PRT/KUNDUZ: SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT ON THE NORTHEAST

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 KABUL 000940 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/FO GASTRIGHT, SCA/A STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE NSC FOR AHARRIMAN OSD FOR KIMMITT TREASURY FOR ABAUKOL CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, AND POLAD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PTER EAID ECON MASS SOCI AF SUBJECT: PRT/KUNDUZ: SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT ON THE NORTHEAST PROVINCES REF: REF: KABUL 195 -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) The situation on the ground in the Northeast region of Afghanistan has not changed appreciably in the past six months. The security situation remains relatively calm, with only occasional criminal or terrorist attacks against local officials and ISAF. The primary threat and cause of instability come from lack of government control. Control rests with former jihadi commanders, many of whom are heavily involved in illegal activities, including drug production and trafficking, smuggling of fuel, weapons, and other high-value commodities, and extortion. The Northeast had high expectations of the Karzai government, but pervasive corruption and failure to control illegal activities, both in the region and in Kabul, have led to an almost total loss of faith in government authorities and programs. ¶2. (SBU) Economic growth has slowed over the past year. Large investors particularly are reluctant to commit their resources due to lack of effective government regulation and security concerns in general. Most of the population continues to rely on agriculture for survival, but drought remains a serious concern. The overall economy is doing fairly well, with construction a particularly strong sector, but the lack of adequate power, unconstrained corruption and illicit activity, and the lack of employment for young men hamper economic growth and development. Despite perceptions that development aid has been wasted and little accomplished, some projects -- especially roads between and within the provincial capitals -- have made an important impact. There is a view that some development aid ends up in someone's pocket, but enough filters into the economy to improve the lives of most people, including many women. Education is highly valued -- including for girls -- and school construction cannot keep up with the demand. The success of democracy and progress in the region depend on a successful and visible reduction of corruption and criminality, which would signal a clear gain of control by the government over the current criminal elements who largely run things. END 
SUMMARY. -------------- Security Situation: Relative Calm Prevails -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The security situation in the Northeast of Afghanistan -- which includes the provinces of Badakhshan, Takhar, Kunduz, and Baghlan -- remains relatively calm, but not entirely stable. Restrictions on travel or movement of people and goods in the Northeast primarily have to do with poor (or in Badakhshan, total lack of) roads rather than security threats. With the exception of a few problem districts in Baghlan and Badakhshan, and occasional short-term threat alerts, both Afghan and foreign civilians from government organizations or NGOs travel freely around the area with only basic safety guidelines (i.e., armored vehicles or two-vehicle convoys). ¶4. (SBU) Military vehicles from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) also travel widely and freely, though they have been subject to occasional attacks. These include several attacks on German convoys with small arms and Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) launchers on the main roads going east and south from Kunduz City, and several Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and small arms attacks on Dutch, Hungarian, and German convoys in Baghlan on the main road north of the capital of Pul-e Khumri. No injuries and little damage to ISAF vehicles have resulted from these attacks, though an Afghan Police vehicle was destroyed and one Afghan National Police (ANP) soldier were injured in one incident. All armed attacks in Kunduz have occurred at night, and all incidents have targeted ISAF or Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) vehicles. Some of these KABUL 00000940 002 OF 008 assaults have been carried out by terrorists and the attackers appear to come from outside the region. While they do have some local supporters who assist or enable their operations, the attackers have gained little traction with most locals. PRT Feyzabad (Badakhshan Province) military convoys have also been attacked several times, and the PRTs in Pul-e Khumri and Feyzabad have taken occasional incoming rockets. A series of small IED explosions (no injuries and only minor damage) and IED finds in early 2007 in Taloqan, where such incidents have been almost unknown for many months, seem to be the work of disgruntled local commanders. ¶5. (SBU) No NGOs have been attacked in the region since the May 2006 IED that destroyed a vehicle belonging to USAID Alternative Livelihoods Program contractor PADCO in Darayeen District of Badakhshan. That assault killed two Afghans and slightly wounded two Americans, and is believed to have resulted from perceived interference in the drug business of the district rather than from any political or terrorist objective. In addition, two German reporters camped on the roadside in the far southwest of Baghlan (Tala Wa Barfek district),were shot and killed in October ¶2006. Although not a robbery (valuable items were left behind),this attack remains a mystery and may have been carried out by locals who felt either threatened or insulted by the pair. Other violent incidents in the region have been attributed to personal