PRT/MAZAR: SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT ON SECURITY,

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 KABUL 000979 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/FO GASTRIGHT, SCA/A STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE NSC FOR AHARRIMAN OSD FOR SHIVERS TREASURY FOR ABAUKOL CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82, AND POLAD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PTER EAID ECON MASS SOCI AF SUBJECT: PRT/MAZAR: SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT ON SECURITY, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL SITUATION IN THE NORTHWEST PROVINCES REF: KABUL 195 -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Northwest Afghanistan enjoys a better security situation than much of the rest of the country but drought and crime hamper development. The Afghan National Police (ANP) and the judicial system need much work but progress has begun with the ANP. The balance of power between Tajik-dominated Jamiyat and Uzbek-dominated Junbesh political parties has been somewhat disrupted by improved organization among the Pashtuns and other forces and the perceived weakening of Junbesh leader General Dostum. The caliber of governance remains low and corruption is rampant, although the new chiefs of police may bring improvements. The media is playing a greater role in the region, increasing the importance of the battle for public opinion. The regional economy is stunted by water shortages, although the major urban center of Mazar-e Sharif continues to grow. Re-opening oil and gas production in Sheberghan, construction of a gas-fired power plant there, and completion of the North East Power System connections to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan could stimulate faster economic growth. Taliban values never took hold in the northwest, so girls can go to school if their families can afford it and women can put aside their burkas if they are ready. Overall, trends in the region are positive but the pace is painfully slow. Many residents still fear the international community will leave and the Taliban will return. END SUMMARY ¶2. (SBU) Northwest Afghanistan includes the provinces of Faryab, Jowzjan, Sar-e Pul, Samangan, and Balkh. The Amu Darya river marks their long northern border with the Central Asia. The northern area by the river border is largely desert; south of that is an agricultural belt that has suffered severely from drought; the mountainous area further south is a mountainous area that is largely inaccessible in winter. The region's 2.8 million residents are a mix of Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmens, Pashtuns and Hazaras. ONE quarter of the population lives in the vicinity of Mazar-e Sharif, although the provinces cover nearly fifty thousand square miles. Traditional trading and smuggling routes crisscross the region. -------------- Security Fairly Stable -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Security in the region during the winter improved, probably due to a weather-related decrease in crime, and remains better than in many parts of the country. Insurgent activity is largely limited to recruitment, propaganda, winter resting and smuggling. Taliban and Hezb-Islami Gulbuddhin (HiG) party representatives work with local power brokers (LPBs) in the rampant and lucrative smuggling of drugs and weapons. There have been few improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and no suicide bombings. The spate of school burnings last summer stopped in the fall and has not resumed. The Disarmament of Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG) process is moribund but caches of old weapons and ammunition continue to turn up. It is suspected that locals are moving unexploded ordnance (UXO) they find in the fields to the side of the road so ISAF will find and dispose of them. -------------- Biggest Threat: Local Crime -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Crime is the biggest security issue facing most residents. Motorcycle gangs work stretches of the highways (Route Ring North) in good weather and many LPBs terrorize their local populations. Notorious subcommander Wali Mohammed was killed in a firefight with international and Afghan national security forces (ANSF) in Balkh in November, to the great relief of many local residents and GOA KABUL 00000979 002 OF 006 officials. After his death there was a noticeable downturn in incidents in the area. We received reports that other LPBs worried they would meet the same fate and curtailed their illegal activities accordingly. (COMMENT: This bounce will only be temporary if ANSF and ISAF are unable to follow up with arrests of other mid-level LPBs on wanted lists. END COMMENT.) ¶5. (SBU) NGOs continue to be nervous about safety, mainly because of unrest in the country as a whole and the threat of violent crime. A car belonging to an NGO in Sar-e Pul was attacked in what many NGOs believe was a robbery. Other than several attacks on the Asian road construction teams paving the ring road in Faryab