Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KATHMANDU1033
2007-05-24 12:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:
NEPAL: CHINESE AMBASSADOR AGREES MAOISTS HAVE NOT
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001033
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PREF PHUM KDEM CH NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: CHINESE AMBASSADOR AGREES MAOISTS HAVE NOT
CHANGED THEIR STRIPES, DISCUSSES TIBET
REF: BEIJING 3171
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 001033
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PREF PHUM KDEM CH NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: CHINESE AMBASSADOR AGREES MAOISTS HAVE NOT
CHANGED THEIR STRIPES, DISCUSSES TIBET
REF: BEIJING 3171
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
--------------
1. (C) The Maoists have not given up violence and
intimidation, agreed Chinese Ambassador Zheng Xianglin in a
May 23 meeting with the Ambassador. The two Ambassadors also
discussed splinter ethnic groups in the Terai, their
potential impact on elections, and the Maoist reaction to
these groups. Ambassador Zheng hinted that Tibetan
resettlement, if done quietly and in small numbers, might be
a possibility as long as the Government of Nepal (GON)
understood China's position and Tibet's stability was not
under threat.
Maoists: In Government, Yet Still Violent
--------------
2. (C) Chinese Ambassador Zheng Xianglin initially posited in
a meeting May 23 that the Maoists wanted to join the
political mainstream, but concurred with the Ambassador that
they continued to engage in violence and intimidation even
after their entry into the interim government. The
Ambassador pushed Zheng to admit that Maoist actions,
including abuses by the Young Communist League's (YCL),
signaled that the Maoists had not abandoned their violent
past. The Ambassador stressed to Zheng that there were only
two positions within the Maoist ranks: first, those who
argued for absolute power by remaining inside the government
while maintaining pressure on the government from the YCL and
others on the outside, and second, those who argued it was
better to leave the government and gamble all on direct
confrontation. There was no third Maoist position of
following the rules and gaining power solely through the
electoral process and by peaceful means.
Ethnic Groups Fight for Representation
--------------
3. (C) The growing power of ethnic groups in the Terai
(Nepal's southern borderlands with India) and their continued
fight for representation in the government seemed to surprise
Zheng. The Ambassador stated that inclusive ethnic
representation remained a key issue for Nepal's ongoing peace
process and for fair and free elections. The Maoists
appeared afraid of the potential power of formerly loyal
Maoist ethnic liberation fronts, which were splintering and
cutting into Maoist influence in the populous Terai. A good
chunk of Madhesi Maoists had already split from the party and
there were reports of similar pressures building among Tharu
and Magar Maoists. This would create the potential for
additional conflict. The GON needed to include these groups
in the political process to avoid a potential splintering of
Nepal. Zheng hoped the Ambassador was being alarmist, but
concurred that neither a failed state nor a fractured country
were in the region's interest.
Tibetan Resettlement Possible?
--------------
4. (C) Zheng raised the issue of Tibetan refugees in Nepal.
In a frank conversation, Zheng implied that limited
resettlement to the United States might be possible, but
cautioned that large and public resettlement plans were not a
viable option. He emphasized the importance of a stable
Tibet and the potential fallout of a large refugee
resettlement plan, particularly in encouraging outward
migration from Tibet. The Ambassador assured Zheng that the
U.S. viewed Tibet as a part of China and sought to assist
Tibetans who were stranded in Nepal, not create a new wave of
migration.
Comment
KATHMANDU 00001033 002 OF 002
--------------
5. (C) Ambassador Zheng appeared to start his May 23 meeting
with a rosier view of the Maoist intent to join the
mainstream than the one he ended with. He ended up
acknowledging that the Maoists had shown no indication of
changing their violent ways since joining the government
seven weeks ago. Zheng made the usual disclaimer that
China's role was that of an observer, but added that China
had not yet established official relations with the Maoists.