feuds, land disputes, or grudges against particular officials or other individuals, and have not involved foreigners. ¶6. (SBU) Terrorist activities, although supported by a small portion of the population, receive little encouragement from officials, many of whom actively seek to interfere with Taliban or HIG) activities and arrest perpetrators, or at least drive them out of the region. This is in part because terrorism is considered bad for Afghanistan (and the Northeast),but also because it is considered bad for (illegal) business. A large percentage of officials in both the provincial capitals and districts -- including police and other security authorities, as well as governors, district managers, and others -- are closely linked with criminal activities, including drug production and trafficking, smuggling of weapons, fuel, and other high-value commodities, and extortion. In many cases, particularly in the remote areas of all four provinces, these officials not only permit but also control and direct illegal activities. In fact, police and other official vehicles are the preferred means to transport drugs, weapons, and other contraband. People are reluctant to stop for uniformed police, particularly in remote areas, since some of those "uniformed police" are in fact highway robbers. -------------- -------------- Political Situation: Criminality Hampers Good Governance -------------- -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Virtually every official in the region claims to support the Government of Afghanistan, and most have good relations with the international community (including the PRTs). Although willing to act against terrorist threats and individuals, few are prepared to give up their own (illicit) pursuits or actively involve themselves in measures against local power brokers that may either upset the power balance or hinder the illegal activities from which they gain most of their income and prestige. Officials often respond to and implement central government programs and requirements, but not if it threatens their own positions or the stability of the region. In general, senior officials seek to keep security conditions under control by balancing the interests of competing parties, including drug lords, former commanders, powerful religious leaders, and other local power brokers. The national interest definitely comes second (or much farther down) on their lists of priorities. ¶8. (SBU) Locals' total lack of faith in the national, KABUL 00000940 003 OF 008 provincial, or local governments is largely due to the lack of government control and the widely-known involvement of officials in illegal activities. Bribes are considered normal; those who refuse to pay them do not get the service or commodity they seek and sometimes end up in trouble with the formal or informal authorities. This negative perception applies to the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Border Police at all levels. Many people have a more positive view of the Afghan National Army (ANA),but with virtually no ANA presence anywhere but Kunduz, this is neither surprising nor helpful. ¶9. (SBU) The distrust of government extends to Kabul. Northeasterners had high expectations of the Karzai government; the majority in this overwhelmingly non-Pashtun area voted for him. Many people now believe the core of the region's problems lies in the pervasive corruption in Kabul and, in particular, the continuation in office or in positions of influence of known drug dealers and former commanders who protect local officials and prevent authorities from removing bad actors. Arresting local power brokers is considered impossible -- not even something a governor or chief of police could do -- because of the perception that their sponsors in Kabul will have them released in short order, and retribution on those who carried out or supported the arrest will be swift and fierce. ¶10. (SBU) Another problem is the regions' perceived "Pashtunization." Although Pashtuns are in the minority in the north, many people believe that Pashtuns receive advantageous treatment in everything from government positions to land allocation. The treatment of non-Pashtuns in Kabul is a particularly sore point; the Kunduz Provincial Council claimed that they waited 23 days for an appointment with President Karzai, whereas a Pashtun elder from the Northeast went to Kabul and saw Karzai within 24 hours. Many also have a negative view of Pakistan, but the woes of Afghanistan are attributed more to corrupt and inept Afghans than to interference from outside the country. ¶11. (SBU) Provincial Council (PC) members, Parliamentarians, and other powerful people are sought out as intermediaries with government officials because any petition or request delivered without the assistance of such an intermediary is unlikely to receive any attention whatsoever, much less a favorable response. Many of these powerful people, including MPs, are themselves former commanders, and continue to operate at the center of narcotics trafficking or other criminal activities. ¶12. (SBU) While the Provincial Councils of the four provinces are active as representatives of and intermediaries for the people, all continue to have problems with funding, and they face uncertainty about their role. USAID and other PC training projects appear not to have had substantial impact, but continued capacity building programs, along with more substantive guidance and support from the central government (such as a new Provincial Council Law),may improve these elected representatives' ability to fulfill their functions more effectively. Interestingly, although many PC members were elected on the basis of traditional leadership roles (e.g., many mullahs sit on the councils),the individuals with the most local influence -- who also control the largest and most pervasive drug and other criminal organizations -- were mostly