON to take action against
Lokendra Bista, a Maoist Member of Parliament who brought a
weapon to the floor of Parliament and made threats, showed
the public how powerful the Maoists had become, and that the
GON was not serious about holding them accountable. The
Maoists had also not been held accountable for the killing of
the young man in Lahan that had started the first round of
unrest in the Terai six weeks earlier. Until the GON
enforced law and order against Maoist violations, there could
not be a free and fair election.

MK Nepal: Maoists Into Interim Government Immediately
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7. (C) MK Nepal argued that the Maoists needed to be brought
into an interim government as quickly as possible. The
Maoists had not yet taken responsibility for their actions
because they were not in the government, but once they
entered, they would be held accountable by the people and
would have to begin living up to their commitments. The
Ambassador stated that such a move would seemingly reward the
Maoists for bad behavior, allowing them into the government
while they still engaged in violence, extortion, and
intimidation across the country. MK Nepal responded that it
had to be made clear to the Maoists that such activity would
not be tolerated once they were in the government, and that
they had to change and sign a commitment in writing. The
Ambassador reminded MK Nepal that there were many such
written agreements already that the Maoists were not living
up to. MK Nepal dismissed the Ambassador's criticisms and
reiterated that the Maoists needed to be brought in
immediately.

Deuba: Maoist Entry Into Government Should Be Delayed
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8. (C) Deuba stated that MK Nepal was "absolutely wrong"
about the Maoists changing if they were brought into the
interim government. They were not supposed to have been let
into the Interim Parliament until arms management had been
completed, and the GON had caved on that. It would be
terrible to let the Maoists in now without a change in their
behavior to show their good faith in the process. Changing

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the mindset of the Maoists would take time, but it would
happen. The Maoists needed to spend another year living a
"five-star life" in Kathmandu; then they be seduced and
forget about violence and intimidation and enter into
politics for real. The Maoists had lost the battle of
patience in the political process thus far, becoming weaker
by the day. If the SPA could remain patient over the next
few months and hold out on letting the Maoists into the
interim government until they live up to their commitments,
things might work out okay.

Disagreement Over Timing of Elections
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9. (C) MK Nepal stressed that the election to a Constituent
Assembly needed to be held in June according to the timeline
set out in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Realizing they
had lost power in the Terai and were losing power in many of
the rural districts as well, the Maoists now wanted to delay
the election as long as possible so they could recapture
their advantage. The GON had spent too much time on the
interim constitution and on "minor problems" like the unrest
in the Terai when it should have been focusing on holding the
election immediately. Deuba stated that elections should be
delayed by "at least a year" in order to give the Maoists
time to show their commitment to a democratic system and give
the GON time to set up an electoral system in a free and fair
way for all citizens. The Maoists had continued to engage in
atrocities because they planned to "terrorize the nation"
during the election to ensure that they would win. If an
election were held in June, the Maoists would almost
certainly win because of fear in the countryside.

Maoist Strategy Changing, But Not Goal
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10. (C) MK Nepal and Deuba agreed that the Maoist goal of
grabbing a monopoly on state power had not changed. MK Nepal
said that whenever any of the political leaders had
criticized the Maoists in public, Prachanda had become
outraged and told them to stop. Deuba complained that Maoist
actions had not changed in the countryside, and worried that
the outcome of the current situation did not look positive.

Maoist End-Game; Depose PM
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11. (C) Narayan Khadka, a leader in the NC-D, told the
Ambassador in a separate meeting on March 1 that he saw two
possible end-games in which the Maoists would be able to push
the PM out of office and seize power of the state. First,
they could use the issue of the monarchy. Prachanda had
already stated that the Maoists would push for a republic to
be declared immediately by the Parliament. (Note: Such a
decision would require amendment of the interim constitution,
which declared that the fate of the monarchy would be decided
by the first sitting of the Constituent Assembly. End note.)
If the Maoists brought such a bill to the floor of the
Parliament, and the PM stood up against it, it would likely
spell the end for the PM -- students from all the parties
might surround the palace and force the King out themselves.
If this didn't happen, the Maoists could use any delay in the
date of the Constituent Assembly election to press for the PM
to step down. They could place the blame for any delay
squarely on the PM's shoulders. If he refused to step down,
the Maoists could potentially surround the PM's residence and
force him out. Khadka argued that either of these outcomes
would facilitate a quick takeover of power by the Maoists.
The Maoists had already moved in this direction by calling
for more action in the streets to support their demands.

Comment
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12. (C) The Maoists are using the divisions in the SPA to
play the parties off of one another for their own ends. MK
Nepal is playing a dangerous game by calling for Maoist entry
into the interim government immediately without any show of
good faith from their side. Even more dangerous, his
proposal of running the nation with a "team" would make the

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GON even more dysfunctional that it already is. The Maoists
have not given up their goal of a monopoly on state power.
The ruling SPA will continue to muddle through as best it
can. We will continue to push for unity within the SPA and
for a firm line against allowing the Maoists into the interim
government until arms management is complete.
MORIARTY