Zheng did not appear to have devoted much time to the Terai
and the issue of ethnic separation. Most surprising were his
comments about Tibetan refugees. While we would not advise
reading too much into his remarks, we will continue to
explore with the Government of Nepal the option of quietly
resettling a few Tibetans.
MORIARTY
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PREF PHUM KDEM CH NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: CHINESE AMBASSADOR AGREES MAOISTS HAVE NOT
CHANGED THEIR STRIPES, DISCUSSES TIBET
REF: BEIJING 3171
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).
Summary
--------------
1. (C) The Maoists have not given up violence and
intimidation, agreed Chinese Ambassador Zheng Xianglin in a
May 23 meeting with the Ambassador. The two Ambassadors also
discussed splinter ethnic groups in the Terai, their
potential impact on elections, and the Maoist reaction to
these groups. Ambassador Zheng hinted that Tibetan
resettlement, if done quietly and in small numbers, might be
a possibility as long as the Government of Nepal (GON)
understood China's position and Tibet's stability was not
under threat.
Maoists: In Government, Yet Still Violent
--------------
2. (C) Chinese Ambassador Zheng Xianglin initially posited in
a meeting May 23 that the Maoists wanted to join the
political mainstream, but concurred with the Ambassador that
they continued to engage in violence and intimidation even
after their entry into the interim government. The
Ambassador pushed Zheng to admit that Maoist actions,
including abuses by the Young Communist League's (YCL),
signaled that the Maoists had not abandoned their violent
past. The Ambassador stressed to Zheng that there were only
two positions within the Maoist ranks: first, those who
argued for absolute power by remaining inside the government
while maintaining pressure on the government from the YCL and
others on the outside, and second, those who argued it was
better to leave the government and gamble all on direct
confrontation. There was no third Maoist position of
following the rules and gaining power solely through the
electoral process and by peaceful means.
Ethnic Groups Fight for Representation
--------------
3. (C) The growing power of ethnic groups in the Terai
(Nepal's southern borderlands with India) and their continued
fight for representation in the government seemed to surprise
Zheng. The Ambassador stated that inclusive ethnic
representation remained a key issue for Nepal's ongoing peace
process and for fair and free elections. The Maoists
appeared afraid of the potential power of formerly loyal
Maoist ethnic liberation fronts, which were splintering and
cutting into Maoist influence in the populous Terai. A good
chunk of Madhesi Maoists had already split from the party and
there were reports of similar pressures building among Tharu
and Magar Maoists. This would create the potential for
additional conflict. The GON needed to include these groups
in the political process to avoid a potential splintering of
Nepal. Zheng hoped the Ambassador was being alarmist, but
concurred that neither a failed state nor a fractured country
were in the region's interest.
Tibetan Resettlement Possible?
--------------
4. (C) Zheng raised the issue of Tibetan refugees in Nepal.
In a frank conversation, Zheng implied that limited
resettlement to the United States might be possible, but
cautioned that large and public resettlement plans were not a
viable option. He emphasized the importance of a stable
Tibet and the potential fallout of a large refugee
resettlement plan, particularly in encouraging outward
migration from Tibet. The Ambassador assured Zheng that the
U.S. viewed Tibet as a part of China and sought to assist
Tibetans who were stranded in Nepal, not create a new wave of
migration.
Comment
KATHMANDU 00001033 002 OF 002
--------------
5. (C) Ambassador Zheng appeared to start his May 23 meeting
with a rosier view of the Maoist intent to join the
mainstream than the one he ended with. He ended up
acknowledging that the Maoists had shown no indication of
changing their violent ways since joining the government
seven weeks ago. Zheng made the usual disclaimer that
China's role was that of an observer, but added that China
had not yet established official relations with the Maoists.
Zheng did not appear to have devoted much time to the Terai
and the issue of ethnic separation. Most surprising were his
comments about Tibetan refugees. While we would not advise
reading too much into his remarks, we will continue to
explore with the Government of Nepal the option of quietly
resettling a few Tibetans.
MORIARTY