where criminals want to prevent ANSF and ISAF from gaining easy access to their operating area, there is no evidence that foreigners are being targeted. A substantial upturn in security incidents during poppy harvesting season and eradication operations is expected, with the aim of preventing extensive patrolling of drug areas. -------------- National Security Forces: Slow, Steady Reform -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The Afghan National Army (ANA) is the most respected branch of the ANSF operating in the northwest, but their presence is limited. PRT and other international forces work with them regularly and the mentoring programs are showing progress. Experts put the ANP at 3-4 years behind the ANA; the U.S. operates a regional police training center in Mazar-e Sharif to help the ANP catch up. The U.S. training focus in the northwest has shifted to the Afghan National Civil Order Police, but basic skills are still lacking everywhere. Three quarters of the ANP in the region do not even know how to read or write. Reports of local police exploiting their own communities are not uncommon. A district police office in Sar-e Pul was exchanging firewood for sex with boys. Other reports involve forced sex or stealing food aid. Police pay and rank reform is proceeding slowly but steadily. Banks now operate in the provincial centers so police can get paid their actual salaries. Previously, police were paid in cash, and money was skimmed off the top before it reached its intended recipients. Also, there were previously fewer banks, so it was logistically not possible to send money electronically to the provinces in many cases. Now, however, most regional centers have banks, and the improved infrastructure has allowed for an improved payment distribution system. ¶7. (SBU) The next reform step is the replacement of the district chiefs of police. Some COPs are trying to do a good job, but many are corrupt and/or incompetent. New leadership at the provincial level should help. Three of the five provincial chiefs of police in the region were on the national probation list (14 individuals in total were on the list); they were all replaced in January. ONE positive sign of change: the new Balkh Chief of Police (COP) is tackling corruption involved with the issuance of passports, which are valid for ONE year. The COP signs the passports in a public room to show that he is taking nothing for his signature. Officially, passports cost less than twenty dollars, but the previous COP charged approximately ONE thousand daily applicants USD 300-400 each. Rumor has it that the price is down to USD 160 and will drop more as others who take their cut in the process are removed. ¶8. (SBU) The public has a justifiably low opinion of the effectiveness of not only the ANP but also the judicial system. Major and minor criminals with influence or money can, and do, buy their way out of jail. Men and women are held in jail for months without being charged with any crime. Residents prefer to use the Provincial Councils to settle civil disputes because the courts are ineffective, corrupt and expensive. Returning refugees, especially Pashtuns, often KABUL 00000979 003 OF 006 find their land has been taken by others so many land disputes end up before the Provincial Councils. Consequently, the PRT receives many exaggerated reports of Taliban activity by residents trying to discredit returnees. -------------- -------------- Politics: Self-Interested Governors Poor Administrators -------------- -------------- ¶9. (SBU) The five Governors in the northwest present studies in contrast: -Governor Latif of Faryab has a reputation as ineffective, corrupt and controlled by General Dostum,s Junbesh party. PRToff has seen nothing to contradict this. His ambitious deputy governor Abdul Sattar Barez has better managerial skills and more interest in accountability to the people, but no power. -Jowzjan Governor Hamdard, who harbors ambitions to lead Pashtun political forces in the north and has Taliban/HiG connections, is a crafty individual who runs his own agenda while claiming loyalty to Karzai. He aims to replace Balkh Governor Atta. During the recent high tensions between a new political force, the Turkic Council headed by Akbar Bay, and Dostum's Junbesh party, Hamdard spent more time in Kabul checking up on his political opponents than he did at home controlling the outbreaks of violence. The other parties resent rising Pashtun influence in the area as new appointments of Pashtun officials are attempted. Friction is particularly strong in the broad areas controlled by Dostum,s Junbesh party (this includes much of Hamdard,s Jowzjan province),probably in part because Dostum,s strength has begun to wane. -Sar-e Pul Governor Munib is corrupt, has HiG connections and is allied with the notorious commander Haji Payenda Khan, who is reportedly the real power in Sar-e Pul province. -Governor Shafaq of Samangan provides the best governance out of all the northwestern governors, but he still needs to work on his management skills. -Balkh Governor Atta, a Tajik