NEPAL: IAN MARTIN COMMENTS ON ARMS MANAGEMENT,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000165 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2017 TAGS: PGOV PTER MARR UN IN NP SUBJECT: NEPAL: IAN MARTIN COMMENTS ON ARMS MANAGEMENT, MADHESIS REF: KATHMANDU 105 Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST -- See para. 3. Summary -------------- ¶2. (C) The UN Secretary General's Personal Representative Ian Martin informed the Ambassador January 22 that the process of Maoist arms management was progressing fairly smoothly at the two main People's Liberation Army camps where it began January 17 (reftel). The United Nations arms monitors were focused primarily on combatant registration and were still getting set up. Martin expressed interest in knowing more details about the Ambassador's recent public comments regarding the purchase by Maoists of low-grade weapons in neighboring India. The Ambassador confirmed those comments and asked what the UN planned to do if the Maoists failed to turn in a significant percentage of their weapons. Martin replied awkwardly that it was up to the Government of Nepal (GON) to determine whether the arms management process was complete. Martin and the Ambassador agreed that it was incumbent on the Seven-Party Alliance and the Maoists to act quickly to address the grievances of the Madhesis, the historically disenfranchised Hindu-speaking population, of the Terai. The situation was explosive. Ambassador's Comment/Action Request -------------- ¶3. (C) While Ian Martin can, at times, be an astute observer of Nepal, he is making a huge mistake if he intends to keep silent if the type and number of Maoist weapons turned in vary significantly from the list the UN has received from the GON of weapons captured by the Maoists from government security forces. Absent effective arms management, the peace process will not get on track and the Maoists will continue unchecked intimidation in the countryside. It remains to be seen what the Maoists will do, but according to early indications, they are falling short in both categories; the few weapons they have turned in so far reportedly are low-grade. Given the importance of a successful arms management process to the success of the overall peace process, I would urge the Department to consider instructing USUN to raise this issue at the highest possible level as soon as possible. Arms Management Progressing Fairly Smoothly -------------- ¶4. (C) On January 22, the UN Secretary General's Personal Representative Ian Martin told the Ambassador that he was pleased with how the process of arms management was proceeding. It had been less than a week since the start date on January 17 at the PLA Third ""Divisional"" site in Chitwan district and the Fourth ""Divisional"" site in Nawalparasi. Martin indicated that the emphasis had been on combatant registration thus far. In response to a question from the Ambassador, Martin stated that no combatants had been excluded on the basis that they were underage, although representatives from UNICEF were observing the process. Thus far, at least on paper, all the combatants had presented paperwork indicating that they were 18 as of May 2006. Martin added that the UN's child protection officers were worried that the children who were known to have been in the PLA ranks were at greater risk outside the camps than in. Their preference would have been for the Maoists to present them. The good news was that there were NGOs, including human rights organizations, working in the vicinity of all the camps and they could assist these minors, some of whom, Martin indicated, the Maoists appeared to be drafting into other front organizations. UN Still Setting Up -------------- KATHMANDU 00000165 002 OF 003 ¶5. (C) Martin said that the UN Mission was still in the process of being set up. He noted that two helicopters were due to arrive from a UN Mission in Congo shortly. The UN continued to face logistical challenges. The good news was that a Norwegian logistician who had been seconded to the team had funds at his disposal from the Norwegian Embassy in Kathmandu and he had been using those monies to purchase the equipment the UN needed to set up the UN compounds within the Maoist cantonments. Martin stated that he had not yet decided whether it made more sense to finish arms management in the two camps before moving on to others or to go ahead and start the process in one or more of the other five main camps. Because of the need for additional equipment, the UN arms monitors were focused on combatant registration, not the arms, for now. Curious About Maoist Purchases of ""Crummy"" Weapons in India -------------- -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) The Secretary General's Personal Representative asked whether the reports were true that the Ambassador had told the press January 19 that the Maoists were purchasing ""crummy"" weapons in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh in India to turn in to the