SENATOR FEINGOLD RAISES REGIONAL AND DOMESTIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KAMPALA 001426 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2016 TAGS: PHUM PREL PGOV UG SU SUBJECT: SENATOR FEINGOLD RAISES REGIONAL AND DOMESTIC ISSUES WITH UGANDAN PRESIDENT REF: KAMPALA 1419 Classified By: P/E Chief Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ). ¶1. Summary: Senator Russell Feingold discussed Somalia, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA),Congo, the war on terror, and the President's plans for the 2011 election with President Yoweri Museveni on August 28. Museveni described potential military action against the LRA in Congo as "easy" and did not rule out running for a fourth term in 2011. End Summary. - - - - - SOMALIA - - - - - ¶2. (C) Senator Russell Feingold, accompanied by staff members Sarah Margon and Evan Gottesman, Ambassador Browning and P/E Chief (notetaker) met with President Yoweri Museveni on August 28. Feingold sought Museveni's views on what Uganda hopes to accomplish in Somalia. Museveni said that Uganda has three goals: the liberation of Somalia from the Islamic Courts, the building of the pillars of state authority, and the establishment of democracy. Museveni said that now that the Islamic Courts were ousted, Uganda wanted to help rebuild the army as a national institution and respond to the humanitarian needs of Somalis. ¶3. (C) Regarding the third goal, Museveni said Uganda was seeking a timetable for the transition. Museveni wanted Uganda to act as an engine to relaunch the Somali state so the transitional government could hand power to the people. Unfortunately, Museveni said, Transitional Federal Government (TFG) President Yusuf does not want to talk to some parts of the opposition who were not in the clan structure. ¶4. (C) Museveni told Feingold that "this time, the U.S. acted well in Somalia," America is unpopular in Somalia. Museveni said that he discusses Somalia with Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer. In his SIPDIS opinion, the Bush Administration took a stand against the Islamic Courts and encouraged Ethiopia from behind-the-scenes to act. Museveni said that the timing for this action was right because if the Islamic Courts had taken Baidoa, then the TFG would have fallen. Museveni described U.S. bombing of suspected terrorists in Somalia as "irrelevant." ¶5. (C) Looking forward, Museveni outlined "mistakes expected to come" in Somalia. A key concern for Uganda was if those who want to talk, get left out of the process. Second, Museveni was concerned that the army being built was not national in character, which would create suspicions among the population. Museveni argued that the way forward on democracy was that it must be transparent or it would fail. It would be critical for Yusuf to elaborate milestones for the transition. The TFG must develop an ideology to bring Somalis together as a nation. Without one, the task of nation-building could fail, according to Museveni. Finally, Museveni stated that the TFG must deliver infrastructure and services to the population to demonstrate the benefits of the new government. - - - - - - - - WAR ON TERROR - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) Feingold thanked Museveni for Uganda's help in the global war on terror and asked what has been the impact of U.S. involvement in Iraq. Museveni stated that he had supported the U.S. military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan because he thought these operations were in self-defense. Afghanistan harbored Al Qaida and used it as a base to attack the U.S. Uganda supported operations in Iraq because the U.S. stated that Sadam Hussein had links with Al Qaida and had weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Uganda was concerned that its neighbor, Sudan, had ties to both Hussein and Osama Bin Laden. Museveni said that Uganda was surprised to learn that Saddam had neither WMD or links to Al Qaida. If Uganda had known this, it would not have voted for the motion at the U.N. on Iraq. ¶7. (C) Nonetheless, Museveni said Uganda would continue to operate closely with the U.S. and described U.S. positions as "more correct" than those of Europeans, which he described as "too weak, almost criminal, and opportunistic." According to Museveni, "the U.S. never obstructs our stand on Sudan." Feingold agreed that there was a strong, bipartisan consensus on a tough policy on Sudan. ¶8. (C) Museveni also said that democracy must come from KAMPALA 00001426 002.2 OF 003 within; it cannot be brought by invaders. He stated that the U.S. mistakes on Iraq included bad intelligence and misinformation; attempts to install democracy; lack of credibility on issues related to WMD; poor optics of naming an "Administrator for Iraq"; and the mishandling of the army. Museveni said he told President Bush in December that he wanted to meet with him confidentially to discuss Iraq and encourage the U.S. to hold an American-African Summit, similar to the one hosted by China. - - - CONGO - - - ¶9. (C) Museveni told Feingold that he would be meeting Congolese President Joseph Kabila in Tanzania to discuss cross-border