former mujaheddin commander and a national figure, has the most experience, power, income and visibility of the five. Rumors of his corruption and drug ties persist. He is a leader of Jamiyat party (founded by former President Rabbani in 1971),whose main rival remains Junbesh party despite their having formed alliances of opportunity including against the splinter Azadi party in Faryab. Atta's word is law in Balkh; this year he used it to the GOA's advantage with his strong anti-poppy campaign. Preliminary indications show the crop will be far smaller than last year. ¶10. (SBU) Balkh is the only province with a functioning professional staff in the Governor's office, but these staffers primarily look after Atta,s needs, which do not always coincide with the interests of the people. Attorney General Sabit has been examining reports that they take bribes. Sabit has also been quite active in Jowzjan, which makes Dostum nervous. Munib has made a show of looking into corruption at the district level in Sar-e Pul but nothing has come of it. Balkh has been a pilot province for GOA-led administrative and budgeting reform, and results are visible at the local level. Line ministries in Mazar are generally staffed by competent individuals; this is not always the case in the other provinces. ¶11. (SBU) The Provincial Councils (PCs) all function somewhat effectively by Afghan standards although the council head in Balkh is completely under the Governor's control. Junbesh controls the PC in Jowzjan. Almost all officials spend much time away from their jobs. Samangan's administration grinds to a halt when Governor Shafaq is away. -------------- Mass Media Growing -------------- KABUL 00000979 004 OF 006 ¶12. (SBU) The media has diversified and increased in recent months, as has public access to both TV and radio. Public opinion is becoming increasingly important in the region. Governor Atta is particularly media savvy. General Dostum is not. Most of the population continues to view the provincial governments (and the national government) as corrupt and ineffective and media coverage of government excesses is increasing. Governor Atta forbade Balkh TV from airing a story about the Attorney General's investigation of Atta,s notorious Chief of Technical Services, but the story got out nevertheless. -------------- -------------- Locals Disillusioned With Karzai, Wary of Pashtuns -------------- -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Most of the population supports or at least tolerates both ISAF and the central government. Hostile propaganda centers are small and few. However, a substantial number of residents doubt the staying power of the international community and the ability of Kabul to maintain control, expecting it is only a matter of time before the Taliban will return. Few are actively looking for alternatives to Karzai, but they feel his government favors the Pashtuns. Elites feel that the Pashtuns are trying to regain the power in the north that they lost when they were defeated by the Northern Alliance. Ordinary people point to their villages and say there is no development. Uzbeks and Tajiks resent how the Pashtun pockets have allegedly received a particularly high concentration of development assistance and have a higher standard of living yet security incidents remain elevated in these areas and poppy cultivation is widespread, weakening the argument that good behavior is rewarded. The GOA's and ISAF's struggle against the insurgency will likely increasingly be waged in the media in the northwest, where actual incidents are few but propaganda opportunities considerably greater. -------------- Agrarian Economy Suffers Water Shortage -------------- ¶14. (SBU) The economy in the northwest, outside of the few urban centers, remains primarily agricultural, dominated by rain-fed crops and animal husbandry. The long years of drought have weakened the sector across the region as cereal and other crops have failed several years in a row (unfortunately there has been no negative effect on the drought-resistant poppy crop). Temperatures have been higher than normal and rain and snow shortfalls have decreased river flow and ground water, drying up fields and pastures. Poor water management infrastructure and spring flooding displaces many residents and destroys homes; however these same regions are completely dry by summer. The GOA has planned some major water projects, but the shortfall is already critical and many communities cannot wait the years it will take for dams and other works to be built. Water shortages feed tensions between communities and have led to the threat of riots in Jowzjan over accusations that some districts use up the water in the river before it reaches districts downstream. Animals are being slaughtered prematurely across the region because farmers cannot afford to feed them. -------------- Farmers Leaving to Find Work Elsewhere -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Impoverishment of farmers is a growing problem across the region. Displacement of farmers to urban centers continues. Many