UGANDA: THE INTERNATIONAL COMPONENT OF PRESIDENT MUSEVENI'S

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KAMPALA 001595 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREF PREL MOPS UG SU CG SUBJECT: UGANDA: THE INTERNATIONAL COMPONENT OF PRESIDENT MUSEVENI'S IN-BOX ¶1. (SBU) Summary: A look inside Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni's in-box reveals a range of international and regional issues, many where the U.S. also has interests. Museveni's immediate "to-do" list includes repairing relations with the Democratic Republic of Congo, to gain its cooperation to resolve the 21-year-old conflict with the Lord's Resistance Army currently camped out in Garamba National Park, Congo; countering the activities of the Khartoum Government through support for the Government of Southern Sudan and the faltering Comprehensive Peace Agreement; and establishing security and a political transition in Somalia. His longer-term in-box includes strengthening the leadership of like-minded African countries, East African economic integration, and combating climate change through poverty alleviation. Museveni's domestic priorities include readying the playing field for a fourth presidential term and preparing to host the Commonwealth Heads of State Meeting. Museveni never hesitates to find platforms to explain his deeply-held positions and actions on his priority items. End Summary. - - - - - - - - - - - - CONGO: ACTION ITEM ONE - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (SBU) Museveni believes the resolution of the 21-year-old conflict with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) depends on assistance from Khartoum and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Over a year into the peace process, Museveni's patience is wearing thin. He welcomed U.S. statements that the Juba Peace Process could not go on endlessly. He believes that the LRA needs to be under pressure with a deadline and physically encircled for its leaders Joseph Kony and Vincent Otti to consider seriously Uganda's offer of a soft-landing. To this end, Uganda has been reaching out continuously to Congolese President Joseph Kabila. His efforts finally paid off at the Uganda-Congo summit in Arusha in September when Kabila promised to take action against the LRA in January 2008 if there were no progress at the negotiating table. Museveni welcomed the pledge, but is skeptical that Kabila can or will follow through. Museveni views the U.S. as having leverage over Kabila and wants us to help hold Kabila to his promise. ¶3. (SBU) If Congolese forces cannot take on the LRA militarily, Museveni wants, at a minimum, for the LRA to fulfill its commitment �0A;to assemble at Rikwangba. This would require the DRC Government to tell the LRA it is no longer welcome at Garamba and that the LRA should move its forces to Rikwangba assembly area. Museveni believes that this will help build confidence among the internally-displaced persons in Uganda that the LRA wants peace, but also would put the group closer to Uganda, where its activities can be monitored and individual members would be able to break away. This would also put pressure on the LRA leadership to make peace. Museveni is anxious to settle ongoing border problems in the Lake Albert region and use joint oil exploration as a means to further economic cooperation with DRC and decrease tensions. (Note: Embassy believes the LRA is highly unlikely to assemble at Rikwangba, absent a peace deal, even if the DRC were to tell the LRA to move. End Note.) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - "SUDAN, SUDAN, SUDAN, SUDAN": ALWAYS A PRIORITY - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (SBU) Museveni has told A/S Frazer and other visiting delegations that "behind everything is Sudan, Sudan, Sudan, Sudan." Museveni knows that he needs the cooperation of both the Khartoum and Southern Sudanese Governments to resolve the LRA problem. He also views the Khartoum Government as spreading what he calls "Arab fundamentalism" in the region (within Sudan, northern Uganda, and Somalia). Because Khartoum provided significant support in the past to the LRA, Museveni remains deeply suspicious that Sudan is keeping the LRA "in reserve" to be used to disrupt progress on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Museveni is focused on the upcoming census and Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM) elections in southern Sudan (2009),the referendum (2011),and Uganda's next elections (2011). ¶5. (SBU) Museveni wants pressure on Khartoum to close off the LRA's options, and wants President Omar al-Bashir to take a public stand that Khartoum will not tolerate further delays in the negotiation and send private messages that the LRA can no longer count on support from Sudan. From the Government of Southern Sudan, which is mediating the Juba Peace Talks, Museveni wants a full-time commitment from Vice President Riek Machar and an accelerated timetable to conclude the negotiations by the end of January 2008. ¶6. (SBU) An inextricably linked problem for Museveni is what he views as poor prospects for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), KAMPALA 00001595 002 OF 003 reached in January 2005. Museveni continues Uganda's support for the SPLM and is highly concerned that the CPA implementation is behind schedule, because its failure has serious repercussions for Uganda's security. Museveni is particularly concerned that the Southern Sudanese themselves will oppose moving forward with the referendum if other aspects of the CPA remain unimplemented, and if they perceive it to be rigged by Khartoum. Uganda fears a return to war in southern Sudan, which would once again bring Kampala in, to the detriment of Museveni's other agenda items, such as regional integration and industrializing Uganda. ¶7. (SBU) Darfur also worries Museveni because he believes that the continuing civil war there will undermine the CPA as well as spread Arab fundamentalism to Chad and Central African Republic. Museveni visited Chad earlier his year and hosted CAR President Bozizie in late August. Museveni is pushing other African countries to commit enough troops to Darfur to stabilize the security situation. Uganda has over 100 police officers in Darfur, but military officials say that Uganda is stretched thin with its commitment to Somalia, LRA-Affected northern Uganda, and Karamoja. