Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KATHMANDU1901
2007-10-17 13:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

NEPAL: NO POLITICAL PROGRESS LIKELY UNTIL AFTER

Tags:  PGOV PTER KDEM NP 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001901 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2017
TAGS: PGOV PTER KDEM NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: NO POLITICAL PROGRESS LIKELY UNTIL AFTER
HOLIDAYS


Classified By: Ambassador Nancy J. Powell. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001901 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2017 TAGS: PGOV PTER KDEM NP SUBJECT: NEPAL: NO POLITICAL PROGRESS LIKELY UNTIL AFTER HOLIDAYS Classified By: Ambassador Nancy J. Powell. Reasons 1.4 (b/d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Nepal's Six-Party Alliance and the Maoists are not expected to reach any agreement on resolving the current political deadlock until after the Hindu holiday season of Dashain. Communist Party of NEPAL - United Marxist Leninist (UML) General Secretary M.K. NEPAL informed the Ambassador October 17 that he hoped Prime Minister Koirala would take the initiative to hold talks before the holidays were over. The Interim Parliament will not resume its special session until afterwards, on October 29. The challenge, according to senior Nepali Congress and UML leaders is to find some way to provide sufficient incentive for the Maoists to participate in the Constituent Assembly election and to keep the Maoist hard-liners at bay. The discussion is still of a spring election and G.P. Koirala's position as Prime Minister appears to be fairly secure. End Summary. No Political Deal Until After Dashain -------------- ¶2. (C) On October 17, with Kathmandu already emptying out for the biggest of Nepal's festival seasons, the Hindu holiday of Dashain, Communist Party of NEPAL - United Marxist Leninist (UML) General Secretary M.K. NEPAL confirmed to the Ambassador that the parties and the Maoists were deadlocked. He said he hoped that Prime Minister Koirala would take the initiative to bring party leaders together for talks before the end of Dashain, but he was not confident it would happen. C.P. Mainali, the leader of the United Left Front, which is part of the governing Six-Party Alliance (SPA),told Emboff October 17, that working-level talks between the SPA and the Maoists might start up again October 24, after the main Dashain festival days had passed. The purpose would be to try to reach consensus on how to handle the two Maoist proposals which are pending before the Interim Parliament's special session: the immediate declaration of a republic and the adoption of a proportional system. The session itself is not scheduled to resume until October 29, after the entire holiday is over. Immediate Declaration of Republic A Non-Starter -------------- -- ¶3. (C) UML senior leader Bharat Mohan Adhikari informed Emboff October 16 that UML was trying to bridge the gap between the Nepa
li Congress (NC) and the Maoists. The Maoists, he said, had urged UML to support the Maoist call for the immediate declaration of republic, which UML had rejected. UML was of the view that the current parliament did not have the legitimacy to take that step. Moreover, the international community would not accept it. (NC senior leader Chakra Prasad Bastola made the same point to post October 17.) Adhikari explained that UML supported NC's position that, as agreed in the Interim Constitution, it was for the first session of the Constituent Assembly (CA) to decide on the future of the monarchy. The Maoists did not have the votes for a simple majority without the UML, let alone the two-thirds for a constitutional amendment. If the Maoists tried to force a vote on their republic proposal, it would be defeated. In the end, Adhikari anticipated the SPA and the Maoists would commit themselves publicly to vote for a republic in the CA's first session, perhaps in a resolution of the Interim Parliament. UML General Secretary M.K. NEPAL was less optimistic. He told the Ambassador the Maoists would only accept the "commitment proposal" if the parties agreed to adopt a purely proportional election system. Election System Not Likely To Change Significantly -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Adhikari, Bastola and Mainali all told post that they did not expect the Maoist proposal to adopt a purely proportional system for the Constituent Assembly election KATHMANDU 00001901 002.4 OF 003 would prevail either. Adhikari confirmed that UML continued to be in favor of a proportional system instead of the mixed system adopted in the Interim Constitution. To assure its voters of its support for pure proportionality, UML had even introduced its own motion to that effect on October 15 in the special session of the Interim Parliament. But the senior UML leader added that his party was under no illusions: ultimately, it would have to agree with the Nepali Congress and stick with the mixed system. UML and NC had to work together. (M.K. NEPAL voiced the opinion that UML would also do well in the first-past-the-post races.) Bastola, for his