UN. If so, could the U.S. Embassy share that information with the UN? The Ambassador confirmed that he had publicized that information and stood by the charges. Indian Ambassador Mukherjee had been expressing similar concerns in private and there had been some press reports on the issue. The United States, the Ambassador stated, did not have sources in Bihar and U.P., but we did have clear indications that the Maoist leadership intended to make such purchases. We would not, however, share more precise information on our sources or methods. Part of the reason, the Ambassador said, for making this information public was to put pressure on the Maoists to engage in a credible arms management process. Maoist Weapon Shortfall: What Then? -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador conceded that the test of his comments would be what the Maoists turned in. He then asked Martin how the UN intended to respond if the Maoists did not turn in all the weapons that they were known to have captured from the Government security forces. If they were short a few dozen or even a few hundred, that might be acceptable, but what if there was a discrepancy of thousands between the arms they turned in and the lists of arms which they were known to have seized during the insurgency? Martin, noticeably ill at ease, responded that it would be up to the Nepali Government to determine whether the arms management process was complete. That was not the UN's role. The Ambassador replied forcefully that the UN should at least be willing to inform the GON under such circumstances that there was a clear discrepancy between the GON's list of weapons captured by the Maoists and the types and numbers of weapons the Maoists had placed in the containers. He stressed that a flawed arms management process would undercut the entire peace process. The Ambassador urged Martin to reconsider the issue to which Martin replied, ""We will see."" Madhesis Fed Up; Need for Action -------------- ¶8. (C) Martin and the Ambassador began their January 22 meeting with a discussion of the need to address the serious problem of the Madhesis, historically disenfranchised, Hindu-speaking residents of the Terai, Nepal's flat border region with India. The meeting took place in the midst of a strike in the capital called by the transportation union to protest the destruction of buses by Madhesis in Terai after a Maoist cadre shot a Madhesi protester. The Ambassador noted that he had been surprised by the depth of feeling on this issue in the Terai in recent visits there. He and Martin agreed that the Interim Constitution had failed to address the Madhesi issue adequately. Martin said he had stressed to the Seven-Party Alliance and the Maoists the importance of including provisions on ethnic rights and federalism in the KATHMANDU 00000165 003 OF 003 final Interim Constitution or in some peace agreement, but nothing had happened. He said the region was on the ""knife's edge"" and ready to explode. The Ambassador and Martin agreed the GON had to act. Comment: Maoist Arms Management -------------- ¶9. (C) While we do not yet know whether or not the Maoists will turn in their weapons to the UN, we continue to see credible reporting that the Maoists plan to hold weapons and combatants back. In that context, it is far from encouraging to hear Ian Martin's hesitation about speaking the ugly truth, if necessary, to the GON. While he denied to the Ambassador that UN silence in the face of flagrant Maoist cheating would put pressure on the GON to accede to a less than credible arms management process, that is exactly what it would do. We will keep the pressure on the UN here to keep the process credible, but it may be necessary to shore up the UN in New York as well, as noted above in para. 3. Suggested Talking Points -------------- ¶10. (C) Suggested talking points follow: -- Hope UN involvement will help bring peace to Nepal. First major test: arms management. -- Compared with most such exercises, arms management in Nepal should be relatively straightforward. Most Maoist weapons captured from Government of Nepal. GON has turned over lists of those weapons to the UN team. -- Concerned, however, by reports that Maoists plan to cheat massively on their commitments. In clear violation of Comprehensive Peace Agreement, conducted massive recruitment campaign, in part to keep seasoned combatants out of cantonments. -- New reports indicate purchase of low-quality weapons from India to place in containers instead of more capable weapons captured from GON. -- If UNMIN allows Maoists to make arms management a hollow exercise, fear of the Maoists will not diminish in the countryside and a free and fair election will be impossible. -- Prime Minister Koirala has said Maoists will not enter Interim Government until arms management completed. UN role thus crucial. UNMIN must report truthfully to the GON whether the Maoists have actually turned in the bulk of the weapons captured from the security forces. MORIARTY "