SCENE SETTER: US-AFGHAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

S E C R E T KABUL 000804 SIPDIS SIPDIS DOD FOR USDP EDELMAN AND STATE A/S BOUCHER DEPT FOR DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SCA/PB, S/CT, EUR/RPM STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC PASS TO AHARRIMAN OSD FOR KIMMITT CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT C O R R E C T E D C O P Y -CLASSIFICATION E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER: US-AFGHAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP TALKS IN KABUL - MARCH 13 REF: A. A) KABUL 661 ¶B. B) KABUL 775 ¶C. C) KABUL 685 ¶D. D) KABUL 692 ¶E. E) 06 KABUL 5568 ¶F. F) 06 KABUL 5298 ¶G. G) KABUL 662 ¶H. H) KABUL 533 ¶I. I) KABUL 603 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i., Richard Norland for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Your March 13-14 visit to Afghanistan will be greeted by an Afghan government eager to host the Second U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Dialogue meeting. As some Afghans begin to fear international support may be slipping, the GOA sees the Strategic Partnership as a key vehicle to reaffirm and strengthen the U.S. commitment. Attending the event in Kabul helps send the signal that we view the country as an equal partner. The four Strategic Partnership Working Groups -- Security, Prosperity, Governance, and Counter-narcotics -- produced agreed working-level commitments during meetings last month and in December, and set the stage for the March 13 meeting to bring greater political attention to these efforts. ¶2. (C) While heartened by President Bush's $11.8 billion supplemental request for increased military and economic support, President Karzai and the Afghan government are seized with several immediate challenges, some of the most serious since the fall of the Taliban. These include getting out ahead of the Taliban spring offensive, divisive legislation demanding blanket amnesty for warlords, pressure for stepped up poppy eradication efforts, increasingly systemic corruption, and eroding public confidence in the government's ability to deliver development and basic services such as electricity. The Afghans will be looking for your encouragement and signs of continuing U.S. commitment. But assurances must be balanced with a clear message -- from a partner and friend -- that the Afghans need to do more. They need to know that while we are committed to long-term partnership, we continue to rely on the top leadership to take bold action on good governance, corruption, and poppy eradication and be more visible publicly in GOA efforts to improve the lives of all Afghans. (Septel will provide points for bilateral meetings.) END SUMMARY. STRATEGIC DIALOGUE PLENARY -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The Strategic Partnership Dialogue Working Groups on Security, Prosperity, Governance, and Counter-narcotics met in December and February and agreed upon working-level goals and commitments for the March 13 Plenary (Refs A, B, C). Each group had its own flavor and level of participation, and set the stage for further progress. We see the March 13 Plenary as a vehicle to add political momentum. The Plenary will begin with an opening statement from each side, followed by a brief report from the WGs and discussion of key follow-up points, and end with closing statements from both sides, a working lunch on regional issues, and a joint press conference. The GoA has offered to take the lead on Security and Counter-Narcotics and has asked that we take the lead on Prosperity and Governance. Rather than repeat technical issues, we have suggested that the Plenary focus on the following key themes. SECURITY: MINISTERIAL COMMITMENT FOR A LONG-TERM VISION -------------- -------------- Afghan Lead -------------- ¶4. (S) This session should pick up on the February 15 WG discussions on building Afghan National Security Force capacity and increasing security sector cooperation, particularly between Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). Minister Wardak and Deputy Minister Khaled were present for the duration of the session which covered the growth, equipping, and capacity building of both the army and police, with emphasis on training and long-term programs, including the need for an Afghan vision for the security forces based on a threat assessment (ref A). ¶5. (S) As lead, the GOA will likely raise the following issues: -- Long-term Vision for the ANA: Defense Minister Wardak sees the ANA as eventually being able independently to defend Afghanistan, protect the populace, and repay Afghanistan's debt to the international community by fielding peacekeeping forces worldwide -- admittedly an ambitious goal. He will stress that the cost of training and equipping the ANA to a standard where it is fully self-sustaining is far less than the cost in U.S. money and lives of continuing to deploy U.S. forces to Afghanistan. While unlikely to discuss specific programs, he may refer to the need for