elected to Parliament rather than Provincial Councils, leaving the latter body with less capable but also less corrupt membership. -------------- Economic Situation: Relatively Positive -------------- ¶13. (SBU) The economic situation in the Northeast is relatively positive, particularly in the larger cities and towns, where commercial activities abound and the streets KABUL 00000940 004 OF 008 are bustling with people, vehicles, and animal-drawn carts and carriages. Gas stations are readily available and new ones are going up all the time, though lacking reliable (or in some cases any) electricity, pumps are still run by small generators that the attendant starts up when a car comes in to buy diesel, the usual fuel of choice. -------------- Energy Supply Is Vital -------------- ¶14. (SBU) Energy availability is a critical issue in the Northeast. The close proximity to Tajikistan and electric transmission lines has made Kunduz one of the few Afghan cities with relatively dependable electricity that does not rely on diesel generators. Baghlan provincial capital Pul-e Khumri has an inadequate hydroelectric plant (built in the early 1960s to supply the cement factory and currently running at about one-third capacity),while Taloqan and Feyzabad provinces have no large power generation capability. Although small hydro and other generators provide some power to many areas, the failure thus far to expand the power grid in the region is one of the major complaints of the local population -- and one of the serious constraints on economic development. The route from Kunduz to Taloqan is lined with hundreds of large concrete power poles lying on the side of the road, awaiting the transmission lines that were expected several years ago. Many of the poles are no longer usable. The Kunduz Provincial Power Director outlined a plan he claimed was funded by the Asian Development Bank (this project is also being funded by USAID, World Bank, Germany, and India) that will transmit power from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan and bring the whole region (except Badakhshan) into the new 220V power grid. Donors have paid little attention to renewable energy projects, despite excellent solar and wind power prospects, though fairly small hydroelectric schemes in conjunction with canal upgrades may also contribute to the local power supply in the near future. While it seems likely that the grid will reach large portions of Baghlan, Kunduz, and Takhar within the next few years, the prospects for mountainous Badakhshan remain far less hopeful. -------------- Agriculture Remains Key -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Agriculture is a mainstay of the Northeast, and farming activities are visible throughout the year in the extensive irrigated fields bordering the rivers of the region. The EU is working on the irrigation canal system in the Kunduz River Basin (Takhar and Kunduz Provinces), and has recently announced a follow-on project to complete an upgrade in the Khanabad area (Kunduz) that was started in the 1970s. Irrigated areas are usually double cropped, with wheat as the primary first crop, while rice, cotton, vegetables, and other crops share the second planting and a later harvest. If farmers believe there will not be adequate water for rice, they will often switch to another crop that requires less water. ¶16. (SBU) Many large areas that cannot be irrigated, including fairly steep slopes, are planted with wheat in the often forlorn hope that precipitation will be sufficient for a successful crop. Many such areas, particularly in Badakhshan, are also planted with poppy. In 2006, Badakhshan was second only to Helmand province in poppy cultivation. During the fall of 2006, however, Governor Majid demonstrated greater engagement with counter-narcotics activities and launched a widespread campaign against planting poppy. He followed this with approximately 500 hectares of early eradication in November and December 2006. UNODC's Rapid Assessment Survey predicts that Badakhshan will see a sharp decline in poppy cultivation. Previously, the high degree of control by local commanders (often involved in the narcotics trade),lack of GOA penetration, the inaccessibility of many areas, and the lack of serious alternatives for the local KABUL 00000940 005 OF 008 population made this one of the most difficult areas to eradicate or otherwise eliminate poppy production. More recently, the governors in the Northeast have responded to increasing pressure from the GOA to eliminate poppy, and they have taken advantage of the region's comparatively benign security environment to extend legitimate government influence throughout the region. Corruption remains a problem, and local offices often attempt to derail poppy elimination efforts. The Interior Minister dismissed the Daraim District's Governor and Chief of Police in the fall due to their interference with the provincial governor's eradication plans. ¶17. (SBU) Like all of Afghanistan, most agriculture in the Northeast depends on winter snows and rains for the runoff that fills the streams and rivers for irrigation and to nourish rain-fed wheat. Years of drought (and given the meager rain and snowfall so far, it looks like 2007 may be yet another drought year) have left water levels low and have severely limited the crop from rain-fed agriculture throughout the region. Only Kunduz, which normally has a surplus and depends far less on rain-fed crops, had no food shortage in 2007, but even Kunduz may have difficulties in ¶2008. -------------- -------------- Development Projects Abound, But Much Still to Do -------------- -------------- ¶18. (SBU) Many reconstruction (or construction) and development projects have been carried out in the five years since the fall of the Taliban. Despite this effort, a tremendous amount remains to be done. Many Afghans in the Northeast bemoan the lack of