NEPAL CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF FEELS BELEAGUERED, SEEKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000024 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2017 TAGS: PREF PREL PGOV NP SUBJECT: NEPAL CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF FEELS BELEAGUERED, SEEKS ALLIES KATHMANDU 00000024 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty for reasons 1.4(b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C/NF) In a January 4 meeting with Ambassador Moriarty, Chief of Army Staff Rookmangud Katawal worried that armed Maoists were occupying strategic locations in and around Kathmandu and questioned why they had not been sent to cantonment sites. Katawal felt somewhat beleaguered, with little support from the political parties or the government. Katawal feared that once Maoists entered an interim government, they would push for his removal. Katawal bemoaned the nearly "totalitarian" power granted to the Prime Minister by the draft interim constitution and intimated that he was working behind the scenes to seek substantial revision of the draft. He feared that once the Maoists entered an interim Parliament, they would grab a majority and replace PM Koirala with Prachanda. He reassured the Ambassador that he had conveyed the message to King Gyanendra that a political resurgence was out of the question and that the King should consider abdicating in favor of his grandson. Katawal reaffirmed his commitment to civilian control over the Nepal Army. Katawal also stressed that he had initiated programs to improve civil-military relationships. "Situation in Nepal Deteriorating Fast" -------------- ¶2. (C) On January 4, Ambassador Moriarty met with Nepal's Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Rookmangud Katawal, to discuss current events in Nepal and to thank the Nepal Army (NA) for agreeing to participate in the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). Citing impressions garnered from an EmbOff's recent trip through the West and Mid-west regions of Nepal (septel),the Ambassador described the pervasive climate of fear and intimidation that existed as a result of continued Maoist threats and extortion in nearly all parts of the country. Katawal agreed, opining that the "situation in Nepal is deteriorating fast." Katawal was particularly concerned that armed Maoists were occupying strategic locations in and around the Kathmandu Valley and seemingly had no intention of reporting to cantonment sites. Katawal said he had discussed this issue with Deputy Prime Minister and Health Minister Amrit Sherchan, a close friend of the Maoists. He had warned Sherchan that, as Deputy PM, he would be under direct threat from the Maoists if they were to take military action in Kathmandu. Nepal Army, the "Punching Bag" -------------- ¶3. (C/NF) Katawal expressed concern several times that the political parties were treating the Nepal Army like a "punching bag" in order to garner public support in the current political climate. Katawal emphasized the need to keep the NA intact until the Maoists were completely disarmed and peace was secured. Katawal, in an aside to the Ambassador, feared, in particular, reprisals against his office once the Maoists were part of an interim government. He intimated that if the political parties or Maoists were to "touch" him, elements within the NA would "revolt." (Note. In response to the Ambassador's concern that such statements sounded seditious, Katawal publicly added that he was referring to what would happen if the Maoists attempted extra-constitutional action against him. Katawal's senior aide, Brigadier General Pande, later caveated Katawal's assertion, suggesting that elements within the NA would oppose such a move, but not revolt. End Note.) Promulgation of Interim Constitution Must Be Stopped -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C/NF) Bemoaning the absence of democratic principles in the interim constitution, particularly the amount of power KATHMANDU 00000024 002.2 OF 003 placed in the hands of the Prime Minister, Katawal said he opposed its promulgation in its current form. He had discussed his concerns with the Chief Justice and Speaker of the House and had requested their support for a major review of the interim constitution. "The Chief Justice should not be required to swear an oath before Parliament," he said. Katawal also reported that he had met recently with former Chief Justice Shubayash Upadhyay, who was also PM Koirala's mentor. According to Katawal, Upadhyay had urged the Prime Minister not to allow promulgation of the interim constitution without significant revision, but doubted whether the PM could maintain a strong stance on this issue, especially considering his poor health and opposing views from other political advisors. Katawal noted that PM Koirala had not been able to receive official visitors for the past two days due to illness. ¶5. (C/NF) Katawal believed that, if the current draft of the interim constitution were promulgated and the Maoists became part of an Interim Parliament, they