IDA 15 NEGOTIATIONS GOAL - SUSTAIN MULTILATERAL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000684 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR EB/IFD/ODF, SCA/FO, AND SCA/A TREASURY FOR LMCDONALD, ABAUKOL, AND JCIORCIARI NSC FOR AHARRIMAN OSD FOR BRZEZINSKI E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAID EFIN PREL AF SUBJECT: IDA 15 NEGOTIATIONS GOAL - SUSTAIN MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANK FUNDING LEVELS FOR AFGHANISTAN REF: BERLIN 215 (U) This message contains SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED information. It is predecisional and not for release outside the U.S. Government. Please protect accordingly. Not for Internet Distribution. SUMMARY 1.(SBU) As mentioned in reftel, Afghanistan could face declining assistance from the multilateral development banks beginning in FY-08 because Afghanistan's status as a "post-conflict" country will begin to phase out over the next three years. While figures are only speculative at this time, the decline could be as much as 75%, from $200 million in FY-10 to $50 million in FY-11. Such a decline would not be consistent with the reality of Afghanistan's needs and the current virulent insurgency in parts of the country. In addition, the World Bank's $400 million London Compact pledge for FY-09 and FY-10 could be cut if the IDA-15 replenishment negotiations produce insufficient donor contributions. A decline in the World Bank budgets would have serious negative consequences for economic development and for the U.S. ability to influence economic policy decisions. U.S. IDA 15 negotiators should incorporate into their strategy the goal of ensuring sufficient donor contributions to lock in the World Bank's $400 million London Compact pledge for FY-09 and FY-10. U.S. negotiators should also factor into their calculations the very real necessity to sustain this level of funding at least through the end of IDA-15 (FY-11). This will require negotiating an extension of "post-conflict" status or some other characterization that will provide the World Bank with justification to sustain its current higher level of funding allocations. A similar issue will arise in ensuring adequate future Asian Development Bank Funding levels for Afghanistan. END SUMMARY. IDA 15 NEGOTIATIONS AND AFGHANISTAN 2.(U) Replenishment negotiations (IDA 15) for the World Bank's International Development Agency and the ADB's Asia Development Fund (ADF),the concessional windows of both multilateral banks, will soon commence. IDA replenishments are expected to conclude in 2007, while ADF is expected to conclude in 2008. Funding under IDA 14 will expire in FY-08. During the Afghanistan Compact negotiations in London in 2005, the World Bank pledged $1.2 billion over five years and the ADB pledged $1 billion to rank second and third after the United States among donors. The World Bank pledge was structured in a three plus two format - $800 million of IDA 14 money (FY-06, 07, and 08) and $400 million in IDA 15 money for FY-09 and 10. There is a major concern about the available funding for the second phase of the 5-year pledge, which was heavily caveated by the level of donor contributions to IDA 15 and the performance of the Afghan government. According to the World Bank office in Kabul, a preliminary assessment of the GOA's performance relative to other post-conflict countries is positive. U.S. negotiators should encourage strong donor commitments to IDA 15 as well as firm up the Bank's commitment to the $400 million allocation for FY-09 and 10. 3.(U) The World Bank's large Afghanistan Compact pledge in London was made possible because the Bank placed Afghanistan in its special post-conflict status. According to Bank officials, this status will be phased out under current procedures at the end of FY-10/11, at which point Afghanistan will become a normal IDA country and must compete for funds globally. The IDA competition criteria are based on key performance criteria - the quality of economic management, structural policies, public sector management and institutions(governance),and policies for social inclusion and equity. While Afghanistan looks reasonably good when compared to most post-conflict countries, it will need to KABUL 00000684 002 OF 003 improve drastically its record on corruption, governance, and public financial management to compete with normal IDA countries. Assuming little change in these areas, the FY-11 World Bank allocation will fall substantially, to perhaps as low as $40-50 million. FISCAL POLICY IMPACT OF THE WORLD BANK PROGRAM 4.(U) World Bank contributions to the Afghan operating budget help the Afghans finance recurrent spending priorities while staying within IMF budget limits. A significant proportion of World Bank allocations in the past two years has gone to support Afghanistan's operating/recurrent cost budget. Another $80 million is slated for this purpose in FY-08. The grant or no-interest loan basis for the World Bank contributions also assists the government in its efforts to keep the budget in balance by eliminating or reducing Afghanistan's debt repayment burden. The loss of World Bank budget support in future years could seriously affect Afghan government operations, including support for the security forces. MICROECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE WORLD BANK PROGRAM 5.