visible development despite the billions of dollars invested by the international community. In some cases, the projects have been poorly designed or poorly executed, and there is no doubt that millions of dollars have been spent with little or nothing to show for it. Results of capacity-building projects are less visible, though no less important, but also appear to have had only partial success. One issue that has received little focus is the need for and capacity to do maintenance on buildings, roads, or other infrastructure, or to follow basic sanitation procedures. Facilities that have only recently been completed often look very old, with apparently no effort made to replace broken windows, fix leaking roofs or plumbing, or repair other damage, or even to clean toilets or washing facilities. Sometimes the main problem is poor construction, but often it is simply a lack of basic maintenance and hygiene. ¶19. (SBU) Many projects, however, have made a huge difference. Paving the road from Kabul through the Baghlan capital of Pul-e Khumri up to Mazar e-Sharif, Kunduz City, and the Tajik border at Sher Khan Bandar, and from Kunduz City over to the Takhar capital of Taloqan, has made these stretches of road effectively superhighways of transport for goods and people. The drive from Kunduz, where many regional organizations and companies are located, to Pul-e Khumri or Taloqan has been reduced from well over half a day to only about an hour and a half, and the drive time between Kunduz and Kabul has been cut in half to about six or seven hours. A project to reconstruct and pave the road from Taloqan to the Badakhshan capital of Feyzabad, which is being funded by USAID and the World Bank, will extend that commercial connection to the fourth capital of the region and, it is hoped, bring it more contact with the region. The increased ability to transport grain and other food is particularly important, and the increased ability for police and other security patrols is also vital. In Kunduz and Taloqan between 45 and 50 km of city streets have been paved, cutting down considerably on what previously was one large dust cloud over these cities and removing a major source of pollution and respiratory illness. Agriculture near the cities has received a boost, as the removal of a persistent coating of dust on the KABUL 00000940 006 OF 008 plants has increased yields. ¶20. (SBU) While there are still few good roads linking the capitals to the districts, this need is recognized and is slowly being addressed, with some district roads already graveled and others planned in the near future. For example, USAID is building a road from the paved highway near Sher Khan Bandar to the fairly large population center of Imam Sahib, in the far north of Kunduz. This will link Imam Sahib to the border crossing into Tajikistan, where a new three-lane U.S.-funded bridge will finally provide a road connection between Kunduz and Tajikistan, previously linked only by small ferries. The facilities will include U.S.-funded border crossing stations on both sides, and a large customs facility on the Afghan side funded by the EU. This complex is expected to lead to a quantum jump in cross-border trade, giving an economic boost to the region and a revenue boost to the GOA. -------------- -------------- Small Investors Build, But Larger Investors Worry -------------- -------------- ¶21. (SBU) Investment continues, primarily in the construction of homes and commercial establishments, but it is less than it was a year ago, with some estimating a decrease of approximately 40 percent. Constraints on small investors include lack of city planning that may lead to forced removal in the future and the lack of employment that limits available funds. Larger investors are more concerned about the bigger picture in Afghanistan: lack of security in the south, lack of GOA capacity or control, and Taliban or other insurgent activities. Although these risks (except lack of GOA control) are minimal in the north, investors -- particularly foreigners -- fear their negative effect on the future of the nation as a whole. A joint venture between a French company and the GOA to revive the cotton processing industry that led the economy of the region until the 1970s is still struggling after two years (COMMENT: Given the anti-competitive behavior of the French company, this may not be a bad thing. See reftel. END COMMENT.). A group of Afghan and other investors is planning substantial investment ($140 million) in the cement production and coal mining facilities in Baghlan Province. If successful, this venture should improve employment and economic growth in the region, particularly in Baghlan, which thus far has received relatively little attention from the international community. ¶22. (SBU) Markets and business are still good in the region, but they are not growing as much as they were a year ago. Then, people were importing everything they possibly could, new items were appearing constantly in the markets, and people were bidding up the cost of land and houses. Now, those costs have gone back down (though not quite to what they were before the price hikes),while imports of durable goods (cars, furniture, appliances) have slacked off and most imports are softer goods like food and textiles. Although traffic congestion is growing, perhaps only half the number of large Russian trucks is visible transporting goods from Tajikistan or Pakistan into the region. ¶23. (SBU) Despite the apparent prosperity of the cities and towns, however, many young men, mostly from rural areas, leave the region to seek employment in Iran or Pakistan. Regional immigration officials estimated that between five and 15 percent of young men in Kunduz, Takhar, and Baghlan have left, and in Badakhshan, the figure is 35 to 45 percent. A few women and families go along, but some 90 percent of emigrant laborers have been young