UGANDA: IF A TREE FALLS IN MABIRA FOREST, WHO WILL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KAMPALA 000744 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL SENV UG SUBJECT: UGANDA: IF A TREE FALLS IN MABIRA FOREST, WHO WILL HEAR IT? Classified By: P/E Chief Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) . ¶1. (C) Summary: The April 12 and 17 violence associated with the campaign to stop the sale of land in the Mabira Forest to foreign investors continues to reverberate throughout Uganda's political arena. Five people died after frustrations were taken out on Asians during violent confrontations. Uganda's political players are preoccupied with their next moves in the wake of the violence. President Museveni and Minister of Security Amama Mbabazi tried to reassure the Asian community of its security and continue to crack down on dissenters. Opposition leaders continue to seek ways to provoke or embarrass the Executive. Foreign investors are concerned that Uganda's political situation could deteriorate if the current trajectory holds. Embassy officials continue to urge restraint and dialogue in our interactions with Government and opposition officials. Even if Mabira Forest land is saved, the fall-out from the demonstrations has implications for key players and institutions. End Summary. - - - - - - - FOR MUSEVENI - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) The Mabira Forest demonstrations, coming on the heels of the High Court siege on March 1, have increased Museveni's unease with multipartyism and political dissent, according to a wide range of observers. His speeches reveal deep distrust of the opposition, dissenters within the ruling party, and the independent media. On April 19, Museveni stated that the Mabira Forest protest was "organized by fascists pretending to be democrats." In other public statements, Museveni referred to the protest participants as "criminals." Museveni placed the bulk of the blame for the violence on the opposition--especially Kizza Besigye and his Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)--rather than the criminals that took advantage of the protest march to loot and kill. Museveni's focus on opposition parties could be underestimating other relevant, and potentially destabilizing factors. Some observers believe that the violence on April 12 and 17 was the result of frustration with Museveni and his policies which appear to favor regime insiders, including foreign businesses, over indigenous investors. The Asian victims became easily identifiable scapegoats. ¶3. (C) The President's failure to convince Ugandans that the key to the country's development was to give away land to regime cronies cannot be blamed on the political opposition and media alone. The Executive has ignored a public perception that super-wealthy Indian businessmen were benefiting from sweetheart business deals in exchange for financial support during elections. These businessmen are rumored to be closely connected to the President, his family, and historical members of the National Resistance Movement (NRM). The reportedly poor treatment Ugandan workers receive at the hands of Indian employers is a source of resentment for many Ugandans struggling to earn a meager living. Added to this, the high levels of resentment among the urban unemployed boil over in the streets of Kampala during public gatherings. The GOU makes no efforts to seek genuine dialogue to alleviate the sources of tension. ¶4. (C) President Museveni may have to back down on the planned forest give-away in the face of widespread public opposition. Various sources tell us that he will likely use the Cabinet, which reportedly opposes the give-away, and an agreement with the World Bank on the Bujagali Dam that requires protection of Mabira Forest to justify his reversal on the deal to Mehta Group. Given the recent New Vision poll of parliamentarians that indicated that 72 percent of NRM MPs opposed the give-away, Museveni is unlikely to push the issue in Parliament. Nonetheless, publicly, Museveni will continue to advocate his belief that Uganda must exploit all of its natural resources and support foreign investment to become an industrialized country. While many Ugandans agree that the country should maximize the use of its resources, they are highly suspicious of deals that appear to favor foreign over Ugandan investors. - - - - - - - - - - - FOR THE RULING PARTY - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) The Mabira Forest issue is one of many that is widening divisions within the ruling party between the "historicals" who have remained in the NRM and the next generation of NRM politicians. The constant references of the remaining historicals to accomplishments during the bush war and their perceived arrogance have worn thin on the KAMPALA 00000744 002 OF 003 rank-and-file party members. Museveni's refusal to announce that he will not run in the next election and alleged plan to extend the presidential term to ten years have created opposing camps within the party and spurred jockeying to succeed him. The non-historicals resent the imposition of the party discipline mechanism, whereby the NRM parliamentarians debate issues freely within the party caucus, but must vote along party lines on the floor of Parliament. When contentious issues bubble up in Parliament, such as a report questioning Government actions during the High Court siege, the NRM historicals have quashed them by threatening committee members with financial ruin. Nonetheless, Museveni was unable to force MPs to drop their demands for cash to buy vehicles in February. The recent New Vision poll indicates that Museveni could suffer a similar fate if the Mabira Forest debate goes to Parliament. - - - - - - - - - - FOR THE OPPOSITION - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) The Mabira