TALIBAN AND AL QAEDA FOCUSING ON HELMAND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000679 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT, EUR/RPM STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR AHARRIMAN OSD FOR KIMMITT CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF SUBJECT: TALIBAN AND AL QAEDA FOCUSING ON HELMAND Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. Helmand Governor Wafa assesses that most districts in his province are either under the control of the Taliban or surrounded by Taliban, as Taliban and Al Qaeda are focusing on Helmand and their numbers are on the rise. Wafa wants military operations to commence in five districts in Helmand, starting with Sangin where, he says, the majority are willing to support the GOA and the Kajaki dam and infrastructure project when the Taliban threat is removed. The Ambassador asked Wafa to focus more on talking with the Kajaki and Sangin shuras; negotiations and military operations need to support each other. Wafa agreed to hold more talks. He also made some ammunition requests that we have referred to CSTC-A. END SUMMARY Taliban and Al Qaeda Focusing On Helmand -------------- ¶2. (C) Helmand Governor Wafa told Ambassador February 26 that most districts in Helmand were either under the control of the Taliban or that Taliban were surrounding areas that the GOA controlled. He believes Taliban and Al Qaeda are focusing their attention on Helmand and that large numbers of insurgents were entering the province. He called for precision attacks against these groups in response. The good news was that the three main Taliban groups (two representing different Afghan tribal groups, the third from outside the country) were all opposing each other. In addition, he reported that through his outreach efforts, 350 mullahs across the province were now supporting the GOA, although they likely would not offer pro-GOA messages in the mosques until the security environment improved. ¶3. (C) Wafa described Sangin District as being divided into five parts, with different ethnic groups in control. Four parts of the district were friendly to the GOA and were predominantly controlled by the Barakzai, Noorzai, and Alakozai tribes. One part, where the Isakzai tribe was dominant, was not supporting the GOA. The supporters of the GOA want the Kajaki dam and related road reconstruction project to move forward but are surrounded by Taliban. They will support fighting the Taliban and have even identified their own fighters. The one anti-GOA group, the Isakzai, is made up of smugglers and heavily supported by the Taliban. Wafa said this latter group sees the Taliban getting stronger and is hedging its bets. The Ambassador asked if it was correct that the Isakzai are an historically marginalized group wanting revenge and profiting from Taliban smugglers. Wafa remarked this was 100 percent correct. Wafa agreed that we had to both fight the Taliban and help broker peace among the tribes to keep them away from the Taliban. Wafa saw the second part as his job. Need Military Operations in Five Districts -------------- ¶4. (C) Wafa called for military operations in five districts -- Sangin, Musa Qala, Kajaki, Garmser, and Baram Chah. The Ambassador cautioned that we could not do all at the same time but needed to decide our priorities. Baram Chah, along the Pakistan border, could not be first, but cannot be ignored. General McNeill realizes this and will also not ignore Musa Qala. He will be consulting closely with the Governor and President Karzai on Musa Qala, the Ambassador explained. Wafa did not think that a big military operation was needed in Musa Qala. He said he would send his own security forces into the district. Wafa asked for a return of border police that were first assigned to Helmand and then reassigned to Nimroz in previous years. KABUL 00000679 002 OF 002 ¶5. (C) The Ambassador said it was important to view the situation as one war, not separate wars in each province. We had to choose the right places to fight and win and then move on to other places to do the same, rather than defending all areas. Wafa agreed and suggested operations start in Sangin. The Ambassador said he would convey to ISAF and the UK that he had spoken to the Governor and that Wafa understands the need to negotiate but he also needs to understand how military planning is proceeding. Wafa agreed with this approach but cautioned that the longer operations were delayed the stronger the Taliban got. Wafa indicated he was willing to share any information with ISAF. (NOTE: The UK Task FORCE reports that its arrangement with Wafa is to brief him about all operations, with the only exception being instances where time did not permit it, e.g., recent precision AIR strikes against Taliban commanders. END NOTE.) NEUMANN