would seize control. With their superior cunning and disciplined approach, Katawal worried, the Maoists would take advantage of fractures within the other political parties, ally themselves with elements within the Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML),and seize control of the legislature. Katawal claimed that a majority of CPN-UML cadre were already with the Maoists either willingingly or under threat. With this advantage, he feared, the Maoists could replace Prime Minister Koirala with Prachanda. "Non-democratic forces should not be allowed to take over the country," he said. Katawal later added that as long as the Maoists came into mainstream political power by legitimate means, the Nepal Army would "nod and salute." If the Maoists were to seize power illegitimately, he implied, the army would not accept it and be forced to act. Nepal Army Secretariat at the Palace -------------- ¶6. (C/NF) In response to the Ambassador's query whether the NA had removed its Secretariat from the Royal Palace, Katawal indicated that the Secretariat as originally formed did not now exist; instead, Major General Tika Dharmala remained at the Palace to coordinate security matters between the two institutions. Katawal assured the Ambassador that the U.S. should not worry that the Nepal Army would support a royal resurgence. The Ambassador replied that as long as King Gyanendra continued to send out feelers about a possible comeback, the NA would continue to appear complicit, even if the appearances were unfounded. King Told To Smarten Up -------------- ¶7. (C/NF) In a subsequent aside, Katawal informed the Ambassador that he had instructed Major General Dharmala to tell King Gyanendra to make amends with the Prime Minister and to acknowledge there was no chance for a political comeback. Katawal also claimed that, through Dharmala, he told the King that, if he was truly interested in retaining the monarchy as an institution, he should abdicate in favor of his grandson. (Note: Popular opinion is strongly opposed to King Gyanendra's son, Crown Prince Paras, ascending the throne. End Note.) Katawal also had Dharmala tell the King that Indian actors who were telling King Gyanendra the GOI wanted to see a royal comeback were blowing smoke; the GOI was perfectly content to leave the future of the monarchy to the Nepali people. Requests for the United States -------------- ¶8. (C) When asked what message he would like to convey to U.S. policy makers, Katawal responded that it was important for the U.S. to believe that the NA stood for democracy and KATHMANDU 00000024 003.4 OF 003 would support any civilian administration that comes to power legitimately. He expressed appreciation for continued U.S. support on JCETs. (Note. U.S. military personnel will be arriving in Nepal soon to conduct training with the Nepal Army Ranger Battalion. End Note.) Noting the Indian Ambassador's meeting with Maoist Chairman Prachanda, Katawal also asked the Ambassador to urge the Indian Ambassador to "stop meddling" in Nepal's political affairs. In an aside to the Ambassador, Katawal also asked whether the U.S. would consider sending out a high-level defense official as a show of support for the Nepal Army or, alternatively, to invite Katawal to visit Washington. The Ambassador replied that Katawal would first need the Prime Minister's support for such an initiative. COAS Katawal Seeks To Improve Civil-Military Relationship -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Katawal reported that he had offered several Army officers for assignment to the Ministry of Defense, but that his offer had not yet been accepted. He noted he would soon provide Parliament's State Affairs Committee with an in-depth orientation on Nepal Army operations and had already taken the committee members to see various units around the country. Katawal described his initiative to offer training to civilians at the military staff college as part of an overall effort to develop a positive civil-military relationship and deepen civilian understanding and administrative capacity. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C/NF) Katawal's insecurity regarding the Maoist strategic position in and around Kathmandu Valley presumably also reflects his feelings that the Nepal Army has been isolated by the political parties and Maoists. With relatively little support other than from the PM, Katawal is searching for allies and working behind the scenes to prevent what he sees as a potential Maoist takeover. His concern that promulgation of the interim constitution would result in Maoist control, however, may be unfounded. Although members of the Seven Party Alliance are not united against the Maoists, Post has not seen signs of complete fracturing, as Katawal suggested. In particular, we have seen relatively little support within the CPN-UML for an early alliance with the Maoists. A well-spoken advocate for democracy and civilian control of the armed forces, Katawal appears genuine in his desire to forestall any moves by the Palace to make a political resurgence. MORIARTY