NEPAL: PM'S ADVISOR TALKS TOUGH, BUT SEEMS WORRIED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000171

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2017
TAGS: PGOV PTER NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: PM'S ADVISOR TALKS TOUGH, BUT SEEMS WORRIED


Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
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1. (C) Dr. Suresh Chalise, Foreign Policy Advisor to Prime
Minister Girija Prasad Koirala, stressed to the DCM January
24 that the Maoists would not be allowed into the Interim
Government until Maoist arms management was complete.
Chalise was unhappy with the way the UN was handling arms
monitoring, and stressed that the UN needed to certify that
arms management was complete in order for it to be effective.
Chalise worried about the possibility of a Maoist Deputy
Prime Minister, and suggested that the PM was looking for a
way to avoid that outcome. Chalise expressed concern about
the recent flare-up of violence in the Terai, and suggested
that similar situations would occur between now and the
planned Constituent Assembly elections in June. Chalise
stated that Maoist intimidation and violence had continued
over the past few weeks, although the rhetoric of their
leaders reflected a more subdued attitude. Chalise also
confirmed that the Maoists would likely enter the Interim
Government within the next two weeks.

Arms Management Must Be Complete
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2. (C) On January 24, Dr. Suresh Chalise, the PM's Foreign
Policy Advisor, told the DCM that the Maoists would not be
allowed into an Interim Government until the arms management
process was complete. He said that the PM defined complete
as the Maoists being completely separated from their weapons
and the UN monitoring equipment (alarms, closed circuit
cameras, and locks) being operational. When the DCM asked
Chalise what number of Maoist weapons had to be handed over
to be acceptable to the Government of Nepal (GON),Chalise
said, "100 percent." Chalise stated that he had spoken with
the UN Secretary General's Personal Representative to the
Peace Process Ian Martin, who had said that the Maoists were
not handing over significant amounts of "sophisticated
weapons." Chalise was unhappy with the UN process, and
stressed that the UN would need to certify that arms
management was completed before the GON could make the
decision about allowing the Maoists to enter the Interim
Government.

Worry Over A Maoist Deputy PM
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3. (C) Chalise said that the PM shared the U.S. concern about
the Maoists holding the Deputy Prime Minister position and
what that would mean if PM Koirala died. He said that the
Seven-Party Alliance (SPA) was still negotiating with the
Maoists about the issue and trying to find a way to fix it.
Chalise suggested that a second Deputy PM position could be
created for the Maoists to hold and that perhaps someone from
the PM's Nepali Congress Party could be the first Deputy PM.
He acknowledged that the Maoists would not be happy about
such a set-up. Chalise said that the SPA was trying to get
the Maoists to appoint Maoist third-in-command Baburam
Bhattarai as the Deputy PM to bring him into the fold instead
of having him continue to control things from the outside.

Violence in the Terai: More to Come?
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4. (C) Chalise worried about the continued violence in the
Terai (southern Nepal on the border with India),and worried
that such violent flare-ups would continue in the run-up to
the proposed Constituent Assembly elections in June. Chalise
emphasized the importance the GON placed on human rights, and
stressed that the PM's biggest concern about the violence was
protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Nepal. Chalise said that human rights activists needed to be
conscious of the consequences of their actions and take care
not to do anything that could hurt Nepal's territorial
integrity. He made clear that the GON would not tolerate a
situation in which activists caused the Terai to break away

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from Nepal. Chalise also worried that "regressive" (read
"royalist") and leftist forces were exploiting the Terai
violence to their own advantage. He said that the eight
parties were speaking with a unified voice about the violence
and that was positive.

Maoist: Rhetoric Good, Actions Bad
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5. (C) Chalise said that, although the Maoists had still not
dissolved many of their parallel government structures, the
rhetoric the Maoist leadership was using was more positive
than before. Chalise stressed that, in the past, the Maoist
leadership, including Maoist Supremo Prachanda, had been
adamantly opposed to re-establishment of police posts and
local governments. Now, he said, the Maoist leadership was
vocally advocating for these things, and calling for the end
to Maoist "People's governments" and "People's courts."
Chalise acknowledged that the central Maoist leadership often
said one thing and the lower level cadre did something else,
but saw the change in Maoist rhetoric as positive. He
acknowledged that an effective GON law enforcement presence
across the country would be vital to free and fair elections.

Maoists on the Way Into Interim Government
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6. (C) Chalise told the DCM that the Maoists would likely
enter the Interim Government within the next two weeks.
Chalise repeated his view from prior meetings that the GON
did not really have many choices regarding the terms under
which to allow the Maoists into the government, because to
not allow them in would hurt the peace process. When the DCM
asked what the GON's plan was between now and March 15, when
registration of the Maoist People's Liberation Army
combatants was expected to be complete, Chalise said that
situations like the one in the Terai were likely to take up
much of the Interim Government's time.

Comment
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7. (C) The Maoists will almost certainly enter into the
Interim Government soon, but the PM and other leaders of the
SPA do not have a clear plan for what to do once this
happens. The pattern of the SPA in the past has been to wait
as long as possible to make difficult decisions and then
strike a deal at the final hour. The time for those
decisions is rapidly approaching. Once the SPA has crafted
some solution to the untenable situation of a sole Maoist
Deputy PM, they will need to come up with some mechanism to
ensure that the UN arms management process is effective.
Locking up Maoist arms is an indispensable first step, but
the Interim Government, with the Maoists in it, will have to
witness the successful completion of combatant registration
if the peace process is to continue. As the present spate of
violence in the Terai shows, muddling through is not an
option, but a way of life in Nepal.
MORIARTY