FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER CALLS FOR U.S. TO TALK TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001196

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2017
TAGS: PGOV PTER NP
SUBJECT: FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER CALLS FOR U.S. TO TALK TO
MAOISTS


Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

Summary
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1. (C) In meetings with the Ambassador on June 14 and 16, and
strongly in a June 16 press conference, former President
Jimmy Carter called for the United States to end its policy
of not meeting with the Maoists. Although press reports
claimed in the wake of Mr. Carter's June 15 session with
Maoist chief Pushpa Kamal Dahal (aka Prachanda) that Mr.
Carter had agreed to press the United States to take the
Maoists off the terrorist list, the former President made no
such promise. Mr. Carter stressed his concern publicly and
privately about ongoing abuses by the Maoist Young Communist
League and termed the security situation "unacceptable" for a
free and fair Constituent Assembly election. The former
President also hailed the progress Nepal had made in its
peace process and urged that special attention be taken to
ensure that the election would be inclusive.

End U.S. Policy of No Contact With Maoists
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2. (C) In an early morning meeting on June 14, the day after
his arrival in Nepal, former President Jimmy Carter gently
asked the Ambassador why the United States had no contact
with the Maoists. The Maoists were participating in the
peace process and had joined the Interim Parliament, and more
recently, the Interim Government, Mr. Carter noted. By not
meeting the Maoists, was not the U.S. depriving itself of the
ability to influence Maoist behavior? The Ambassador replied
that, with all the other diplomatic missions in Nepal meeting
with the Maoists, the Maoists were already being told to
renounce violence and join the political mainstream.
Moreover, if the U.S. changed its policy without an
improvement in Maoist behavior, it would send the wrong
message to the Nepali people, the Government of Nepal (GON),
and especially the Maoists. On June 16, at the airport prior
to his departure, Mr. Carter confirmed that he had publicly
called for the end of the U.S. no-contact policy with the
Maoists. As he had said in response to a question at a press
conference immediately beforehand, he was of the opinion that
the U.S. should be in direct communication with the Maoists.

No Call For Taking Maoists Off Terrorist List
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3. (C) In his two meetings with the Ambassador, former
President Carter did not call for the U.S. to take the
Maoists off the list of specially designated global terrorist
entities. In fact, he noted that he wanted to be careful not
to interfere with that process. According to the Carter
Center's Nepal Field Director Darren Nance and Nance's deputy
Sarah Levitt-Shore, Mr. Carter also said nothing different in
his meetings with Nepalis. Press reports after Mr. Carter's
June 15 session with Maoist Supremo Pushpa Dahal (aka
Prachanda) and Dahal's deputy Dr. Baburam Bhattarai quoted
Dahal and Bhattarai claiming the former President had agreed
to lobby the U.S. for delisting. According to Nance, former
President Carter was upset when he saw the headlines and told
Nance: "I am no lobbyist for the Maoists."

Carter Raises Young Communist League Abuses
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4. (C) Mr. Carter reported to the Ambassador June 16 that he
had raised several cases of human rights abuses by the
Maoists, specifically the Young Communist League (YCL),when
he met with Dahal on June 15. He had provided details of
twenty cases to Dahal at a gathering of all the parliamentary
parties on June 16. Mr. Carter said he was confident these
incidents were true because they were based largely on the
firsthand knowledge of the Carter Center's 13 long-term
observers (LTOs). He proudly described how, since March, the
LTOs had visited cities and remote villages in 70 of Nepal's
75 districts. The former President indicated that Dahal had

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agreed to investigate. In the press conference on June 16,
Mr. Carter cited his conversation with the Maoist chief about
the problems with the YCL and Dahal's personal assurance that
the Maoist leadership took its responsibility to end the
YCL's "bad behavior" seriously. When he met the Ambassador
June 16, the former President noted the YCL had been on the
receiving end of extreme abuses as well, notably in the
Terai, which the Ambassador freely acknowledged.

Security Situation "Unacceptable"
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5. (C) In his discussions with the Ambassador and others, as
well as in his public statements, Mr. Carter stressed the
need to address the problems of insecurity and violence.
According to Nance, Prime Minister Koirala told the former
President during their second meeting on June 16 (Note: Their
initial meeting was on June 14.) that he agreed about the
need to improve security. In fact, the PM indicated he
intended to replace Home Minister Sitaula within 15 days.
During his June 16 press conference, Mr. Carter stressed that
a safe and secure environment was a "core requirement" for
Nepal's transition and upcoming Constituent Assembly
election, adding that the present law and order situation was
"unacceptable." His press statement went on to say that the
GON needed a strong police force with the "morale, capacity
and authority" to do its work.

Progress Made, More Needed
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6. (C) The former President told the Ambassador June 16 that
he was impressed with the rapid progress Nepal had made in
its peace process. He said much the same thing in his press
conference earlier that day. Mr. Carter cited the efforts
the GON was making to include marginalized peoples in the
country's politics and society. He stated to the Ambassador
that he knew of no country that had made as rapid strides in
this area. But the former President also noted that more
would have to be done, and, as he noted in his press
conference, the Constituent Assembly election was "only an
interim step in a larger, longer and more important process
-- the constituent assembly election itself."

Comment
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7. (C) From post's perspective, former President Carter's
visit, like the excellent work of the Carter Center's
long-term observers, has been useful in highlighting many of
the same issues of ending Maoist abuses, ensuring security,
and creating an inclusive system that the U.S. has been
urging for Nepal. While we disagree with Mr. Carter's call
for direct communication with the Maoists, we would certainly
welcome the opportunity to have such communication if Maoist
behavior undergoes significant change. The former President
offered to be of assistance if possible and concluded by
saying that he was prepared to return to Nepal with an
expanded observation mission prior to the Constituent
Assembly election -- barring other unforeseen commitments.
MORIARTY