PM'S ADVISOR ASKS FOR HELP ON ARMS MANAGEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000406 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2017 TAGS: PGOV PTER NP SUBJECT: PM'S ADVISOR ASKS FOR HELP ON ARMS MANAGEMENT Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Dr. Suresh Chalise, Prime Minister Koirala's Foreign Policy Advisor, expressed concern to the DCM February 20 about UN pressure to accept the results of the arms management exercise without effective monitoring mechanisms in place. The UN had submitted a report to the Government of Nepal (GON) on February 19, Chalise noted. The list did not contain information about the weapons of the Maoist protective security details, a contentious subject which the GON is negotiating with the Maoists. The Maoists had been ratcheting up the pressure on the GON to allow them into an interim government soon. The GON was concerned about the problems in the Terai and hoped to find an acceptable solution soon. The King's speech on February 19 had raised suspicion within the GON regarding the King's intentions and concerning the loyalty of the Nepal Army (NA) to the GON. UN Submits Report to GON -------------- ¶2. (C/NF) On February 20, the Prime Minister's Foreign Policy Advisor, Dr. Suresh Chalise, told the DCM that the PM had asked him to raise GON concern with the U.S. about UN pressure to accept the results of the arms management exercise without the alarms and monitoring mechanisms envisioned in the November Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in place. The UN had submitted a preliminary report to the GON on February 19. (Please protect. Note: Content of the list is below. Chalise asked that Post protect the contents of the list and not divulge to the UN that Post had seen it. End Note.) The GON, the Maoists, and the UN were still wrangling over registration of the weapons of Maoist protective details. The GON wanted only central Maoist leaders to have armed protection, not lower-level cadre. Repeatedly asked for the GON's assessment of the UN report, Chalise said that the GON could accept the number of weapons and combatants registered by the UN (3,379 and 30,852 respectively). GON Wants U.S. Help to Counter Pressure From the UN -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Chalise stated that the GON was concerned about the pressure it was receiving from the UN to accept the report as "sufficient" without an effective monitoring regimen. The GON felt that the UN had implicitly applied pressure on the GON to accept the report as completion of arms management. Chalise worried that the UN would use its moral authority to declare that the registered weapons and combatants "broadly correspond in quantity and quality" with what was reported captured by the GON. The GON felt pressure from the UN to agree that the registration was "acceptable" and that it should allow the Maoists into an interim government once the armed protective detail issue was resolved. Chalise asked for U.S. assistance to apply pressure on the UN, both here and in New York if necessary, to reduce UN pressure on the GON to accept arms management as complete. The DCM stated that Post would do what it could to help the GON. Chalise wanted to hold out until alarms, cameras, and monitoring mechanisms were in place in the Maoist cantonments before considering the exercise complete. Maoists Applying Pressure to Enter Interim Government -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Chalise said that the Maoists had ratcheted up the pressure on the GON to allow them into an interim government. Statements from Maoist Supremo Prachanda, coupled with the perceived pressure from the UN, were making it more difficult for the GON to hold on to its bottom line not to let the Maoists in before the second stage of UN registration of combatants was complete. The DCM told Chalise that the U.S. expected that a transparent UN process of registration, verification, and monitoring would be complete before the Maoists were allowed into the government. Chalise stated KATHMANDU 00000406 002 OF 003 that he expected the GON and the Maoists to come to an agreement on the weapons of the Maoist protective details in the next few days, and he did not know how long the GON could hold out after this. Terai: Unsolved Problem is a Concern -------------- ¶5. (C) Chalise asked the DCM if he believed that the resignation of Home Minister Krishna Prasad Sitaula would work as a "silver bullet" to solve the ongoing unrest in the Terai. The DCM responded that effective dialogue that treated the problem of representation in a comprehensive way would be a start to solving the problem. Chalise stressed that the demands of the Madhesi groups were getting more hard-line, and he was concerned that dialogue could create more problems than it solved. The DCM stressed that this was all the more reason to begin dialogue sooner rather than later, and as part of a comprehensive dialogue with all marginalized groups. King's Speech Raises GON Suspicion of Palace and Army -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) The DCM made it clear that the King's February 19 speech was unfortunate, both in its content and timing. At a moment when the King could have remained silent or taken the opportunity to show his support for the newly formed democracy in Nepal, he had instead presented a fallacious justification of his February 2005 takeover and the reinstatement of Parliament. Chalise said that the GON did not know from whom the King was receiving advice, but stressed that the GON was concerned about the intentions and actions of the King. He further worried about a potential alliance between the King and the Nepal Army (NA). The DCM said that the NA thus far had given a clear impression of submission to civilian leadership. The Embassy had close contact with the NA to promote democracy and human rights, and the NA had made progress in those areas. The U.S. had also told the NA in no uncertain terms that any extra-constitutional action would be a serious mistake. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) We will make it clear to the UN team here in Nepal that applying pressure to the GON to allow the Maoists into an interim government before arms management has been completed and monitoring mechanisms are in place is unacceptable. The UN has too often pressured the GON to accept the demands of the Maoists throughout peace negotiations, including during the negotiations on the Arms Management Agreement and the CPA. It does not appear that the GON has a plan for solving the problem in the Terai but rather continues to stand transfixed by unrest in that troubled region. Concern about potential threats from the King and the NA will likely only serve to increase the pressure the GON feels to move forward quickly on the formation of an interim government including the Maoists. (C/NF) Content of UN Arms Monitoring Report -------------- ¶8. (C/NF) Below is the list of weapons and combatants registered by the UN in each of the seven main Maoist cantonment sites: Begin list. Camp 1 - 3,221 combatants, 345 weapons (341 operational and 4 inoperational) Camp 2 - 2,833 combatants, 242 weapons (206 operational and 36 inoperational) Camp 3 - 5,830 combatants, 699 weapons (584 operational and 115 inoperational) Camp 4 - 5,026 combatants, 466 weapons (371 operational and 95 inoperational) Camp 5 - 4,138 combatants, 463 weapons (330 operational and 133 inoperational) KATHMANDU 00000406 003 OF 003 Camp 6 - 4,729 combatants, 482 weapons (432 operational and 50 inoperational) Camp 7 - 5,075 combatants, 446 weapons (379 operational and 67 inoperational) Total - 30,852 combatants, 3,379 weapons (2,876 operational and 503 inoperational) Of the total weapons, 524 were being utilized for perimeter security at the camps. Partial listing of weapons, by type: - 28 AK-47s - 1,217 .303 Enfields - 357 7.62mm Self-Loading Rifles (SLRs) - 167 5.56mm Indian Small Arms System (INSAS) - 18 M-16s - 35 Sub-Machine Guns (SMGs) - 68 Shotguns End list. (Note: The number of weapons does not add up in either section above. We are unsure of the reason for the inconsistencies. End note.) MORIARTY