IDPS, URBANIZATION AND THE CHANGING FACE OF AFGHAN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000099 SIPDIS SIPDIS, SENSITIVE STATE FOR PRM/FO (DAS GREENE),PRM/ANE, SCA/FO, S/CRS, SCA/A, STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/SAA (KEYVANSHAD), REL NATO/AUST/NZ/ISAF E.O. 12958 N/A TAGS: PREF PREL PGOV AF SUBJECT: IDPS, URBANIZATION AND THE CHANGING FACE OF AFGHAN POVERTY ¶1. SUMMARY: Ebbing and flowing tides of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) have been a constant feature of the Afghan landscape for, at least, the past thirty years. Events in recent years seem only to mirror, in many ways, similar displacements following the Soviet invasion, the civil strife under the mujaheddin in the 1990s and the Taliban's seizure of power. These events drove over five million Afghans into exile and displaced millions more. A fundamental difference this time, however, is that there are other forces at work. These forces, coupled with the continuing conflict in the south, southeast and east of the country, may be pushing Afghanistan to the brink of a chronic "displacement/urbanization" crisis, a crisis which will have important implications for the efforts of the Afghan Government and the U.S.-led international donor community to achieve political stability and economic development. END SUMMARY - -------------- SOURCES OF DISPLACEMENT -------------- ¶2. Given Afghanistan's recent history, it is a tragic irony that the displacements generated by the effects of the on-going insurgency in the south are, in strictly numerical terms, dwarfed by other long-term factors. The most recent UNHCR-supplied figures (October 2006) estimate that 20,000 families (approx. 134,000 people) have been displaced by recent ISAF offensives aimed at uprooting Taliban from areas of the south and east. Though tragic, these numbers pale by comparison to the number of people displaced by Afghanistan's on-going drought and by the number driven from their place of origin in search of livelihood as a result of the destruction visited upon Afghanistan's economy by thirty-plus years of warfare and instability. ¶3. Though exact numbers are hard to come by in a place such as Afghanistan, one has only to look at certain subjective indicators to realize the multidimensional nature of the crisis afflicting Afghanistan's population. The first such indicator is the current state of Afghan agriculture and agricultural infrastructure. ¶4. Prior to 1979, 85% of Afghanistan's people made their living from agriculture. The neglect and often-intentional destruction that thirty years of warfare have wrought upon Afghanistan's agricultural infrastructure will take generations to repair. Hundreds of miles of irrigation canals, built up over centuries, were intentionally destroyed or have fallen into disrepair and been left to fill with weeds and gravel. The skills needed to maintain these underground systems have, in many cases, been lost. The importance of these structures, a critical element in the sort of "dry land" agriculture traditionally practiced throughout Afghanistan, cannot be underestimated. Once known as the "breadbasket of Afghanistan," the Shomali Plains, are now a semi-wasteland, scarred by years of war, landmines and drought. Throughout the country, thousands of hectares of orchards have been destroyed, used for firewood or allowed to go wild. Rangelands that were once used to raise hundreds of thousands of goats, sheep and dairy and beef cattle have been seeded with landmines and allowed to go sere and useless. ¶5. Couple this destruction with the results of an on-going drought which, according to a recent UNDP estimate, has left 1.9 million people in 22 provinces facing chronic food and water insecurity. As a result, agriculture, the traditional economic mainstay for the majority of Afghans, can no longer provide a viable source of livelihood for anything like the percentage of the population it once supported. Afghanistan has become a country in which a large segment of the population now faces a decision; whether to stay in place and depend indefinitely upon assistance (especially food assistance) to support their family or to uproot their family, abandon their traditional lifestyle and seek their livelihood elsewhere. The dramatic growth of Kabul stands as evidence of the choice being made. - KABUL 00000099 002 OF 003 -------------- THE CITY -------------- ¶6. A century ago, Kabul was a city of, perhaps, 50,000 people. As recently as 1990, after a decade of conflict had left the countryside ravaged, the city's population was approximately 1,000,000. The population dropped to well below a million during the Civil War in the mid 1990s when Kabul was on the front lines. Today, the population is fast approaching - if it hasn't already surpassed -- 4,000,000. Some