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - SOMALIA: AN IMMEDIATE AND LONG-TERM AGENDA ITEM - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (SBU) Museveni remains concerned that only Uganda has troops in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) almost a year after he began moving ahead with the Ugandan deployment to AMISOM. He considers Ethiopia's withdrawal necessary for Somalia's political transition to move forward. Uganda is frustrated that Nigeria and Ghana are dragging their feet on committing troops. Museveni and Foreign Minister Sam Kutesa believe the issue is money and argue that if Ghana and Nigeria were promised U.N. rates for their peacekeepers, both countries would commit troops. ¶9. (SBU) Museveni's plan for Somalia is re-establishing security, rebuilding the national institutions, and establishing a timetable for a political transition. He has dispatched a special envoy to work with TFG President Yusuf on holding discussions with those parties left out of reconciliation efforts. Uganda appreciates U.S. support for the deployment of its troops to Somalia and prefers U.S. engagement remain behind-the-scenes. Nonetheless, U.S. statements encouraging dialogue among the Somalis could help focus the parties on the country's future political transition. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - FOURTH TERM: NECESSARY TO COMPLETE ALL AGENDA ITEMS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (SBU) President Museveni all but acknowledged to Senator Russell Feingold on August 28 that he (Museveni) would be seeking another presidential term. Museveni told Senator Feingold that the democratic process in Uganda was ongoing and not bound by electoral schedules. For Museveni, change of an individual at the top does not equal democracy. In his view, the development of Ugandan democracy is moving in the right direction and there is no need to change that by changing leadership. Museveni's Political Advisor Moses Byaruhanga told P/E Chief on October 6 that, in 2005, the U.S., through its Embassy officials and the National Security Council, told Museveni it would not oppose his bid for a third term if done legally. Museveni expects the same U.S. position regarding his fourth term. Museveni is content "to agree to disagree" with the U.S. on the issue of term limits. ¶11. (SBU) Byaruhanga said that Museveni was examining ways to "tighten up" the electoral process and would begin by addressing some of the inadequacies of the electoral commission. Several members of Museveni's ruling party and the leader of the opposition tell us that the President has begun to "soften the ground" for a series of constitutional amendments aimed at the 2011 elections. The most important would be removing the requirement of receiving over 50 percent of the vote to avoid a run-off election. The rationale is that the number of votes Museveni received declined in successive elections and the President would find a run-off politically embarrassing. Ruling party Secretary General Amama Mbabazi announced that party members would not be allowed to run as independents in the future, a move designed to rein in perceived party renegades in advance of the elections. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING: ALL HANDS ON DECK - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶12. (SBU) Uganda is not ready for CHOGM, set for November 23-25. As a result, almost all Government activity is centered on CHOGM preparations, including roadwork, beautification, and hotel KAMPALA 00001595 003 OF 003 construction. Intense wrangling for CHOGM contracts resulted in substantial delays and cost overruns in projects and the Government is furiously working to complete them on time. For Museveni, the hosting of 53 fellow heads of state will provide an opportunity to showcase Uganda's progress under the National Resistance Movement government and his progressive ideas about regional integration, climate change, poverty alleviation, fighting HIV/AIDS, and industrialization of developing countries. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - AFRICAN LEADERSHIP: WHO IS IN CHARGE? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶13. (SBU) African leadership issues also preoccupy Museveni. He looks around at his fellow African heads of state and sees no equals, no one of his intellect, vision, drive, and few of his longevity. He is disappointed that former Nigerian President Obasanjo's third term effort was thwarted, because his successor, Shehu Yar'Adua, is not strong enough to demonstrate leadership on African issues. Ghanaian President John Kuffor, whose instincts on African issues were similar to Museveni's, has been "a disappointment" for Uganda. Museveni told A/S Frazer that Ghana lost its nerve once it took on the African Union Presidency. The uncertainty over the African National Congress elections in South Africa could leave Museveni without powerful African allies to confront Sudan and Libya on the continent. Within East Africa, Museveni remains at the forefront of the charge for economic integration, which he believes would remove key barriers to Ugandan development. Museveni also has picked up on the theme of climate change and believes that developed countries need to curb their emissions while helping developing countries with renewable energy sources and poverty alleviation. - - - - COMMENT - - - - ¶14. (SBU) International and regional issues are high on President Museveni's agenda Museveni also believes that his own domestic experience in building democracy can be replicated in other countries, such as Somalia, and that the U.S. can play a supportive role on his key agenda items: Congo, Sudan, and Somalia. CHRITTON