NEPAL: PM'S ADVISOR TALKS TOUGH, BUT SEEMS WORRIED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000171 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2017 TAGS: PGOV PTER NP SUBJECT: NEPAL: PM'S ADVISOR TALKS TOUGH, BUT SEEMS WORRIED Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Dr. Suresh Chalise, Foreign Policy Advisor to Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala, stressed to the DCM January 24 that the Maoists would not be allowed into the Interim Government until Maoist arms management was complete. Chalise was unhappy with the way the UN was handling arms monitoring, and stressed that the UN needed to certify that arms management was complete in order for it to be effective. Chalise worried about the possibility of a Maoist Deputy Prime Minister, and suggested that the PM was looking for a way to avoid that outcome. Chalise expressed concern about the recent flare-up of violence in the Terai, and suggested that similar situations would occur between now and the planned Constituent Assembly elections in June. Chalise stated that Maoist intimidation and violence had continued over the past few weeks, although the rhetoric of their leaders reflected a more subdued attitude. Chalise also confirmed that the Maoists would likely enter the Interim Government within the next two weeks. Arms Management Must Be Complete -------------- ¶2. (C) On January 24, Dr. Suresh Chalise, the PM's Foreign Policy Advisor, told the DCM that the Maoists would not be allowed into an Interim Government until the arms management process was complete. He said that the PM defined complete as the Maoists being completely separated from their weapons and the UN monitoring equipment (alarms, closed circuit cameras, and locks) being operational. When the DCM asked Chalise what number of Maoist weapons had to be handed over to be acceptable to the Government of Nepal (GON),Chalise said, "100 percent." Chalise stated that he had spoken with the UN Secretary General's Personal Representative to the Peace Process Ian Martin, who had said that the Maoists were not handing over significant amounts of "sophisticated weapons." Chalise was unhappy with the UN process, and stressed that the UN would need to certify that arms management was completed before the GON could make the decision about allowing the Maoists to enter the Interim Government. Worry Over A Maoist Deputy PM -------------- ¶3. (C) Chalise said that the PM shared the U.S. concern about the Maoists holding the Deputy Prime Minister position and what that would mean if PM Koirala died. He said that the Seven-Party Alliance (SPA) was still negotiating with the Maoists about the issue and trying to find a way to fix it. Chalise suggested that a second Deputy PM position could be created for the Maoists to hold and that perhaps someone from the PM's Nepali Congress Party could be the first Deputy PM. He acknowledged that the Maoists would not be happy about such a set-up. Chalise said that the SPA was trying to get the Maoists to appoint Maoist third-in-command Baburam Bhattarai as the Deputy PM to bring him into the fold instead of having him continue to control things from the outside. Violence in the Terai: More to Come? -------------- ¶4. (C) Chalise worried about the continued violence in the Terai (southern Nepal on the border with India),and worried that such violent flare-ups would continue in the run-up to the proposed Constituent Assembly elections in June. Chalise emphasized the importance the GON placed on human rights, and stressed that the PM's biggest concern about the violence was protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Nepal. Chalise said that human rights activists needed to be conscious of the consequences of their actions and take care not to do anything that could hurt Nepal's territorial integrity. He made clear that the GON would not tolerate a situation in which activists caused the Terai to break away KATHMANDU 00000171 002 OF 002 from Nepal. Chalise also worried that "regressive" (read "royalist") and leftist forces were exploiting the Terai violence to their own advantage. He said that the eight parties were speaking with a unified voice about the violence and that was positive. Maoist: Rhetoric Good, Actions Bad -------------- ¶5. (C) Chalise said that, although the Maoists had still not dissolved many of their parallel government structures, the rhetoric the Maoist leadership was using was more positive than before. Chalise stressed that, in the past, the Maoist leadership, including Maoist Supremo Prachanda, had been adamantly opposed to re-establishment of police posts and local governments. Now, he said, the Maoist leadership was vocally advocating for these things, and calling for the end to Maoist "People's governments" and "People's courts." Chalise acknowledged that the central Maoist leadership often said one thing and the lower level cadre did something else, but saw the change in Maoist rhetoric as positive. He acknowledged that an effective GON law enforcement presence across the country would be vital to free and fair elections. Maoists on the Way Into Interim Government -------------- ¶6. (C) Chalise told the DCM that the Maoists would likely enter the Interim Government within the next two weeks. Chalise repeated his view from prior meetings that the GON did not really have many choices regarding the terms under which to allow the Maoists into the government, because to not allow them in would hurt the peace process. When the DCM asked what the GON's plan was between now and March 15, when registration of the Maoist People's Liberation Army combatants was expected to be complete, Chalise said that situations like the one in the Terai were likely to take up much of the Interim Government's time. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) The Maoists will almost certainly enter into the Interim Government soon, but the PM and other leaders of the SPA do not have a clear plan for what to do once this happens. The pattern of the SPA in the past has been to wait as long as possible to make difficult decisions and then strike a deal at the final hour. The time for those decisions is rapidly approaching. Once the SPA has crafted some solution to the untenable situation of a sole Maoist Deputy PM, they will need to come up with some mechanism to ensure that the UN arms management process is effective. Locking up Maoist arms is an indispensable first step, but the Interim Government, with the Maoists in it, will have to witness the successful completion of combatant registration if the peace process is to continue. As the present spate of violence in the Terai shows, muddling through is not an option, but a way of life in Nepal. MORIARTY