less formal estimates put the population at 4.5 million. The city's population grew by an average of 15% per year between 1999 and 2002. The return of 4.7 million refugees from Pakistan and Iran since 2002 has accelerated that rate significantly. Afghanistan's annual population growth rate is 2.6%. The rural growth rate, however, stands at only 2.3% while the urban growth rate is 4.7%. These figures principally reflect the growth of Kabul, as Afghanistan's other urban centers (Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad and Kunduz) have seen some growth, but nothing of a similar magnitude. ¶7. A June 2006 World Bank report on urban poverty in Afghanistan estimated that 80% of Kabul's population (covering 70% of the city) is "informally" housed in unplanned neighborhoods which the municipal government does not recognize, often with no clear land title and little or no access to basic services and social infrastructure. Most have no access to basic health care, to education or, even, to safe drinking water. The same study notes that, in 2004, only 0.5% of Kabul's population was officially considered to be "homeless" (with 10,000 living in tents and another 5,000 living in abandoned, destroyed government buildings). This percentage of "homeless" has undoubtedly grown in the two interceding years, as in-migration has continued while housing and construction costs have soared. The great majority of these urban poor relies upon informal employment which lacks protection and income security. Most often this entails casual, hourly labor or self employment. The two fastest growing sectors, construction and retail, rely heavily upon such labor. - -------------- ONE PART OF THE PROBLEM -------------- ¶8. Many efforts, such as USAID's, are underway to address various aspects of this dislocation. USAID's Ag Program has made some inroads in addressing the damage done to Afghanistan's agricultural infrastructure. Strides have been made in improving irrigation, rebuilding farm-to-market roads and repairing irrigation structures. Six hundred and five kilometers of irrigation canals have been rehabilitated, and 22,000 Afghans are employed in cash-for-work projects. Significant efforts have been undertaken to establish a micro-credit system for Afghan farmers and to rebuild the marketing infrastructure destroyed by thirty years of conflict. USDA, working with USAID and the PRTs, has focused upon watershed, dam and canal construction and repair, karez (cistern) replenishment and cleanout, and general irrigation projects. These efforts also benefited thousands of rural residents. These efforts are critical but their impact will not come soon enough to address the immediate needs of many of Afghanistan's rural poor. As in most sectors, the sheer magnitude of the task dwarfs the resources available. - -------------- ANOTHER PART -------------- ¶9. There is also a cultural shift at work here. This is particularly, but not exclusively, noticeable among refugee returnees, most of whom spent their exile in urban or semi-urban settings. In January 2004, an "unexpectedly high" 42% of returnees reported that they intended to settle in urban areas upon their KABUL 00000099 003 OF 003 return to Afghanistan. Many (46% according to a recent UNHCR/ILO report) acquired new skills while in exile; all acquired new expectations. The same January 2004 UNHCR report noted that, "Many refugees have got used to an urban life style, no matter how rudimentary, and [upon their return to Afghanistan] they are congregating, as would be expected, in urban areas. [...] Further, continuing conflict is also likely to spur some internal migration to Kabul and other towns. If the recent experience of Iran and Pakistan is any indicator, Afghanistan is facing a major urban expansion, fueled partly by the return of refugees." - -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶10. While a significant majority of Afghans continue to reside in a rural setting, that percentage is steadily declining. For a number of structural and sociological reasons - including the aforementioned destruction and changing cultural expectations - it is logical to assume this trend will continue well into the future. Rural poverty remains the central feature in the Afghan equation but, as a result of the dislocations noted above, urban poverty is becoming an increasingly important component. Most poverty alleviation programs funded by international donors focus, disproportionately, upon restoring Afghanistan's agricultural sector. Focusing assistance programs only upon rural poverty risks missing the dynamic part of the needs picture in Afghanistan. As has happened in much of the developing world, the urbanization of poverty is fundamentally altering the picture in Afghanistan and reshaping the challenges ahead.