UPDATE FROM NEPAL'S CHIEF ELECTION COMMISSIONER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001344 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM NP SUBJECT: UPDATE FROM NEPAL'S CHIEF ELECTION COMMISSIONER Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Chief Election Commissioner Bhojraj Pokhrel told the Ambassador in a July 12 meeting that negotiations that same day on a Code of Conduct had focused on election expenses. Pokhrel had already designed an enforcement strategy to counter code violations. Getting the Maoists to participate in the Constituent Assembly election remained a primary, though hopefully not insurmountable, concern. The Ambassador encouraged the Commissioner to continue to publicly push for the highest possible standards for the election. Negotiating a Code of Conduct -------------- ¶2. (C) Chief Election Commissioner Bhojraj Pokhrel came directly from negotiations with the political parties about the Code of Conduct to meet with the Ambassador at the Election Commission Building July 12. He informed the Ambassador that the Election Commission (EC) had not yet resolved the maximum amount parties could spend campaigning for the Constituent Assembly election. The larger parties continued to press for a higher limit, while the smaller parties wanted to minimize their resource disadvantage by imposing a lower limit. Pokhrel stated that he believed that, under existing legislation, the EC would have enough power to enforce the code. Penalties for code infractions ranged from levying fines up to 10,000 Rupees (approximately 155 dollars),which could be levied on the spot, to canceling the election in a constituency or region. While final authority rested with the EC, polling station staff and the incumbent officer in the constituency would also be authorized to enforce the code. Pokhrel said the EC was discussing whether the monitors they were fielding could also be deputized to enforce the code. If not, these monitors could still serve as a point of contact and play a coordinating role. Pokhrel acknowledged that effectiveness of enforcement remained a question, particularly for parties that believed no one listened to their complaints about the last election. Enforcement Strategy Taking Shape -------------- ¶3. (C) Aware that India had recently dramatically raised the standard of its elections, Pokhrel said he had asked his Indian counterpart for insight on how India had been able to clean-up its polls. His counterpart's answer had focused on the Code of Conduct and a broad enforcement strategy. Pokhrel was trying to take full advantage of lessons learned in India, as well as from previous elections in Nepal. Pokhrel revealed that his enforcement strategy would not rely solely on EC officials and mechanisms. He was counting on civil society and the press to monitor the parties. By partnering the efforts of the EC with other domestic observers, United Nations Mission to Nepal (UNMIN) observers, the Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR), and other non-governmental organizations, Pokhrel was optimistic that timely information about potential code violations would be available, could be investigated, and if appropriate, penalties could be enforced. As a practical matter he indicated the EC was likely to focus on critical constituencies. The Ambassador responded that making examples by disqualifying flagrant violators in a few constituencies would help keep all parties in line. Concerned about Getting Maoist Buy-in -------------- ¶4. (C) Pokhrel stated he believed Nepal must hold the Constituent Assembly election as scheduled on November 22. It was obvious he was working very hard to bring the Maoists into the elections. Once they participated, Pokhrel was not concerned about the results. He was aware the Maoists had neither a good field organization nor many voters, and their resulting strength in the Constituent Assembly would be KATHMANDU 00001344 002.2 OF 002 significantly less than in the Interim Parliament. Pokhrel desperately wanted to keep the Maoists involved in the electoral process and asked the Ambassador what incentives the other parties could give the Maoists to ensure their participation. The Ambassador replied that the parties had no carrots left. The parties had already given the Maoists everything but complete power, with little to show in return. He added it was time to make clear that it would not be the fault of the EC or other parties if the Maoists did not participate. Rather, the other parties and the EC needed to insist that the Maoists implement the previous agreements to abandon violence and participate fully in the political process. Given the Maoists' expected weakness in contesting seats using the first-past-the-post system, Pokhrel hinted that he was looking for eight-party understanding to informally guarantee the Maoist leaders some constituency seats. Terms Matter -------------- ¶5. (C) The Ambassador cautioned Pokhrel about adopting the terminology "credible and accepted" elections rather than the clearer and higher standard of "free and fair" elections. The Ambassador worried that, in the Nepali context, the "credible and acceptable" formulation would imply to the Maoists that everyone expected and would tolerate abuses on their part; that would amount to encouraging them to see how many violations they could get away with. Pokhrel confessed he had occasionally used the "credible and accepted" terminology without having considered the lowered expectations surrounding those terms. He added, though, generally the EC used the term "free, fair, and impartial" elections. The Ambassador strongly supported this expanded formulation. Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) Throughout the discussion, Pokhrel repeated that the work of the EC involved group decisions and was a joint venture, implying that he could only move as far as other participants were willing to go. He clearly feels the pressure of having to make difficult decisions that will have a huge impact on Nepal's future. That said, he has a track record of success that assures us that he will do everything possible to pull off a free and fair Constituent Assembly election. He was reasonably confident that the dissatisfaction with the election procedures by groups in the Terai could be adequately addressed, but he remained much more concerned about the Maoists. MORIARTY