NEPAL'S ELECTION: DO THE COMBATANTS HOLD THE KEY?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001833

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2017
TAGS: PGOV MARR PTER KDEM UN NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL'S ELECTION: DO THE COMBATANTS HOLD THE KEY?


Classified By: Ambassador Nancy J. Powell. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

Summary
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1. (C) In recent days, senior diplomats have told the
Ambassador that if Prime Minister Koirala wishes to hold a
Constituent Assembly election in November, he must come up
immediately with some satisfactory solution on the Maoist
combatants. UN Mission in Nepal political adviser John
Norris insisted October 1 that Minister of Finance Mahat
needed to release backpay now to those in the UN-monitored
cantonments. The Government of Nepal would have to take
other steps as well if it wanted the Maoists to participate
in the election. Without something to show to their
increasingly agitated cadres, the Maoists would, he warned,
have little choice but to obstruct the polls. End Summary.

Do Combatants Hold the Key?
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2. (C) A number of senior diplomats, including British
Ambassador Hall, have made the point to the Ambassador over
the past week that the key to holding the Constituent
Assembly election on November 22 as scheduled is for the
Government of Nepal to meet its agreement to pay each of the
so-called "combatants" in the Maoist People's Liberation Army
(PLA) camps. The GON also had to redouble its efforts to
improve the infrastructure in the seven main divisional
cantonments and the 21 satellite camps. Without these
changes, the top Maoist leadership of Pushpa Dahal (aka
Prachanda) and Baburam Bhattarai would not be able to
persuade those less inclined to participate, such as Badal,
Biplav and Vaidya, who had close ties to the combatants, to
remain engaged in the political process. UN Mission in Nepal
(UNMIN) political adviser John Norris made these same points
to Emboff October 1.

Time To Pay Up
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3. (C) Norris stressed that a small group of senior Nepali
Congress leaders should not be allowed to hold up the agreed
payments to all those in the UNMIN-monitored camps. He
singled out Peace and Reconstruction Minister Ram Chandra
Poudel, whose Ministry has oversight over the camps, and
Finance Minister Dr. Ram Sharan Mahat for preventing the
payment of Nepali Rupees 3,000 (approximately USD 47) per
person per month in the cantonments. So far the GON had only
paid one month's worth and owes eight more. The UNMIN
political adviser conceded that the Maoists had not helped
their case by refusing to hold up their part of the bargain
and return seized land. But he added that the tit-for-tat
had to end if the election and the peace process were to
survive.

Who Is In the Camps?
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4. (C) The GON's Central Coordinator for Cantonment
Management Avanindra Shrestha had complained to Emboff
earlier on October 1 that one of the biggest problems was
getting a firm grip of on the actual combatants in the camps.
He suggested that it might not be possible for the
politicians and the Maoists to reach a deal on payment until
UNMIN completed the second phase of the registration process
-- perhaps by November. Shrestha noted that UNMIN had found
large numbers of the nearly 31,000 "combatants" it had
registered in the initial phase were missing when it
conducted the verification phase. He cited a figure of 20
percent from both the first and second PLA divisions,
according to sources in the Nepal Army. Shrestha confided
that Ex-Indian Army Gurkhas guarding the weapons containers
for UNMIN had estimated that 30-40 percent of the combatants
were outside the cantonments at any given time. This, the
Central Coordinator noted, was in clear violation of the
December 2006 Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of
Arms and Armies, in which the Maoists had promised that no

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more than 12 percent of the combatants would be on leave at
any given time.

Numbers No Reason For Delay In Discharge
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5. (C) Norris admitted that the Coordinator's 20 percent
figure on missing Maoist combatants was roughly accurate and
applied as well to the 6th division where UNMIN completed the
second phase on September 17. He emphasized, however, that
the only thing holding up discharge of those whom UNMIN had
been found to be under 18 or adults recruited after the
cease-fire in May 2006 was the absence of a GON commitment to
pay up. Non-combatants had no incentive to leave unless they
were confident they were going to get their money. In
response to a question about the children in the camps,
Norris confirmed that UNICEF and its partners had been ready
for several months with resettlement packages, but were
stymied by the lack of action by the Nepali Government. The
UNMIN political adviser claimed that the Maoists had
abandoned their previous insistence on the completion of
verification in all seven divisions before allowing any
discharges to take place.

Situation Deteriorating
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6. (C) The UNMIN political adviser painted a dire picture of
what would happen if steps were not taken to address growing
dissatisfaction in the Maoist camps soon. Although some
improvements had been made in camp infrastructure, he alleged
there were still far too many in the Nepali Government who
had a desire to punish the combatants or use the issue as a
bargaining chip. He cited the case of 2,000 tents donated by
the Government of India which had been stuck on the Nepali
side of the border for weeks for lack of GON transport. He
predicted that if nothing were done, there would be more and
more episodes like those September 14 when Maoists left the
first and fourth cantonments to demand better conditions and
insist on the fulfillment of Maoist political demands, and
they would involve larger and larger numbers. Moreover,
while UNMIN's verification process in the PLA seventh
division was going smoothly, Norris voiced worries about what
would happen when UNMIN turned to the third and fourth
divisions which had hardline commanders and were believed to
contain large numbers of impermissible recent recruits as
well as children. He was not so sure a November date for
completing the second phase would be attainable.

Knock-on Effect on Election and Peace Process
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7. (C) Norris stated that the bigger problem was what this
meant for the Constituent Assembly election and the peace
process. He feared that tension in the camps might prove to
be the final straw as the Maoists saw less and less to gain
from participating in an election which might relegate them
to political oblivion. While Norris conceded many of these
problems were of the Maoists' own making, he argued that they
needed something more from the GON at a time when the Maoists
were feeling squeezed by their diminishing popularity and
dismayed that their participation in the Interim Government
formed in April 2007 had reaped little of the expected
benefits. He agreed that delaying the election until the
spring was also potentially disastrous and might lead to a
complete breakdown in a state already struggling with serious
ethnic and security challenges. The UNMIN political adviser
urged the United States to use its influence with the Prime
Minister to make the necessary compromises with the Maoists.

Comment
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8. (C) The Ambassador raised the issue of the Maoist
combatants when she met with Prime Minister Koirala on
October 2. Koirala was clear in his assessment that the
issues represents a potential bargaining chip. Of course,
the Maoist combatants are only of several key issues that

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could be addressed relatively easily and could result in
lessening "harder liner" pressure on the Maoist leadership
and decrease the chance for a major blowup in the camps. The
comments by UNMIN political adviser Norris reflect UNMIN's
concern about the conditions in the camps and its desire to
move forward on removing those vetted by UNMIN and found
unqualified. The U.S. Government should continue to make the
issue of combatants part of our message to the GON on the
need to implement the peace agreements and the agreements
with the minority groups. That said, post has low
expectations about a quick turnaround in the positions on the
Government or the Maoist side.
POWELL