NEPAL: HOME MINISTRY TO HIRE 75,000 POLICE FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001328

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PTER KDEM BT NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: HOME MINISTRY TO HIRE 75,000 POLICE FOR
POLLS


Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) During a farewell call July 10 on Home Minister
Krishna Sitaula, the Ambassador stressed that the Maoists had
miscalculated by assuming that the Nepal Army would acquiesce
if the Maoists attempted to seize power. Pushing ahead with
the Constituent Assembly polls in November was the best way
for Nepal to bring the less violent of the two Maoist
factions into the democratic process. The Ambassador
emphasized that it was essential, however, that the Home
Ministry enforce law and order. Minister Sitaula reported
that the Ministry planned to engage 75,000 "temporary" police
to provide security for the election. The Ambassador
outlined U.S. preparations for resettling at least 60,000
Bhutanese refugees over the next several years. Sitaula
agreed that the Ministry had to restore security in the camps
so this process could go forward, and noted that 25 police
officers would be assigned to each of the seven refugee
camps. The Ambassador and the Minister agreed that
resettlement should proceed despite opposition by a minority
of refugees, and that resettlement would eventually heighten
the pressure on Bhutan to allow repatriation. With respect
to the peace process, the Ambassador advised the Minister
that the most critical role of the Home Ministry was to
resist efforts by the Maoists and Madhesi extremists to
postpone the election.

The Maoists Have Miscalculated
--------------


2. (C) In a farewell call July 10 on Minister of Home Affairs
Krishna Sitaula, the Ambassador described the Maoist forces
as currently divided into two factions. The first faction,
led by Pushpa Kamal Dahal (aka Prachanda),was intent on
remaining in the government, forcing more and more
concessions from the other parties, and gaining political
power gradually; the other faction, led by Mohan Vaidya (aka
Kiran) and Ram Bahadur Thapa (aka Badol),wanted to seize
power quickly by forcing the collapse of the government. He
said both factions had miscalculated by assuming that both
the Seven-Party Alliance and the Nepalese Army would
acquiesce in either a gradual or violent Maoist takeover.
The Army especially, the Ambassador stressed, would not
tolerate power passing to the Maoists, because the officer
corps knew they would lose control of the institution and
would face a Maoist purge. Even the enlisted ranks had no
love for the Maoists because of the Maoist treatment of their
families in the countryside. The Ambassador went on to
stress that the political parties had to remain united in
support of the democratic process and push ahead with the
Constituent Assembly election in November. If the parties
succeeded in holding the election, the Maoists would have no
choice but to remain in the process, and abandon their hopes
for absolute power. The very worst scenario for the Maoists,
the Ambassador added, would be to become politically isolated.

Home Ministry Must Ensure Election Security
--------------


3. (C) The Ambassador pointed out that the role of the Home
Ministry in staging the election was crucial to the success
of the election, and to Nepal's democratic transition. It
was essential that the Government of Nepal (GON) provide a
secure environment nationwide for the polls. The Minister
responded that the Ministry would do what it could. It
planned to engage 75,000 "temporary" police to maintain order
leading up to and during the election. It would attempt to
recruit these temporary police from the ranks of ex-police
and ex-military. (Note: This number of "temporary" police
would greatly exceed that of the regular Nepal Police force,
which currently numbers only about 55,000, with another
23,000 in the Armed Police Force. End Note.) Sitaula was
not able to explain where the Ministry would find enough
qualified recruits if sufficient ex-police and ex-army failed

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to step forward.

U.S. Resettlement Preparations Moving Forward
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4. (SBU) The Ambassador noted that, based on the GON decision
to allow third-country resettlement of Bhutanese refugees,
the U.S. and its partner, the International Organization for
Migration (IOM),were moving quickly to establish the
infrastructure for U.S. refugee resettlement processing in
eastern Nepal. He acknowledged that the Chief District
Officer (CDO) of Jhapa District had expressed a preference
that the Overseas Processing Entity (OPE),which IOM would
operate, be based in the district capital of Bhadrapur; the
U.S., however, planned to establish it in Damak, closer to
the refugee camps and the site of the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) sub-office. He hoped the CDO could
support that decision. The Ambassador told the Minister that
IOM staff were already arriving in Nepal to prepare for a
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) visit. DHS officials
wanted to conduct refugee adjudications as early as September
or early October.

Ensuring Security in the Refugee Camps
--------------


5. C) The Ambassador stressed that this huge humanitarian
operation could not proceed until the GON had restored
security in the refugee camps so that UNHCR and resettlement
countries could do their work in safety. Refugees needed to
be able to decide for themselves whether to seek resettlement
without fear of violent intimidation by other refugees
opposed to the resettlement option. Minister Sitaula
informed the Ambassador that the situation in the camps at
the moment was "peaceful," but that the Ministry was
instructing the CDO to deploy 25 police officers to each of
the seven camps. (Note: Per UNHCR, currently about six
police are on duty in each camp during daylight hours. End
Note.) He expected this would improve security sufficiently
for processing to proceed. The Minister observed that
deploying more police in the camps would not permanently
solve the Bhutanese refugee problem. Ultimately, it would be
necessary to find a political solution. The Ambassador
agreed, adding that the U.S. would continue to try to win
over pre-repatriation refugees to the proposition that their
fellow refugees had the right to choose resettlement if they
wanted. The Ambassador stressed, however, that a small
minority of troublemakers in the camps was to blame, and that
resettlement processing could not be put off indefinitely
while a compromise was sought. The Minister and Ambassador
concurred that third-country resettlement of thousands of
Bhutanese, rather than taking pressure off the Royal
Government of Bhutan (RGOB),would rather internationalize
the issue and put pressure on the RGOB to acknowledge and
repatriate its nationals. For example, said the Ambassador,
thousands of former Bhutanese refugees in the United States
writing to their Congressmen and women would not go unheard.

Furthering the Peace Process
--------------


6. (C) The Minister asked the Ambassador for advice on how to
further the peace process. He conceded Nepal's unelected
parliament and unelected government were weak. Nepal needed
the support of the international community, Sitaula stated,
to bring all the competing factions into a democratic
settlement. The Ambassador agreed that international support
was necessary, and the United States would assist to the
extent it could. He suggested, however, that the Home
Ministry's objective at this point should be to convince the
Maoists and Madhesi extremists that violence would not be
tolerated and that their efforts to force the postponement of
the election would fail. If Nepal did not hold the election
in November, the Ambassador warned, then there would not be
one in the near future. But if the election were a success,
in two years the Constituent Assembly would likely produce a
good constitution. The best thing the Home Ministry could do

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for the country would be to see to it that the police
enforced the law.

Comment
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7. (C) Home Minister Sitaula's plan to add 75,000 temporary
police to the rolls is a good start, although it will be a
challenge to meet that hiring target. In past elections, the
Home Ministry brought on temporary police also, but not in
such large numbers. Security for the Constituent Assembly
election will be different from past elections because the
Nepal Army is not permitted to play any role. The peace
agreements proscribe the Army's involvement. Post is pleased
Sitaula plans to deploy additional police to the Bhutanese
refugee camps. Now, if he will only give them, and the rest
of the Nepali Police and the Armed Police Force, orders to
use their authority to keep the peace, peace may stand a
chance.
MORIARTY