NEPAL: PM CONCERNED ABOUT MAOISTS AND KING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000416

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: PM CONCERNED ABOUT MAOISTS AND KING

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
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1. (C) Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala expressed concern
to the Ambassador February 22 that the UN arms management
exercise had not been satisfactorily completed. Although the
UN had told the PM that the quantity of weapons was
satisfactory, the PM was not satisfied that enough weapons
had been locked up or that the weapons of Maoist protective
details had been accounted for. The Government of Nepal
(GON) did not want to allow the Maoists into the government
until the registration and verification process was complete,
but felt pressure from the Maoists and the UN to do just
that. The GON was upset about the Maoist combatants leaving
their cantonment in Chitwan but pleased that the UN had so
quickly condemned the action. Regarding the unrest in the
Terai, the PM stated that an inclusive round-table conference
was necessary to find a comprehensive solution to the
problems for all marginalized peoples. The PM worried about
the recent speech given by the King, acknowledging that the
King was a distraction that the Maoists could use to their
advantage.

Arms Management Not Satisfactory
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2. (C) On February 22, Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala
told the Ambassador that he was worried about the UN arms
management exercise. The types and quality of weapons that
had gone into the containers in the Maoist cantonments was
not enough to satisfy the GON, although the UN had said that
the weapons exercise was satisfactory. Dr. Suresh Chalise,
the PM's Foreign Policy Advisor, added that the UN had told
the GON that the list of weapons turned in "broadly
corresponded" with the list of captured weapons the GON gave
to the UN. The Ambassador suggested that the government tell
the UN-led Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee that the
weapons were not sufficient and demand that the Maoists
produce more of their high-quality weapons before the
exercise was considered complete. The Prime Minister said
his bottom line was that all monitoring equipment would need
to be in place and the second stage of verification (where
the UN culls the non-combatants out of the camps) needed to
be completed before he could consider arms management
complete.

Registering for Maoist Protective Details
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3. (C) The PM said there would be a decision soon on the
weapons carried by Maoist protective details. Only a small
amount of weapons would be allowed for small number of people
in the details, and such protection would only be provided
for the highest levels of the Maoist leadership. All of
these weapons would need to be registered by the UN
monitoring team. In order to make the weapons held by the
protective details legal, Chalise noted, the GON planned to
legally license and register the weapons outside of the UN
process as well. The Ambassador added that such a step would
make it easier to identify illegally held weapons by Maoist
militia in the countryside, which would be an important step
toward relieving fear of Maoist intimidation in those rural
areas.

Pressure From the UN
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4. (C) Both the PM and Chalise felt pressure from the UN to
accept arms management as complete and move forward on an
interim government soon. Chalise said that Ian Martin, the
UN Secretary General's Special Representative to Nepal, had
"not been keen to separate the Maoist militia from the
People's Liberation Army combatants" in the cantonments.
Chalise made it clear that the GON would not allow the
Maoists into the government until arms management was
complete but complained that pressure from the UN and the
Maoists was making this stance more difficult. The

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Ambassador stressed that the U.S. would support the decision
made by the GON regarding arms management and that he would
speak with Martin later in the day to discuss the issue
(septel).

Departure From Cantonments a Serious Breach
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5. (C) The PM said that the departure of nearly 3,000 Maoist
combatants from the third division cantonment in Chitwan was
a serious breach of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. He
was pleased that the UN had taken a strong stance against the
move. The Ambassador promised to publicly condemn the action
as well; the Maoists had made a tactical mistake that hurt
their credibility in negotiations and the GON should also
condemn it.

Delay in Election Likely
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6. (C) The Ambassador asked whether the PM believed the
Maoists were attempting to put off the election to the
Constituent Assembly by walking out of the camps. While the
PM said he could not speak to the intentions of the Maoists,
he suspected that the elections would not be held in June as
expected; the GON, however, did not want to be blamed by the
Maoists for any delay so no one in the GON would say anything
publicly about the possibility.

Terai - No Solution Forthcoming
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7. (C) The PM said that a round-table conference that
included people from all marginalized groups was the only way
to find a comprehensive solution to the problem in the Terai.
The Ambassador told the PM that the U.S. would help in any
way it could, and hoped that the PM could find a way to make
such talks happen quickly.

Worry Over King's Actions
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8. (C/NF) The Prime Minister said that the King's February 19
speech was objectionable and that he had expressed those
sentiments to the King's secretary. The King was the lesser
of two evils to worry about, because he did not have strong
grassroots support like the Maoists. However, the Maoists
were using the issue of the monarchy to gain support and
exert pressure on the GON to move toward a democratic
republican setup for the country. The PM believed he was
being dragged toward supporting a republic by the Maoists and
other parties, and worried that if the King pulled another
stunt like the speech, the PM would have no choice but to go
along.

(C/NF) Abdication a Good Option - But Unlikely
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9. (C/NF) The Ambassador asked whether the PM still supported
the idea of the King and the Crown Prince abdicating in favor
of the Crown Prince's young son. The PM responded that that
was what should happen, and the son should be put into
regency under the GON. If the Nepal Army asked the King to
abdicate, he might concede, but the PM did not think the NA
would ask. If the monarchy were to survive as an
institution, the King would have to abdicate, the PM
stressed, but he acknowledged that he had no idea whether
this would ever happen.

Comment
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10. (C) While the Prime Minister has a strong position on
arms management, he does not have clear action plans on any
of the other main issues facing Nepal today, the unrest in
the Terai or the King. Overloaded by multiple challenges and
internal Seven-Party Alliance-Maoist divisions, the GON
continues to let problems fester until they become even more
unmanageable. That said, the GON's position is by no means

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untenable. For the most part, the Madhesis and other
marginalized groups want a greater say in the running of the
state, not independence. Moreover, the Maoists have seen
their support among the Madhesis virtually disappear.
Additionally, when the Maoists walked out of their
cantonments, the government potentially gained some leverage
in ongoing negotiations about arms management and forming the
interim government. We will continue to urge the GON to
press forward on all fronts.
MORIARTY