INDIAN AMBASSADOR ACKNOWLEDGES MAOISTS ARE OUT OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001112 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PHUM KDEM IN NP SUBJECT: INDIAN AMBASSADOR ACKNOWLEDGES MAOISTS ARE OUT OF CONTROL Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty for reasons 1.4(b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C/NF) Indian Ambassador Shiv Mukherjee agreed with the Ambassador June 4 that the Maoists had intensified their campaign of threats and intimidation. Mukherjee admitted he was being recalled by the Government of India (GOI) for consultations amid fears that the Maoists were out of control. Mukherjee intended to request GOI permission to warn the Maoists that the GOI might reduce its engagement with Nepal if their behavior did not improve. He also planned to seek increased GOI pressure on the Government of Nepal (GON) to establish an election timetable as soon as possible. Mukherjee indicated that the GOI was urging the GON to resolve problems in the Terai, including the activities of the Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha, that continued to threaten Nepal's future stability. He expressed concern as well that the UN Mission in Nepal was looking to expand its mandate to include brokering talks between the Madhesi rights groups and the GON, a move the GOI would not support. Mukherjee Fears Maoists Out of Control -------------- ¶2. (C/NF) The Ambassador expressed concern to Indian Ambassador Shiv Shankar Mukherjee on June 4 that the Maoists appeared to be dividing into two camps: "the hard-liners and the harder-liners." Unified by the common objective of seizing total control of the state, both camps differed only in strategy. Mukherjee agreed and said that he had been recalled for consultations in New Delhi amid rising fears that the Maoists were out of control. The Ambassador stated that the more severe Maoist hard-liners had intensified threats and intimidation to up the pressure on the political parties and business community and were pushing for a massive increase in confrontation with the government. The less severe Maoists intended either to postpone the Constituent Assembly election indefinitely or to win the election through massive fraud and intimidation. Either strategy would have dire consequences for the Nepali people. Mukherjee asserted that the Maoists lacked popular support and would have to rig an election to win. Indian Ambassador Will Seek to Rein In Maoist Abuses -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) The Indian Ambassador believed his government needed to try to rein in Maoist abuses. He intended to seek New Delhi's permission to tell the Maoist leadership that the Government of India (GOI) would walk back its engagement with Nepal if they did not improve their behavior. Mukherjee appeared frustrated that the Maoists had upped their intimidation campaign, particularly through the Young Communist League (YCL),against political parties and businessmen despite GOI intervention. India To Push Hard For Election Timetable -------------- ¶4. (C) In New Delhi, Mukherjee intended to request GOI support to push publicly for the Government of Nepal (GON) to set an achievable timetable for elections. Mukherjee was worried that the current trajectory in Nepal could lead to a Maoist takeover. He believed that a decision on elections and adequate preparations for the election would help forestall Maoist advances. Mukherjee also indicated that he was liaising with Nepal's political parties to negotiate a firm election date. Ongoing Problems in the Terai -------------- ¶5. (C) The GOI was working to calm down the situation in the KATHMANDU 00001112 002 OF 002 Terai, Mukherjee said. The Ambassador pointed out that Maoist Minister for Forestry Matrika Yadav, who was also the head of the Maoist Madhesi National Liberation Front, had recently announced a month-long protest program in the Terai. The program would begin June 7 with the objective of declaring a republic. Mukherjee did not appear to have focused on the Maoist program. He expressed concern that Madhesi People's Rights Forum (MPRF) President Upendra Yadav planned to visit the U.S. The Ambassador assured him that the U.S. Government was not funding Yadav's visit. (Note: Upendra Yadav plans to travel to the U.S. in June at the request of the Association of Nepalese in America (ANA). End Note.) The Ambassador worried that problems in the Terai threatened to tear apart the country if not addressed soon. He predicted that, if the Maoists were to seize power in Kathmandu, they could face a civil war in the Terai. The U.S. would continue to support the legitimate demands of the Madhesi people, but would not tolerate violence, the Ambassador added. GON Should Talk With Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) The Ambassador expressed grave concern that the two factions of the Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha ("People's Terai Liberation Front") (JTMM) posed a serious threat to Nepal's future stability. Mukherjee agreed that, although the JTMM groups were small in size, they could create a great deal of trouble for the GON. He said he had advised the GON to initiate a dialogue with the JTMM, while strictly enforcing law and order with respect to JTMM criminal activity. Dissatisfaction With UN in Nepal -------------- ¶7. (C) Mukherjee indicated there was concern in New Delhi that the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) was looking for an expanded mandate to include brokering talks between the Madhesi rights groups and the GON. The GOI would oppose any such UN move, he asserted. The Ambassador agreed that the UN first needed to fulfill its current mandate, particularly in the area of pre-election observation. He noted that UNMIN Chief Ian Martin continued to push for the appointment of a high-level joint (GON and Maoist) commission to oversee implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and for the appointment of commissioners to the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). Mukherjee said both these initiatives were laudable; monitoring of, and reporting on, Maoist abuses needed to be strengthened if security were to return to the countryside. The Indian Ambassador also agreed that the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights should not ignore Maoist violations while holding the GON to account. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Overall, the Indian Ambassador was more pessimistic in his assessment of Maoist actions and intentions then ever before. The GOI seems to have moved past its post-April 1 euphoria over its success in pressing the Seven-Party Alliance to include the Maoists in an interim government. Mukherjee at least now appears to realize that the Indians have little influence over the Maoist leadership. Overall, the meeting left us hopeful that the GOI will, to the extent possible, increase pressure on the Maoists to meet their commitments on combatant verification, the return of property, and the end of their terror campaign. MORIARTY