Forest debate turned into a partisan issue for the GOU because the demonstration was organized by members of the opposition. FDC members, in particular, seized the Mabira Forest issue as another platform from which to challenge the government and capitalize on popular sentiment. The politicization of the issue makes it more difficult for Museveni and the security apparatus to back down or make concessions. The violence associated with the April 12 and 17 protest bolsters the Executive's argument that protests in public places should not be allowed. Press reports indicate that the violence has strengthened the hand of intelligence chief, Gen. David Tinyefuza, who has taken over coordination of police and security bodies. This move not only stifles voices of moderation within the security forces, but portends a deepening of the government crackdown on its opponents. ¶7. (C) The transformation of the issue into a partisan one denied the political parties an opportunity to forge a unified strategy on an issue of national importance. Polls show that many NRM officials oppose the forest give-away, but the interjection of the FDC into the fray, means that sympathizers cannot voice their dissent because they fear being linked to the President's enemies. While the FDC's confrontational tactics are popular with the party's established base, especially urban unemployed with nothing to lose, its unyielding militancy hinders the party from attracting new members from the growing number of disaffected Ugandans, who would have a lot to lose if they went into the streets to protest. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - FOR RULE OF LAW...RULE BY LAW - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) The Executive has increased its use of intimidation, through the use of the law and other means, to crack down on the political opposition in the aftermath of protests over the Mabira Forest give-away and the High Court siege. For example, plainclothes security officers surrounded the homes of the MPs in the late evening of April 14 even though the Government could not arrest them until the Speaker of the House was notified the next day. The GOU's hardliners pushed for stiff charges. However, the Director of Public Prosecutions refused to sign the original charge sheet, which included terrorism and murder charges. Several diplomatic missions, including this one, told government officials that treason, terrorism, and murder charges would appear politically-motivated. Since the protest, twenty persons, including five members of parliament and twelve political party activists, have been arrested on charges ranging from unlawful assembly and incitement to violence to murder. ¶9. (C) Government intimidation of opposition members, ruling party politicians, and judges is increasing, according to human rights groups. Some of those who have spoken out against the Executive branch have been followed and threatened with financial ruin and/or scandal. The President publicly stated that he and other bush warriors know better how to interpret the law than judges and he accused some judges of being members of the opposition. The process is underway for the President to hand-pick judges, a move that judicial officials argue would curb the independence of the judiciary if not based on professional qualifications and experience. ¶10. (C) Another worrisome development over the past two weeks was the emergence of the "Kiboko" squad or "stick brigade" on April 17 at an opposition rally. Eyewitness accounts, confirmed by the Uganda Police Service's own KAMPALA 00000744 003 OF 003 spokesman, report that police stood by while the kiboko squad beat up civilians. Publicly, government officials are denying any involvement with the kiboko squad, but privately a Cabinet member told emboffs that the squad was created to "fight fire with fire" by teaching Besigye's "paid thugs" a lesson. The squad was seen leaving Central Police Headquarters to go to the scene of the demonstration. Museveni said "I salute the Ugandans who stood by justice and opposed the criminals." He claimed that the kiboko squad had reacted "spontaneously, nobody organized it. These people when they saw these rioters attacking people and shops. I think they are part of a group that rescued many Asian people who would have been killed by these criminals." - - - - - - - - - - - FOR FOREIGN INVESTORS - - - - - - - - - - - ¶11. (C) Various foreign investors have told emboffs that they are keeping "one foot in Uganda, and one foot outside" to guard against the heightened tensions between Museveni and his political opponents. There are indications that the Asian community is divided between some of the larger investors and smaller Indian and Chinese businesses. Longtime contacts are concerned about rising xenophobia and the association of the Asian community with the Executive. Violent incidents in March and April have raised concerns among outside investors about Uganda's long term prospects for stability if current trends continue. - - - - COMMENT - - - - ¶12. (C) The Mabira Forest land could be saved from sugarcane production if Museveni uses the Cabinet as a way out of the situation and other land is found for the Mehta Group. Meanwhile, the Executive's crackdown on dissent is unlikely to abate and the political space for competing ideas will continue to close. Lacking a focused political platform, and resources, and facing internal divisions, the opposition will continue to use confrontational tactics to voice its dissent and undermine the government. In response, the Executive will use the full extent of the law and other types of threats and pressure, such as calling in bank loans of its opponents, to quell dissent. We do not see any indications that the Executive or the opposition are taking steps to break the current cycle of acrimony. BROWNING