part, insisted that NC would not agree to a purely proportional system. It would, however, make other accomodations with the Maoists in order to encourage them to participate in the election. Mainali stated that his small party opposed the purely proportional system because it feared that it would lead to division of the country on ethnic lines. He suggested there were other ways to deal with historic discrimination against the Madhesis, the indigenous nationalities and other marginalized groups. Accommodating the Maoists: Dealing With the Camps -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Adhikari stressed to Emboff that Prime Minister Koirala needed to shift his focus beyond the top Maoist leadership of Pushpa Dahal (aka Prachanda) and Baburam Bhattarai and make a concerted effort to win over Maoist hard-liners, particularly within the Maoist People's Liberation Army (PLA). Their family members and combatants should be offered scholarships, jobs and other benefits. The UML leader was convinced that most of them could be persuaded to abandon their "ultraleftist" and violent ideology. Bastola expressed regret that the Government of NEPAL (GON) had failed to do more to bring down the number of Maoist combatants in the camps. He indicated that he had tried to persuade Finance Minister Mahat and others like him that it was foolish to withhold payments to combatants until the Maoists fulfilled their promise to return seized lands. Bastola argued that it was in NC's interest to empty the camps as quickly as possible, preferably before the CA election. Instead, the GON had sat on its hands. The result was that the PLA block was putting pressure on Maoist chief Dahal to take a hard line. Accommodating the Maoists: Electoral Tinkering -------------- - ¶6. (C) NC leader Bastola told post that one way under consideration to accommodate the Maoists within the current electoral system would be to increase the number of appointed seats. (Note: Under the election law, there are 240 first-past-the-post seats, 240 proportional seats and 17 appointed seats.) He mentioned possibly raising that number to 50. Another possibility would be for the Six-Party Alliance and the Maoists to agree that their top leaders would run unopposed, at least from each other. Bastola reported that Prime Minister Koirala had confided in a recent NC meeting that he had told Dahal that NC would agree to protect 5-6 seats for the top Maoist leaders. Koirala told his NC colleagues he was prepared to go up to 10 Maoist seats. MK NEPAL stated, however, that the Maoists would not support a "set-aside" if, as appeared increasingly likely, it were only proposed for the Maoist leaders. They did not want to give the public the impression of weakness. United Left Front leader Mainali stated to Emboff that another possibility would be to increase the number of proportional seats from 240 to 340. Spring Election Under Discussion; PM To Remain -------------- - ¶7. (C) Embassy contacts stressed to post in recent days that it is important for the parties and the Maoists to reach agreement soon on a new date for the CA election in order to reassure the public and the international community. The talk is of March or April 2007, but preferably before the end KATHMANDU 00001901 003 OF 003 of the current Nepali year (2064) on April 12. Adhikari was unequivocal as well in emphasizing that UML has no intention to assist the Maoists in bringing down the current government headed by Prime Minister Koirala. "Our time has not yet come," he said. Although UML was greatly disappointed in the functioning of the current government -- for example in the area of public security -- and its failure to consult its coalition partners, including with the peace process, there was no alternative to the present PM. In spite of his party's frustration, UML, he added, had no intention either of leaving the Interim Government. Bastola noted that there was no clear successor to Koirala in the NC. He predicted that a shared leadership would succeed him. In his remarks to the Ambassador, M.K. NEPAL was less unequivocal about his willingness to tolerate the Prime Minister's failings. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) The aftershocks of the October 5 decision by the Six-Party Alliance and the Maoists to postpone the November Constituent Assembly election continue to run their course -- although the holiday season has done much to dampen public outrage and pressure for a solution. After Dashain is over, we expect the parties to redouble their efforts to show some progress, perhaps beginning with an agreement on a new election date. UML General Secretary M.K. NEPAL informed the Ambassador October 17 that if an overall deal on the election could be reached with the Maoists, they might even rejoin the Interim Government. Prime Minister Koirala must still see this as a possibility too. A month after the four remaining Maoist ministers submitted their resignations, Koirala has yet to accept them. For the time being, the Prime Minister and his coalition, while weaker, look to try to muddle through. POWELL

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