young men go abroad to work, usually leaving families behind. The Shia go to Iran and the Sunni to Pakistan. Before, few left the region for other provinces but now some families leave for Baghlan or Kunduz (where there is more water),or even Kabul. The drought is particularly severe in Faryab, Sar-e Pul and Samangan. Industry is limited. USAID is looking at reviving oil and gas production around Sheberghan as well as construction of a KABUL 00000979 005 OF 006 gas-fired power plant. North East Power System (NEPS) transmission lines from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan will cross some of these provinces, providing electricity for future growth. Meanwhile, the fertilizer factory in Mazar-e Sharif lacks the natural gas it needs to operate. Old factories such as the Soviet-built bread factory on the outskirts of Mazar remain derelict. Turkmen communities weave carpets, often the major source of income in these rural areas. -------------- Mazar: Center of Commerce -------------- ¶16. (SBU) The economic heart of the northwest remains Mazar-e Sharif, where the economy is growing steadily. The paved portions of North Ring Road are now dotted with modern (and some less modern) gas stations and vehicle traffic is sometimes heavy. However, most other roads in the region are not paved. Faryab province has only twenty miles of paved roads; the Ring Road there will take another few years to complete. Markets in urban centers are full but many people lack money to buy goods. Merchants spend a lot of time waiting for customers. Commercial traffic entering Afghanistan through northwest border crossing points is increasing, but it appears that little of the revenue collected by customs officials is making it into GOA coffers. Allegedly, the majority of customs duties collected is divided among Dostum, Atta and some minor players. The Border Management Initiative is looking at improving duty collection and transmission to Kabul. Communications links are poor, hampering business development. The drug trade is a major source of income in the region, particularly for LPBs, who in turn pay their subcommanders and other supporters. -------------- -------------- Cultural/Social Situation: Rural Life Sees Little Change -------------- -------------- ¶17. (SBU) While conditions in the urban centers have improved substantially in recent years, lives of those living in rural isolation have changed much less. Clinics are more common and doctors more readily available in district centers. Remote areas lack clinics and any winter service, cutting thousands of people off from healthcare for months at a time. Salaries in remote areas are too low to attract the limited supply of healthcare professionals, who are also put off by the isolation. Provincial hospitals have improved. Balkh hospital in Mazar-e Sharif burned last year, crippling critical care resources in this major urban center. The Germans are helping to re-equip the hospital. There are no indigenous civil society organizations. -------------- Burkas Optional, But Forced Marriage Common -------------- ¶18. (SBU) Taliban values never really took hold in the northwest. Although women wearing burkas are still seen on the streets, this is due in part to the greater number of women who are now getting out of the home. Many women apparently still feel more comfortable wearing a burka, but some women, particularly those in Mazar-e Sharif, wear headscarves. Educated women are more likely not to wear a burka, but they are also more likely to travel by car, so fewer of them are visible on the streets. Violence against women is still a problem, despite ongoing education campaigns by the Ministry of Women's Affairs. Some women, many underage, are married against their will, and girls are, in some instances, given as brides to settle disputes between families. Others are contracted for marriage while still in childhood. The Ministry of Women's Affairs runs literacy and other educational programs in the provincial capitals, and in some districts in Balkh Province. The World Food Program donates food to these programs for women to take home to their families. KABUL 00000979 006 OF 006 -------------- -------------- More Girls In Schools, But Teacher Quality Is Poor -------------- -------------- ¶19. (SBU) More girls are now going to school than previously, although many schools lack buildings and classes are held in tents, the open air or in borrowed facilities. Most schools run two shifts. Teachers are in short supply and salaries are low, meaning that remote rural areas have great difficulty in attracting teachers. Some teachers are, themselves, illiterate; in the rural areas teachers who have only finished primary school are common. More secondary schools are being built. In the countryside, girls stay in school at least four years. Boys are more likely to stay at least until the seventh year. Children are mainly taken out of school primarily for economic reasons. In Mazar-e Sharif many girls and boys go to secondary school, and even the older girls typically do not wear burkas. NEUMANN