UNMIN CHIEF CONFIRMS VERIFICATION, ELECTION PREP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001002 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR UN NP SUBJECT: UNMIN CHIEF CONFIRMS VERIFICATION, ELECTION PREP ARE STALLED REF: KATHMANDU 988 Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) UNMIN Chief Ian Martin told the Ambassador May 17 that he continued to urge the Government of Nepal (GON) and the Maoists to allow the second phase of combatant verification to begin, but so far had seen little movement. Martin and visiting Senior UN Political Affairs Officer for South Asia Tamrat Samuel expressed concern that poor conditions in the Maoist cantonments could threaten the peace process. The Ambassador urged Martin to continue reminding the Maoists privately and publicly of their arms management commitments. The Ambassador highlighted that the Maoists must be held to account for the over 1.1 billion Nepali rupees (approximately USD 17 million) that the GON had transferred to them for the camps. The UNMIN Chief stressed the need for an election date so the Election Commission and UNMIN could begin necessary planning and said he hoped to re-emphasize UNMIN's peace agreement and ceasefire monitoring mandate. Combatant Verification Remains Stalled -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador commended UNMIN Chief Ian Martin May 17 for his recent public statements in Nepal and his briefings at UN Headquarters in New York which stressed that verification of Maoist combatants had to begin immediately with no pre-conditions. The Ambassador told Martin that he had highlighted to the Prime Minister in a meeting earlier in the day that if the Maoists did not permit verification of Maoist "combatants" to go forward, then they were breaking commitments not just to Nepalis, but to the international community (reftel). He urged the UNMIN Chief to continue to reiterate this point publicly and in private meetings with the Maoists. Martin said his military advisor, General Jan Erik Wilhemsen, was seeing the Maoist People's Liberation Army (PLA) leadership soon and had received some signs there might be progress in the negotiations. Poor Camp Conditions Threaten Arms Management -------------- ¶3. (C) Martin said UNMIN remained very concerned regarding poor conditions in the camps, referring to the recent death of a cantoned combatant. Under the current conditions, the UNMIN Chief said, injury and death were bound to occur, with dire ramifications for the peace process. Martin stated that, while there was some movement on building more permanent dwellings for the combatants, he doubted necessary improvements could be made before the monsoon. The UNMIN Chief lamented that the GON had not asked UNMIN to play a role in camp management such as providing neutral convening and oversight support. UNMIN was rarely informed of camp management negotiations and planning, Martin added. The Ambassador stressed the importance of verification to camp management. It would be significantly easier to care for and shelter 15,000 verified combatants rather than the over 31,000 currently in the cantonments. Maoists Must Account for Camp Spending -------------- ¶4. (C) The Ambassador emphasized that the Maoists had to be held to account for the over 1.1 billion Nepali rupees (approximately USD 16 million) that the GON had transferred to them to care for Maoist combatants. Before the GON transferred additional funds, the Ambassador said, it would be essential to determine how the existing monies were used. (Note: On May 16 Finance Minister Mahat had emphatically agreed with the Ambassador on the need to give this issue greater attention. End Note.) KATHMANDU 00001002 002 OF 003 UNMIN Eager for Election Date -------------- ¶5. (C) Martin told the Ambassador that UNMIN was eager for the GON to declare a new Constituent Assembly election date. Martin said that the widely mooted late November timeframe for the election was getting tight unless a date were declared right away so the Election Commission and UNMIN could move forward their planning. The Ambassador said he had also stressed this point with the Prime Minister. Reinvigorating UNMIN's Monitoring Mandate -------------- ¶6. (C) In recent weeks, Martin said, he had received signs that the parties were hoping that UNMIN could reinvigorate its peace agreement/ceasefire monitoring mandate. With an upsurge of Maoist Young Communist League violence and a further deterioration of law and order across the countryside, Martin voiced the hope that UNMIN could focus on monitoring efforts. (Note: Post has heard in previous conversations with UNMIN that only two civil affairs officers have been hired thus far to conduct monitoring out of UNMIN's regional offices. End Note.) The Ambassador agreed, stressing that Maoist violations of peace agreement provisions had not abated since they joined the interim government at the beginning of April. In fact, Maoist violations had become so commonplace, no one raised any objections. Maoists Boxed in to the Process -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador reiterated that, despite their misbehavior, the Maoists seemed boxed into the current peace process. While they continued to aspire to control the state, the Ambassador questioned how the Maoists would get from here -- control over a few ministries and a portion of Parliament -- to there. Even if the Maoists were successful in pushing through a republic before a Constituent Assembly election, their chances of weakening their next target, the Army, would be slim. The other parties and the international community were unlikely to stand idly by as the Maoists made a power grab. The Ambassador also pointed out that a reasonably credible election process would also undercut their rise to power. The Maoists faced Madhesi opposition across the densely populated Terai and had been intimidating people in the countryside for years who would punish them at the polls if given the opportunity to do so; the Maoist voting base was waning. Internal Party Dynamics Could Spell Trouble -------------- ¶8. (C) UN Political Advisor Tamrat Samuel said that, at this point in the peace process, each of the political parties was looking at how to advance their own interests at the expense of seven party unity. Ironically, Samuel said, the splintering of the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) would do the most damage to their fundamental interest: it would undermine movement toward a Constituent Assembly election and bolster Maoist strength. If the election were delayed beyond November, Samuel said, security challenges loomed. The Maoists were unlikely to be able to hold together their various armed factions, resulting in a "thugs for hire" phenomenon. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) UN Mission in Nepal Chief Ian Martin is looking a little beleaguered with an impasse in UNMIN's two main tasks, the Constituent Assembly election and the arms management process. His robust recent public remarks have been useful but insufficient to move the process forward. It is becoming increasingly clear that UNMIN's success in arms management will depend in large part on the achievement of other tasks, KATHMANDU 00001002 003 OF 003 namely camp management, reintegration of expelled combatants, and law enforcement efforts. UNMIN must determine what role it can play in these essential areas and how it can encourage other key multinational and bilateral partners, such as the UN Development Program (UNDP),to address them. A combatant registration and vetting process will be for naught if the combatants will not remain in camps, if expelled combatants join the Maoist militia or Young Communist League, or if security conditions continue to deteriorate ahead of the (still-to-be-scheduled) Constituent Assembly election. MORIARTY