MK NEPAL CONFIRMS NO LEFT ALLIANCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001347 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2017 TAGS: PREL ECON PREF PTER KDEM BT NP SUBJECT: MK NEPAL CONFIRMS NO LEFT ALLIANCE Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) On July 10, MK Nepal, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML), reported to the Ambassador that his party had finished a 15 day party meeting at which the party members had discussed the conditions for the election in the countryside. Nepal told the Ambassador the UML had rejected the proposal of several members with "extreme views" to form an alliance with Maoists. The party General Secretary stressed that the UML would continue to push for the declaration of a republic and abolition of the monarchy and admitted that the behavior of the Maoist Young Communist League continued to be a problem. UML Discusses Conditions for Election at 15 Day Party Meeting -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) In a farewell call by the Ambassador on July 10, MK Nepal, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML),reported that his party had finished a 15-day marathon meeting on July 9 to prepare for the November Constituent Assembly (CA) election. Nepal conceded that 15 days was too long, but he explained that the meeting had a "democratic environment" where each member was invited to express their views; this took time. Discussions involved the conditions for the elections in the districts throughout the country. Nepal informed the Ambassador that the CPN-UML's five-year party convention, originally scheduled for September, would be delayed until February, to give the party members more time to prepare for the November election. Maoist: Friend or Foe? -------------- ¶3. (C) Nepal stated that the Maoists were an issue for the UML and conceded that there were several members with "extreme views" who had suggested an alliance with Maoists. He confirmed that the UML had rejected the possibility of an alliance with the Maoist because it would jeopardize the unity of the eight parties. Nepal commented that the Maoists could not be trusted and had a habit of manipulating people to serve their needs. The Ambassador told him that he believed the Maoists had lost much of their support in the countryside. The Ambassador revealed that in the Karnali region the Maoists had attempted to bar an election awareness program in one-third of the villages, but had been unsuccessful in every attempt. The Ambassador suggested that this was a sign that the Maoist presence in the countryside had diminished and now would be an excellent time for the other political parties to return to the villages. MK Nepal Still Worried about the Monarchy -------------- ¶4. (C) The UML leader stressed that his party would continue to push for the declaration of a democratic republic and the abolition of the monarchy. Nepal explained to the Ambassador that the nation was polarized in two camps: the King's supporters and the democratic forces. The Ambassador responded that the King was no longer a threat as he has no credibility and no longer controlled the Nepal Army. On the other hand, assuming that the Maoists should be included in a "democratic camp" was a much bigger problem. The Ambassador highlighted that Maoist leader Mohan Baidya (Kiran) had recently admitted in public that the Maoists were still training guerrilla fighters -- a clear indication that at least some Maoists were ready to use violence to take power. Nepal acknowledged that the Maoist Young Communist League's (YCL) use of violence was a serious problem. Verification, the Terai and the Future -------------- ¶5. (C) Nepal questioned the Ambassador about the delay in the UNMIN verification process in the cantonment camps. In KATHMANDU 00001347 002 OF 002 response to these concerns, the Ambassador shared that the Maoists were reportedly upset because UMNIM had disqualified on the grounds that they were new recruits or children larger numbers of the alleged combatants than the Maoists had anticipated on the grounds that they were new recruits or children. The Ambassador told Nepal that he believed that most of the problems in the Terai could be solved through political dialogue. He stressed that it was important to isolate the extremists as it would be very dangerous if their views and actions became mainstream. The Ambassador told Nepal that he was more optimistic now than he had been since he arrived in Nepal and that if the process that had been put in place was implemented reasonably well, it would set the country on a path toward peace and stability. But, the Ambassador emphasized, the election had to be held in November as scheduled. The Ambassador suggested that the biggest question was what the Maoists would do when they realized they were looking toward an election that they could not win. Nepal thanked the Ambassador and said that the Ambassador had played an important role in the people's mass movement in Nepal. Nepal stressed that the support of the international community had been and would continue to be very important for his country. Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) MK Nepal is consistently inconsistent when it comes to the Maoists. He clearly does not trust them, yet seemingly would not rule out an alliance with them if it would increase the UML's position and his own power. The seven-party alliance could be much stronger if the UML took a solid stance on the Maoists and gave up its paranoia about the monarchy. However, past experience suggests that the UML leader will continue to play sides he sees beneficial to his own quest for power. HUGINS