NEPAL: COAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE MAOISTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000437 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2017 TAGS: PGOV MASS PREL PTER PHUM NP SUBJECT: NEPAL: COAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE MAOISTS Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C/NF) General Rukmangud Katawal, Chief of Army Staff of the Nepal Army (NA),told the Ambassador February 26 that the Maoists were not serious about arms management or joining a democratic system. The NA was the last shield against a Maoist takeover, and the U.S. should not abandon it. The NA's "political masters" had not been listening to Katawal's suggestions on negotiations with the Maoists. The POLITICAL leadership did not support the NA, and Katawal worried that the Maoists were on a path to a totalitarian state which they controlled. The NA would not allow the Maoists to take control of the state in an unconstitutional way. The Ambassador pushed Katawal on responsibility for past human rights abuses. Katawal pledged to help in any way he could without damaging the morale of the NA. Maoists Are Not Serious -------------- ¶2. (C/NF) On February 26, Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Rukmangud Katawal told the Ambassador that the Maoists were not serious about peaceful entry into a democratic system. The arms management exercise had not been done well, with the Maoists putting weapons into storage containers that did not match up, by type, with the list of weapons captured by the Maoists from the NA and Nepal's other security forces. The NA's attempts to push back in the UN-Government-Maoist Joint Monitoring Coordinating Committee (JMCC) had gone unheeded. Maoist participants in the JMCC had spent much of the time complaining about the actions by NA participants, claiming that the NA was trying to roll over them. The Maoists also retained weapons, including AK-47s, that had not been captured from the Government of Nepal and had also been registering crummy weapons brought from India, as the Ambassador had stated to the media. The NA had shared this information with the police, informing them of arms trafficking routes and types, but the police had turned a "blind eye." Political Leaders Are The Problem -------------- ¶3. (C/NF) Katawal worried that the POLITICAL party leaders were handing the country over to the Maoists and were afraid to stand up to the Maoists on anything. The Maoists had been able to use the politicians to their advantage by dividing them. The biggest mistake the government had made thus far was to make Krishna Sitaula simultaneously Home Minister and head of the government's negotiation team, two contradictory responsibilities. The POLITICAL leaders had not supported the NA; Katawal recounted a situation in which a general spoke out about POLITICAL issues incorrectly to the press, and Katawal was hauled before Parliament to give an explanation and apologize, then was required to take action against the general. Why, Katawal asked, were the Maoists not held to the same standards when they violated the Peace Agreement almost daily? The POLITICAL double standard for the NA and the Maoists had caused mounting frustration for the COAS. Maoists On A Path To Total Takeover -------------- ¶4. (C/NF) Katawal complained that politicians throughout the country were not able to do anything effective because of continuing threats from the Maoists. Both inside and outside the Kathmandu Valley, POLITICAL leaders had told Katawal that they would take action against the Maoists if the NA would protect them and their families. Katawal had responded that the NA was unable to do that without orders from the Prime Minister. The country did not belong to the Maoists, even though the politicians seemed to be handing it over wholesale to them. Katawal had made it clear to the Prime Minister that, if he decided to stand up against the Maoists, the NA would back him completely. KATHMANDU 00000437 002 OF 002 NA Will Not Allow A Takeover -------------- ¶5. (C/NF) Katawal said that the NA would not allow an extreme leftist government to take over Nepal and asked whether the U.S. would stand behind him. The Ambassador responded that the U.S. would support any constitutional effort to stop unconstitutional behavior by the Maoists. The Ambassador made it clear, however, that the U.S. would not support any extra-constitutional action by the NA. Katawal quickly replied that any action to NA might take would be in support of the civilian authorities. He reiterated his call for the U.S. "not to give up" on Nepal, and not to let the Maoists take over. The NA was the vanguard of the democratic forces in Nepal, and would do all it could to help the government succeed in bringing the Maoists into a peaceful mainstream. Royal Secretariat To Be Replaced -------------- ¶6. (C/NF) Katawal said he planned to remove the battalion of soldiers from the royal palace, and the government planned to decrease the size of the palace civilian secretariat. The government would replace the King's secretary (the highest advisor to the King) with someone who was accountable to the interim parliament. Human Rights Abuses: No Accountability In Sight -------------- -- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador pushed Katawal hard on accountability by the NA for past human rights abuses, specifically the Maina Sunwar rape and killing case. Katawal responded that there had been an investigation into most cases of abuse, and wondered what more he could do. The morale of the NA was his responsibility, and he would not do anything that would endanger that. Furthermore, after one investigation into 49 alleged disappearance cases at the Bhairavnath Battalion, 11 or 12 had been accounted for, proving in the COAS's mind that many allegations were false. The NA was there to protect the public from the Maoists during the war. Mistakes had happened, but the NA needed to look forward. The Ambassador strongly suggested that the NA needed to take more action at all levels to account for past abuses, including responding to inquiries from the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Katawal stated that his office and the NA stood ready to help with police investigations as necessary, but made no indication that he would respond to OHCHR or that he would look into past cases of abuse. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C/NF) Katawal is growing increasingly frustrated with the lack of leadership from his POLITICAL masters. He has repeatedly tested the waters only to be told that the U.S. would not support extra-constitutional action by the NA. His adamant stance against the Maoists and close relationship with the PM will likely boost the PM to hold a line against allowing the Maoists into an interim government until the arms management exercise has been completed. We will continue to push the COAS to stand strongly behind the civilian leadership. We will also urge the NA leadership to focus on past abuses and hold those responsible accountable while continuing to adopt best practices human rights standards in the Nepal Army. MORIARTY