enablers such as mobility assets as well as building technical expertise within the MOD. -- Police Reform: Minister of Interior Moqbil may lament the disparity in capabilities between the army and the police and raise the need for increased training and equipping of the ANP. The MOI has made some progress toward reform, for instance replacing forty ANP Generals for ineffectiveness or corruption. In fact, a total of 154 Generals, 23 Colonels, six Lieutenants Colonels and 4 Majors have so far been replaced through the rank reform process. Another list of 295 Colonels is with the Minster and there are more to come. The MOI now hopes rank reform will continue this process, as well as increase capability, quality, and capacity of ANP officers. A lack of qualified professional personnel in the ANP remains a significant challenge (ref A). The reform effort needs to move beyond the uniformed police and expand throughout the entire MOI. Minister Moqbil may also mention the need to rapidly deploy the full authorized number of Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) -- 11,271 patrolmen for 21 provinces. ANAP training so far has been concentrated in six priority provinces in the South and has now been approved for the East. While we recognize the need to move quickly to counter the security threat, the staged approach to ANAP is due to the need to fully vet the recruits for ethnic balance and political affiliation, in order to avoid reconstituting militias. Limitations in logistical resources and the number of trainers also contribute to the timeline. PROSPERITY: KABUL POWER IS THE PRIORITY -------------- U.S. Lead -------------- ¶6. (SBU) We should credit the Karzai government for pursuing sound economic policies and for impressive strides towards macro-economic stability. The licit economy's real GDP has doubled since 2002 but growth is still largely donor driven, and private investment and job creation remain weak. Much hard work remains to develop the welcoming and stable investment climate that is needed to provide more jobs and improve livelihoods. ¶7. (SBU) The GOA can be expected to use this session to again ask for additional USG help in key economic areas, especially the electricity sector (ref B). They are likely to raise the following themes, with electricity being the top priority: -- Electricity: Electricity shortages in Kabul are an immediate and critical concern. Per capita access to electricity is among the lowest found anywhere, and poses significant political risks as the Afghans view electricity as one of the most visible indicators of whether the GOA is delivering. Failure to improve the power supply is likely to become a defining issue as the 2009 election approaches. The GOA has developed a reasonable plan for addressing the crisis but has neither the funding nor capacity to execute this plan (ref D). We have recommended that the USG step in urgently to help stand up approximately 100 MW of new generating capacity, in exchange for firm GOA conditionality on specific measures to ensure effective operation and cost recovery. We should insist that the Afghans contribute what they can to the capital costs and adequately budget for future operations, maintenance, and fuel. The Embassy has been working to validate technical options and identify potential U.S. funding that could be reprogrammed, and has asked Washington to engage with the Congress on the notifications necessary for reprogramming. The Afghans have identified the energy sector as its highest priority for the Afghan Development Forum that it will hold with major donors in Kabul in late April. We will use the period ahead to press other donors to increase activity in this critical sector. Announcing our interest in working with the government to increase electricity in Kabul would increase our leverage with other donors, and ensure that the government is able to address its looming electricity crisis. -- Budget Sustainability: The GOA will highlight concerns about the surging recurrent cost obligations from donor spending and ANA/ANP expansion and pay increases. The government's ability to cover recurrent budget costs is limited by its exceedingly weak revenue base. We should continue to stress fiscal discipline and revenue enhancement through improving tax administration and new taxes. The Border Management Initiative can boost customs revenue and help gain control of their borders but we need them to push forward on a Border Management Commission that can marshal Afghan resources behind this effort and ensure participation of key ministries. We can also emphasize our commitment to work with the Afghans to build government capacity in key areas like financial management and procurement to ease development budget bottlenecks. -- Regional Economic Cooperation: Strengthened regional economic cooperation is a key part of our strategic vision. USDEL should commend the GOA for proactively reaching out to its neighbors to improve commercial ties and export opportunities, particularly in energy