men. Most Pashtuns go to Pakistan (a few for religious education, but mostly for employment),most Tajiks (the majority of whom are from Badakhshan) and Hazaras go to Iran, and Uzbeks go to both places. Most travel in groups for security and mutual support. Meanwhile, as many as 40,000 former refugees, primarily Pashtuns, have returned to the KABUL 00000940 007 OF 008 Northeast, and authorities have provided land and shelter for many of these across the region. In spite of this GOA effort, however, many returnees, including widows, the elderly, and disabled persons, continue to live in returnee camps without decent shelter, employment, or basic services. -------------- Cultural/Social Situation -------------- ¶24. (SBU) Although virtually all adult women in the Northeast continue to wear a burqa in public, there seems to be a bit of loosening of the social pressure to wear one, as well as a general sense that society is more lively and less constrained. Underneath the burqa, the women clearly are well-dressed, well-coiffed, and well made up, with nice jewelry and henna and other decoration. Perhaps more importantly, many women can be seen on the streets, shopping together or with children. Women are generally more visible in public, even if behind the veil. Women are also playing an increasingly important role in the community of the Northeast. Many work for the government, and their numbers are increasing, particularly in health and education. Nevertheless, women continue to be viewed widely as property belonging to men; many endure verbal and physical abuse, and the sale or exchange of women to settle debts remains a widespread and accepted practice. -------------- Media Active but Struggling -------------- ¶25. (SBU) The Northeast also has a lively media presence, with nine radio stations covering all four provinces and three TV stations. BBC can also be heard on FM due to an antenna in each province. Two radio stations have been opened in the past year, and none have been shut down; there is no formal restriction on what is broadcast. Kunduz TV is very active; its cameramen are a fixture at important events, and PRT members appear regularly on the evening news. The stations all face financial problems, but so far they have found sponsors to help them keep going, including USAID, which funds a station in Baghlan, and the Kunduz PRT, which pays one of the radio stations in Kunduz a fixed fee in return for broadcast time. The PRT also supports Radio Zohra, a women's radio station and sponsors a cultural center called Mediothek, where young people and others can gather for community theater, internet use, and other media-related activities. -------------- Life is Better, but Serious Concerns Remain -------------- ¶26. (SBU) Basic education and health services are available in most areas, thanks in part to the assistance of the many international organizations that build and furnish facilities, though many schools still rely on tents for all or some of their classrooms. Furniture, blackboards, books, medicines, medical equipment, trained teachers and medical personnel are in short supply. Security incidents, however, occur only sporadically and local authorities are generally are able to manage them. Even in remote places, parents want to send their children, including girls, to school. Although many schools have been built, and many school tents and other equipment have been provided, facilities cannot keep up with the demand. Many schools run morning and afternoon shifts, with boys in one shift and girls in the other. This strong interest in education and other improvements is partly due to the influence of returnees who experienced a much more modern lifestyle in Iran or Pakistan, and who often convince their neighbors of the value of education and clean water, even if that may mean paying for it. Several town water systems are under construction, with one in Aliabad (Kunduz) already functioning. At least three others, including one in Kunduz City, should be completed over the next year. Water meters will allow the towns to collect fees for the KABUL 00000940 008 OF 008 maintenance of the systems. ¶27. (SBU) Although police and legal services are available to some extent in most areas, the numbers are too few, the individuals lack adequate training, and corruption is pervasive. Land disputes are particularly persistent, with both formal and informal adjudicators often collecting bribes from both sides, keeping the disputes going for years so they can continue to collect the payments. Traffic police also notoriously collect bribes from anyone involved in an accident, whether guilty or not. In general, most people would prefer to resolve disputes through informal systems -- elders, local shuras, or other community leaders -- because they believe that going through the formal system may exacerbate, rather than solve, the problem due to the ineptness and corruption endemic in the formal system. Nevertheless, major disputes usually go through the formal system, and most people almost certainly would prefer to go to the government if they felt the officials would treat their cases fairly. Sharia law is used very little in the Northeast, even in remote areas, although local religious leaders often are also community leaders and involved in informal dispute resolution. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶28. (SBU) Although things are going relatively well in the Northeast of Afghanistan, the failure of the GOA and international community thus far to successfully and visibly reduce the level of corruption and criminality undermines continued progress in the region, including economic growth, social advances, political stabilization and legitimate stability. If Northeasterners do not see a real change in circumstances on the ground, building democracy and lasting stability will be an even more daunting challenge. END COMMENT. NEUMANN