(U) The World Bank is financing development projects across the economy and throughout the country. At the project level, perhaps the World Bank's greatest contribution is in government capacity building. All Bank project funding passes through the government's development budget, giving the finance ministry and the line ministries invaluable public financial management experience. The World Bank provides funding for the operation of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy secretariat, which manages the JCMB/ANDS donor coordination process. The Bank is also supporting the PRSP - Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper process. Other areas in which the Bank is active include: health (including Avian Influenza and HIV),public administration Reform, rural development, the National Solidarity Program, irrigation, horticulture, sub-national governance, power (construction of the final leg of the NEPS transmission line),and mining/hydrocarbon legislation. Obviously, a precipitous decline in budgeting would force the World Bank to either substantially reduce its effort across this project portfolio or concentrate its effort in a few sectors. Both options would have a negative affect on the pace of development. POLICY IMPACT OF THE WORLD BANK PROGRAM 6.(U) In the JCMB/ANDS donor coordination system, donors garner greater influence in the policy and development process the more resources they bring to the table. As Afghanistan's second largest donor, the World Bank has used its influence in the JCMB to keep the Afghans on track to meet their Afganistan Compact objectives, without sacrificing key policy requirements. The Bank's voice in Consultative Group and Working Group meetings can be effective in pulling together consensus on the way forward - as it is doing on energy policy. The Bank has been decisive in deflecting misguided initiatives, whether from Afghans or other donors, back onto the track envisioned in London. The fact that donors can alternate leadership on key issues demonstrates broad donor support for Afghanistan to the government and to the public. A smaller World Bank budget would imply a smaller staff, less ability to lead, less influence, and would necessarily place more of the burden on the U.S. to lead the development effort here. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK 7.(U) Likewise, the Asian Development Bank programming is an integral component of Afghanistan's development strategy. In 2007, the ADB plans to invest $150 million to help complete the national highway system and $50 million to further KABUL 00000684 003 OF 003 develop power capacity by linking Afghanistan with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. ADB activities have focused on the national roads, power and gas lines, and natural resource management (agriculture, irrigation, and environment) sectors, together with some programs on public financial management and public administration reform. The ADB is also providing significant capacity building technical assistance to Afghan economic ministries. COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST 8.(SBU) If we do not act during the IDA 15 negotiations, Afghanistan could suffer a precipitous decline in concessional project funding from the multilateral development banks at a critical juncture in its economic development trajectory. We believe such a decline is likely to have negative financial, programmatic, and policy impacts on Afghanistan's medium term economic development. We simply cannot afford to lose the World Bank's positive leadership and financial contributions. The key seems to lie with the World Bank's post-conflict status designation for Afghanistan. It is not intuitive for the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank to substantially reduce its role in a situation in which the government is facing an active insurgency in some parts of the country. However, we need to take care not to overstate the situation. A designation of Afghanistan as a nation in wide-spread conflict could also have a negative impact as it would be difficult for these multilateral development banks to maintain a presence here under that context (as we have seen in Iraq). We understand there is some talk of using the term "conflict-affected" to describe the situation, but we would need to further explore the definition and impact of such a designation. 9.(SBU) As the largest shareholder in the multilateral development banks, U.S. leadership will be key to developing consensus with other shareholders and senior bank management on the necessity of sustaining multilateral development bank funding levels for Afghanistan beyond the currently anticipated end of Afghanistan's World Bank "post-conflict status." U.S. negotiators are requested to include in the strategy the twin objectives of ensuring sufficient IDA 15 contributions to guarantee the World Bank's $400 million pledge for FY-09 and 10 and of sustaining those levels of funding at least through IDA-15 (which ends in FY-11). Similar objectives should be shaped to ensure adequate future ADB funding for Afghanistan. END COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST. NEUMANN