NEPAL: PARTY LEADERS FEAR UNCERTAIN FUTURE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 000469 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2017 TAGS: PGOV PTER NP SUBJECT: NEPAL: PARTY LEADERS FEAR UNCERTAIN FUTURE Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In separate meetings on February 29 and March 1, leaders of the Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) and the Nepali Congress-Democratic (NC-D) told the Ambassador they were not optimistic about the prospects for Nepal in light of Maoist insincerity. Political leaders have begun playing politics in earnest, and although they disagreed about Maoist entry into an interim government and the proposed Constituent Assembly election, they agreed that the Prime Minister and Home Minister had done a terrible job in negotiations with the Maoists. Effective enforcement of law and order would be key to holding Constituent Assembly elections in June, they acknowledged, although most people realized that holding polls that soon would be nearly impossible. Maoist strategy had changed, but their goal remained the same: a monopoly on state power. One political leader said that the Maoist end-game was to remove the Prime Minister from power, either by exploiting public sentiment regarding the King or by placing the blame for the delay in the election squarely on the PM's shoulders. MK Nepal: Deal With Problems One By One -------------- ¶2. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador on February 28, General Secretary of the CPN-UML Madhav Kumar (MK) Nepal said that the Government of Nepal (GON) needed to give serious attention to all the issues facing the country. The unrest in the Terai (southern Nepal along the border with India), the complaints of the Janajatis and dalits, and the problems with the Maoists had risen to a level that made them impossible to ignore, but the GON had been doing just that. Each problem needed to be dealt with one-by-one, satisfying each group before moving on to the problems of the next. The Ambassador stressed the need for a comprehensive solution to all the problems, calling all the groups together to negotiate a solution that would satisfy everyone. He cautioned against a piecemeal approach that would encourage other groups to raise their grievances in a similar way. MK Nepal disagreed, touting a familiar line that appeasement of each group's demands was the only way to go. Deuba: Problems Are All Political -------------- ¶3. (C) In a separate meeting March 1, President of the NC-D Sher Bahadur Deuba stated that all of the problems facing Nepal were political. The unrest in the Terai did not arise from legitimate complaints -- the Terai was the most developed part of the country, with good roads, education, health care, and water. Instead, people in the region had taken advantage of a political vacuum to cause trouble. Janajatis and Dalits, on the other hand, had legitimate concerns that needed to be addressed by the Constituent Assembly. (Note: Deuba is from a hill district in far-western Nepal. His lack of concern for the Terai could stem from the fact that his own ancestral area is one of the least-developed in the country. End note.) The Ambassador stressed to Deuba that the problems in the Terai would not go away and could not be ignored. Deuba agreed that the Terai needed to be addressed, but showed reluctance to acknowledge the complaints of that region. MK Nepal: PM Failed, Should Step Down -------------- ¶4. (C) MK Nepal stressed that many of the problems currently facing the nation, from the Terai to the Maoists, existed because the PM and the ruling Nepali Congress (NC) party were unable to rule the country effectively. The PM should concentrate only on elections and publicly hold the Maoists accountable for their commitments in the peace process. No one else could do this in today's political situation. The PM was not meeting with MK Nepal or consulting with the other parties on important decisions. Considering his poor KATHMANDU 00000469 002 OF 004 physical health, the PM needed to pass responsibility for important decisions over to others in the party. MK Nepal suggested that Koirala give up the Prime Minister position and form a team of people from different parties that "would take responsibility for the nation." Koirala could stay on as a senior advisor to the team. Both Agree: Home Minister Should Go -------------- ¶5. (C) MK Nepal declared that Home Minister Krishna Prasad Sitaula should resign for the good of the nation. Both MK Nepal and Deuba faulted the PM for not acting upon the demands for Sitaula's resignation, which had been coming from Terai-based groups, the Seven-Party Alliance (SPA),and from within the GON itself. Why had the PM been protecting Sitaula's position and why were the Maoists so keen to see Sitaula stay on, MK Nepal queried? The Home Minister had made a huge mistake when he chose not to enforce law and order across the country. The Home Minister had never insisted during negotiations with the Maoists that the Maoists live up to their commitments in the numerous agreements signed with the GON. Deuba agreed that the Home Minister should resign. Law Enforcement Key, But Lacking -------------- ¶6. (C) MK Nepal and Deuba both agreed that law and order needed to be effectively and quickly restored across the country. The GON had still taken the line that it could not enforce law and order against the Maoists for fear of pushing them out of the peace process. It was high time, however, according to Deuba, that the GON begin doing so. MK Nepal sated that, as long as the Maoists were allowed to continue with violence, extortion, and intimidation, they would be able to pull off a victory in an election. Deuba similarly stated that the failure of the GON to take action against Lokendra Bista, a Maoist Member of Parliament who brought a weapon to the floor of Parliament and made threats, showed the public how powerful the Maoists had become, and that the GON was not serious about holding them accountable. The Maoists had also not been held accountable for the killing of the young man