Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KATHMANDU158
2007-01-22 10:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

INDIAN AND UK AMBASSADORS SHARE U.S. CONCERNS OVER

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER UN UK NP 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000158 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UN UK NP
SUBJECT: INDIAN AND UK AMBASSADORS SHARE U.S. CONCERNS OVER
SECURITY

REF: A. KATHMANDU 0092

B. KATHMANDU 2374

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000158 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UN UK NP SUBJECT: INDIAN AND UK AMBASSADORS SHARE U.S. CONCERNS OVER SECURITY REF: A. KATHMANDU 0092 ¶B. KATHMANDU 2374 Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In separate meetings January 18 with Ambassador Moriarty, Indian Ambassador Mukherjee and UK Ambassador Hall stressed the importance of arms management before Maoist entry into government and expressed concern over the security climate in the countryside. Ambassador Moriarty and Ambassador Mukherjee, based on recent meetings with Prime Minister GP Koirala, hoped that the PM would hang tough on ensuring arms management before Maoists entered an interim cabinet (Ref A). All three Ambassadors agreed that improving security and re-establishing a police presence in the countryside in the run-up to elections was a top priority. Both Ambassador Mukherjee and Ambassador Hall welcomed the possibility of additional U.S. assistance to the police. Ambassador Moriarty expressed his desire to coordinate U.S. assistance efforts with the UK and India as key partners on security. Arms Management Before Maoist Entry into Government -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) In separate meetings January 18 with Ambassador Moriarty, the Indian and UK Ambassadors stressed the importance of Prime Minister GP Koirala hanging tough on not allowing Maoists into an interim government until arms management was complete. Indian Ambassador Mukherjee described the intense pressure India was putting on the Prime Minister to stay strong on this point. Mukherjee said that there must be a "high-level" of assurance from UN technical experts that the Maoists had turned in the majority of weapons they had captured from the Government of Nepal's (GON) security forces. UK Ambassador Hall expressed concern over how the GON would define the "vast majority" of weapons captured and asked Ambassador Moriarty the likelihood that the PM would "part company" with the U.S., UK, and India's strong stand on arms management. Ambassador Moriarty said that, based on a recent conversation with the PM, he was reassured regarding the PM's resolve and felt India's "bottom line" on arms management would ensure the PM's continued strength. Ensuring Maoist Compliance in Arms Management -------------- ¶3. (C) Ambassador Mukherjee said that, in meetings
with UN military advisor Jan Erik Wilhemsen, who heads the UN-GON-Maoist Joint Monitoring Coordinating Committee (JMCC) for the arms management process, Mukherjee was impressed with Wilhemsen's expertise and rapport with the Seven-Party Alliance and the Maoists. Regarding Indian concern that the UN would not be able to ensure Maoist compliance with the arms management agreements, Wilhemsen told Mukherjee that the UN would be able to make strong statements of a technical or factual nature if the Maoists were to violate arms management stipulations. Mukherjee said that bilateral players, such as India and the U.S., would then bear the responsibility of following up with political statements and pressure to encourage Maoist adherence to agreement provisions. Maoist Abuses Continue in the Countryside -------------- ¶4. (C) The Ambassadors also discussed continued Maoist abuses in the countryside and the Maoist failure to uphold peace agreement commitments. Ambassador Moriarty stressed that draining fear in the countryside in the lead-up to elections, even more so than on election day itself, would be fundamental to a credible election process. Ambassador Mukherjee and Ambassador Moriarty shared similar reports coming in from official travel throughout the country that KATHMANDU 00000158 002 OF 002 Maoists were placing restrictions on political party movement and activity, interfering with police post re-establishment, and continuing abductions and beatings. UK Ambassador Hall said he had heard encouraging reporting from some areas that villagers were less afraid of pushing back against Maoist intimidation. Ambassador Moriarty said he hoped that progress in the arms management process would begin to reduce fear in the countryside. Coordinating U.S. Support to the Police -------------- ¶5. (C) In meetings with both Ambassador Mukherjee and Ambassador Hall, Ambassador Moriarty raised the possibility of U.S. funding to support the police and promote security in the lead-up to elections. Ambassador Moriarty said he was keen to continue the dialogue begun in December with India, the UK, and the UN on promoting security and planned to coordinate U.S. investments in the police with these key partners (Ref B). The Indian and UK Ambassadors welcomed the possibility of additional U.S. assistance for the police. Ambassador Mukherjee emphasized that his current focus was to push for an election process that was "reasonably" free from fear and intimidation, including getting the police back out in the countryside and flooding the country with international observers. Mukherjee said that, fundamentally, the police needed a confidence boost, and India's primary message to the government was to strengthen the morale of their police force. Ambassador Moriarty described the enthusiasm he had witnessed on the part of the political parties in the countryside for a strengthened police role in election security. Ambassador Mukherjee agreed that dialogue between security officials and local civilian and political party leadership would be important in restoring civilian confidence in the police. ¶6. (C) UK Ambassador Hall was also interested in continuing the "quadrilateral" dialogue begun in December on policing and security sector reform. He raised the potential for the U.S., India, and the UN to meet with a UK police and security sector assessment team traveling to Kathmandu in early February. Ambassador Moriarty agreed that this would be an opportunity to continue the discussion on coordinating complementary approaches and said he would encourage the Indians to participate. Ambassador Hall also said he hoped the UK would be able to continue to support Ministry of Defense (MOD) capacity-building efforts. Both Ambassadors agreed that it would be important to find the "reformers" within the army and police to be partners in assistance efforts. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) The UK and Indian Ambassadors share our deep concern over continued Maoist activity across the countryside at odds with Maoist commitments in the November peace agreements. An improved security environment throughout Nepal's districts will be central to creating an atmosphere conducive to credible Constituent Assembly Elections. To achieve a secure environment, the arms management process must proceed in earnest, and the GON must re-establish a governance and security presence in districts where, in many cases, it has been ineffective or absent for years. We will continue to work closely with the UK and India, as well as the UN, in designing police support efforts to ensure complementary approaches and promote an effective and proactive police presence in the run-up to elections. MORIARTY

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