tensions, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA),and conflict in eastern Congo. (Note: The meeting took place on September 7-8 in Arusha.) Museveni complained about western-backed Mobutu, whom he described as a "clown" and stated that Uganda worked against him because he sided with the Rwandan genocidaires. Rwanda did not hold a national reconciliation conference, which was a contributing factor to the war in Congo. Museveni said that the Lusaka Accord was well-thought out because it covered both internal and regional dimensions of the conflict and contained provisions about use of Congolese territory as a safe haven by rebel groups. The reason for current tensions, according to Museveni, was that the regional aspects of the treaty had not been implemented. ¶10. (C) Museveni stated that Uganda's current border "nonsense" with Congo could be easily diffused. The Europeans demarcated the borders, which African leaders accepted. The documents were available to resolve the boundary dispute. In Museveni's view, integration could put an end to border problems for good. ¶11. (C) Feingold asked Museveni about Uganda's options should the peace talks fail. Museveni said he had advised Kabila to allow Uganda to operate with the Congolese army or find another partner, such as France, to take action against the LRA. Museveni warned Kabila that Congo could become known as "a terrorist holiday center" and that fortifying Uganda's border with Congo could not be a long-term solution. ¶12. (C) Museveni said that the Juba negotiations could succeed if there was military pressure on the "terrorists". He said the LRA had not assembled as required and was using Congo to roam at will. He accused the LRA of engaging in smuggling and poaching at Garamba. On accountability, Museveni said that "we agreed to alternative justice or a soft landing" if the LRA agreed to peace. According to Museveni, if the LRA accepted, the GOU could accept no/no jail time for LRA leaders. (Note: The President's apparent position is at odds with his negotiating team. End Note.). Museveni said a military operation against the LRA would be "easy" or "not hard." - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - FOURTH TERM, CORRUPTION, HIV/AIDS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶13. (C) Feingold told Museveni that the U.S. was concerned about corruption and asked how Uganda was addressing it. Museveni said that the political will to fight corruption existed, the legal framework was falling into place, and that the institutional framework, primarily in the form of the Inspector General of Government, as present in Uganda. He hoped that the fourth component, human and technical resources, could be provided by donors. Museveni said Uganda's own surveys indicated that some progress was being made on corruption. He dismissed Transparency International rankings as "superficial." ¶14. (C) Feingold asked Museveni if he was planing to run again, with respect to term limits. Museveni admitted that he disagreed with Uganda's partners and Washington. Museveni explained his "holistic" approach to leadership which differed from "state leadership" perspectives. Museveni said that for Uganda, leadership was tied to tasks that need to be performed by the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM), such as liberation and establishment of state authority. When the NRM determined the tasks were complete, then it would be time to leave power. The tasks were not time defined. Feingold pointed out that under such a system, former U.S. President Bill Clinton could be running against his wife. Museveni responded that U.S. history is different from that of modernizing societies. The crucial factors for democracy in Uganda were that people voted, elected officials KAMPALA 00001426 003 OF 003 at regular intervals, and competition was free. Other issues, such as who stands for election were tactical in nature. The President then cited Israel as an example where the lack of term limits provided experienced leadership at times of crisis. ¶15. (U) Feingold congratulated Museveni on Uganda's success on HIV/AIDS, Museveni thanked Feingold, and said that he was concerned that the infection rates were not dropping but remaining stagnant. The President attributed this to complacency and said a nationwide sensitization campaign was needed to address the problem. - - - - COMMENT - - - - ¶16. (C) Senator Feingold was able to cover a great deal of ground on foreign policy issues with Museveni. A historian by training, President Museveni explained the rationale behind his positions on key issues, whether at odds with ours or not, with examples to bolster his arguments. Museveni expressed the same position on Iraq during the visit of Deputy National Security Advisor McCormick on March 3. Museveni's position on amnesty for the LRA if it accepts a peace deal tracks has not changed over the course of the peace process. His preferred option remains military action against the LRA, but he continues to demonstrate restraint while the peace process proceeds. ¶17. (U) Senator Feingold did not have an opportunity to clear this message. BROWNING