in Lahan that had started the first round of unrest in the Terai six weeks earlier. Until the GON enforced law and order against Maoist violations, there could not be a free and fair election. MK Nepal: Maoists Into Interim Government Immediately -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) MK Nepal argued that the Maoists needed to be brought into an interim government as quickly as possible. The Maoists had not yet taken responsibility for their actions because they were not in the government, but once they entered, they would be held accountable by the people and would have to begin living up to their commitments. The Ambassador stated that such a move would seemingly reward the Maoists for bad behavior, allowing them into the government while they still engaged in violence, extortion, and intimidation across the country. MK Nepal responded that it had to be made clear to the Maoists that such activity would not be tolerated once they were in the government, and that they had to change and sign a commitment in writing. The Ambassador reminded MK Nepal that there were many such written agreements already that the Maoists were not living up to. MK Nepal dismissed the Ambassador's criticisms and reiterated that the Maoists needed to be brought in immediately. Deuba: Maoist Entry Into Government Should Be Delayed -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Deuba stated that MK Nepal was "absolutely wrong" about the Maoists changing if they were brought into the interim government. They were not supposed to have been let into the Interim Parliament until arms management had been completed, and the GON had caved on that. It would be terrible to let the Maoists in now without a change in their behavior to show their good faith in the process. Changing KATHMANDU 00000469 003 OF 004 the mindset of the Maoists would take time, but it would happen. The Maoists needed to spend another year living a "five-star life" in Kathmandu; then they be seduced and forget about violence and intimidation and enter into politics for real. The Maoists had lost the battle of patience in the political process thus far, becoming weaker by the day. If the SPA could remain patient over the next few months and hold out on letting the Maoists into the interim government until they live up to their commitments, things might work out okay. Disagreement Over Timing of Elections -------------- ¶9. (C) MK Nepal stressed that the election to a Constituent Assembly needed to be held in June according to the timeline set out in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Realizing they had lost power in the Terai and were losing power in many of the rural districts as well, the Maoists now wanted to delay the election as long as possible so they could recapture their advantage. The GON had spent too much time on the interim constitution and on "minor problems" like the unrest in the Terai when it should have been focusing on holding the election immediately. Deuba stated that elections should be delayed by "at least a year" in order to give the Maoists time to show their commitment to a democratic system and give the GON time to set up an electoral system in a free and fair way for all citizens. The Maoists had continued to engage in atrocities because they planned to "terrorize the nation" during the election to ensure that they would win. If an election were held in June, the Maoists would almost certainly win because of fear in the countryside. Maoist Strategy Changing, But Not Goal -------------- ¶10. (C) MK Nepal and Deuba agreed that the Maoist goal of grabbing a monopoly on state power had not changed. MK Nepal said that whenever any of the political leaders had criticized the Maoists in public, Prachanda had become outraged and told them to stop. Deuba complained that Maoist actions had not changed in the countryside, and worried that the outcome of the current situation did not look positive. Maoist End-Game; Depose PM -------------- ¶11. (C) Narayan Khadka, a leader in the NC-D, told the Ambassador in a separate meeting on March 1 that he saw two possible end-games in which the Maoists would be able to push the PM out of office and seize power of the state. First, they could use the issue of the monarchy. Prachanda had already stated that the Maoists would push for a republic to be declared immediately by the Parliament. (Note: Such a decision would require amendment of the interim constitution, which declared that the fate of the monarchy would be decided by the first sitting of the Constituent Assembly. End note.) If the Maoists brought such a bill to the floor of the Parliament, and the PM stood up against it, it would likely spell the end for the PM -- students from all the parties might surround the palace and force the King out themselves. If this didn't happen, the Maoists could use any delay in the date of the Constituent Assembly election to press for the PM to step down. They could place the blame for any delay squarely on the PM's shoulders. If he refused to step down, the Maoists could potentially surround the PM's residence and force him out. Khadka argued that either of these outcomes would facilitate a quick takeover of power by the Maoists. The Maoists had already moved in this direction by calling for more action in the streets to support their demands. Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) The Maoists are using the divisions in the SPA to play the parties off of one another for their own ends. MK Nepal is playing a dangerous game by calling for Maoist entry into the interim government immediately without any show of good faith from their side. Even more dangerous, his proposal of running the nation with a "team" would make the KATHMANDU 00000469 004 OF 004 GON even more dysfunctional that it already is. The Maoists have not given up their goal of a monopoly on state power. The ruling SPA will continue to muddle through as best it can. We will continue to push for unity within the SPA and for a firm line against allowing the Maoists into the interim government until arms management is complete. MORIARTY