where the Afghans have ambitions plans for electricity imports from its northern neighbors. In the WG, the Afghans reported that Pakistan has offered to host the next Regional Economic Cooperation Conference (RECC),which will build on the successful November 2006 RECC in Delhi. Bilaterally, the Afghans have proposed to renegotiate the critical Afghan Trade and Transit Agreement with Pakistan, where transit obstacles are a key barrier to Afghan exports. We should support these initiatives, particularly by offering to raise the transit issue at political levels with Pakistan. President Bush's initiative to create Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) in Afghanistan and Pakistan border areas has potential to enhance further their bilateral economic cooperation and spur integration into the world economy. At the political level, Afghanistan was initially lukewarm to the ROZ concept, out of concern that Pakistan was better placed to exploit the potential benefits; the GOA has come around as they now understand the initiative better. We should be ready to brief the Afghans on where we stand on drafting ROZ legislation and reiterate our interest in getting additional Afghan input on how to structure our ROZ proposal to meet its needs. GOVERNANCE: THE TOUGHEST TO TACKLE -------------- U.S. Lead -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Governance is the most conceptually difficult area of the Strategic Partnership. It reflects the scale and scope of the challenges which go to the heart of the Afghan body politic and touch on sensitive issues such as ineffective internal governmental cooperation, corruption, and lack of service delivery to the people. The WG reflected these difficulties, yet managed to agree on a list of 32 commitments on transparency and accountability in sub-national planning, anti-corruption, capacity building, human rights, and the development of civil society and democratic institutions (ref C). ¶9. (SBU) The GOA has asked that we lead the Governance discussion. The GOA will be most interested in the following issues: -- Capacity Building: During the WG, both sides highlighted increased capacity building as an urgent need both for developing skills to enable effective governance and increasing capacity at the central and provincial levels. Thanks to USAID, we have a good story to tell. -- Corruption: Corruption is eroding public confidence in the GOA, and President Karzai and his ministers need to take this threat seriously and respond with vigorous action. Attorney General Sabit has made bold efforts against corrupt officials and should be encouraged to do more, but only using appropriate legal procedures and in cooperation with the Chief Justice and the Ministry of Justice. The Embassy and other donors have growing concerns over some of his methods -- he believes Afghan law entitles him to detain first and ask questions later, and efforts to question his views usually lead to volatile reactions. We are working with the Italians and the UN to develop a united front that would, if necessary, present Sabit with the choice of continuing his overzealous approach or risk losing international support. President Karzai should likewise use his authority to remove corrupt officials from office while formalizing a transparent review process for government officials accused of corruption. However, punishment alone is not sufficient; ministers must implement measures to prevent corruption. The government needs a comprehensive strategy, but ministers should take urgent action to establish and enforce standards within their ministries. (NOTE: Chief Justice Azimi's anti-corruption draft report is due out in late March.) The Parliament should also be encouraged to ratify the UN Convention Against Corruption, a Compact benchmark. -- Ministry of Interior Reform: While corruption gradually diminishes public confidence, it is the inability of the GOA to deliver for the Afghan people that undermines its support. In addition to counter-narcotics and police, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) is also charged with administration at the provincial level. This third responsibility is sorely lacking in progress, and the MOI needs to show leadership to come together around a reform agenda. Poor cooperation and coordination with line ministries is a consistent complaint of local officials, hindering GOA effectiveness and eroding public confidence. -- Strategic Communications: The GOA is warming up to the need to get its message out to the Afghan people and should be praised for the creation and early successes of its National Communications Coordination Center (NC3),which focuses the GOA's messaging efforts in the four most critical southern provinces. The GOA has increased high-visibility Presidential and Ministerial travel outside of Kabul as a means of inspiring public confidence in the central government; more such travel should be encouraged. The GOA should also be encouraged to build on the NC3,s traditional communication efforts by reaching out to mullahs and religious scholars, many of whom remain aloof from the central government. -- Sustainability of Future Elections: Few Afghans have begun looking ahead to the next elections in 2009, but the financial sustainability of the election system requires urgent attention. The 2004 Presidential and 2005 Assembly elections cost the international community close to US$300 million. The GOA's Independent Election Commission (IEC) is preparing for the next Presidential elections in 2009, just two years away. They will likely ask for USG support for the establishment of a permanent Civil Voter Registry (CVR) called for in the Compact, estimated to cost US$50-100 million. We would like to see this effort linked to other under-funded registry projects, such as the national census. Fewer than half the current IEC staff worked on the last election, so capacity building is also an urgent need. The IEC may also need to economize on expensive new technologies (such as eye scanning to identify voters). A new election law is under consideration, as are proposals to reduce costs by simplifying the election calendar. COUNTER-NARCOTICS: CROSS-CUTTING THEMES -------------- Afghan Lead -------------- ¶10. (C) At the WG December 7, 2006 co-chaired by INL A/S Anne Patterson and Minister of Counter Narcotics Habibullah Qaderi, the GOA outlined four CN priorities: trafficking and law enforcement, alternative development, demand reduction, and capacity building. These priorities are woven throughout the GOA's new National Drug Control Strategy implementation plan, which gives the Ministry of Counter Narcotics broad responsibility to strengthen GOA performance in six key areas: alternative livelihoods, law enforcement, eradication, regional cooperation, demand reduction, and public information. You can expect the GOA to ask for more resources in pursuit of these priorities. The GOA will argue that alternative livelihoods programs are insufficient and that government institutions lack the capacity to pursue sustainable poppy elimination. They will also echo a recurring theme that despite the large development spending, very little assistance reaches individual farmers. We have advised the Ministry of Counter Narcotics that discussion of assistance programs should focus on how to make existing programs work more effectively, not on the need for more money and more programs. ¶11. (C) Our priority at the Plenary should be to help the GOA remain focused on the core immediate challenge: reducing poppy cultivation. Proceeds from poppy cultivation and the attendant narcotics trafficking support the insurgents, promote corruption among public officials, and impede the development of good governance. Suggested points should include the following: -- Poppy elimination: Press the GOA to take a year-round approach with active prevention and eradication campaigns. Governors in the North are pursuing this goal, but we need to see more public leadership from Kabul. President Karzai needs to take the anti-poppy message to the people, and the GOA should insure that a strong, credible eradication program (including the use of herbicides next year) sends a signal that there is no tolerance for continued cultivation. Our carrots -- offers of development assistance -- cannot work in the absence of an effective stick that encourages all Afghans to take advantage of alternative livelihoods programs and other avenues towards licit, sustainable economic growth. -- Focus on Helmand: Progress is being made in the north, but if Helmand registers another record crop (as UNODC predicts it will do),the overall counter-narcotics effort in Afghanistan will be seen as a failure. The GOA has a very limited window in which to affect the situation there, so personal leadership by Karzai, a robust eradication effort by Helmand Governor Wafa, and real law enforcement by the police and prosecutors are crucial to success in Helmand. -- Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice: Eradication alone cannot eliminate trafficking. The GOA needs to arrest and prosecute narcotics traffickers and the corrupt officials who protect them, thereby sending the message that the narcotics industry is illegal for everyone, not just the impoverished. We want to expand cooperation between the DEA and the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA),to see the CNPA grow into its planned structure, and prepare good cases and arrests for prosecution. -- Good Performers Initiative: The USG is prepared to provide incentives for provinces that make progress in reducing cultivation. Complaints of insufficient development assistance are inappropriate. We are already offering millions of dollars in targeted development assistance to poppy-free provinces and near poppy-free provinces, and are prepared to expand this program to every province in the country (refs E, F). The GOA needs to insure that its Counter Narcotics Trust Fund can keep up with the demands to disseminate this development money in a timely fashion. NORLAND