OSD DELEGATION DISCUSSES PAKISTAN, IRAN, AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000662 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT, EUR/RPM, INL/CIVPOL STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG, NSC FOR AHARRIMAN OSD FOR SHIVERS CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2016 TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV SNAR NATO AF SUBJECT: OSD DELEGATION DISCUSSES PAKISTAN, IRAN, AND STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH SENIOR GOA OFFICIALS Classified By: Political-Military Counselor Carol Rodley, for reasons 1 .4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In February 13-15 meetings, a delegation from the Office of the Secretary of Defense discussed Pakistan, Iran, Afghan security forces development, and the Strategic Partnership with key leaders in the Afghan government. National Security Advisor Rassoul advised that the GOA is willing to cooperate with Pakistan but remains skeptical of Pakistan,s motives. He noted that Iran is preparing for a broader international confrontation by stepping up its activities within Afghanistan. Minister of Defense (MOD) Wardak emphasized the importance of the Strategic Partnership to Afghans and the Afghan commitment to improving the quality and capability of the Afghan National Army. Minister of Interior (MOI) Moqbil Zarar discussed the process of rank reform and the need to develop qualified personnel and the systems to support them, as well as institutionalizing the primacy of the rule of law within the Afghan National Police. End summary. ¶2. (U) Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense James Shinn and Senior Advisor on Central Asia Mitchell Shivers led a delegation to Kabul on February 12-15. The primary purpose of the trip was to participate in the Strategic Partnership Security Working Group talks on February 15 (reported septel). The delegation met with National Security Advisor (NSA) Rassoul, MOD Wardak, and MOI Zarar Moqbil (reported below). They also met with the Ambassador, the leadership of Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A),and the Country Team, and visited the Kabul Military Training Center and the National Military Command Center. Embassy polmiloff and representatives from CSTC-A participated in the meetings and Working Group session. Afghan National Security Advisor -------------- ¶3. (C) NSA Rassoul told the delegation that the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) has been working for the last two to three years for a recognition of the role of Pakistan in the political situation. He said that although there are internal problems within Afghanistan that have helped foster the insurgency, we need to work on Pakistan as well, since without the help of the Pakistan Government there can be no real improvement. He noted that the GOA has been asked by the international community to be less vocal on Pakistan, and is willing to give a chance for pressure to work. He said that there is a difference of opinion within the GOA with regard to Pakistani motivations. If the Pakistanis see a stable Afghanistan as a threat, the Afghans are willing to try and persuade them otherwise. If, however, they want to extend Pakistani influence into Afghanistan, that is unacceptable. When pressed by PDASD Shinn, Rassoul said that there is no consensus within the GOA as to which of these motivations is the true one. ¶4. (C) PDASD Shinn asked whether Pakistani support for the Taliban was directive or permissive. Dr Rassoul answered that the involvement of the ISI (Inter Services Intelligence) at the local level was very direct. He said that the GOA had solid information that the ISI is involved in recruiting, paying, and equipping the Taliban, and is supporting their planning and logistics. He noted that the Taliban are good fighters but they are not capable of organizing or planning. At a higher level, Rassoul said the support is permissive, i.e., that the Pakistani KABUL 00000662 002 OF 003 military leadership is aware of what is going on and is not stopping it. He gave the example of a meeting at New York before the 2005 Parliamentary elections when President Karzai requested Pakistani help in limiting cross border incursions. "Cross border activity stopped like a watch," Rassoul said, "and then after the election it went back up. This proves that the Pakistanis could act if they want." ¶5. (C) Senior Advisor Shivers asked about the relations between Afghanistan and Iran. Rassoul replied that like Pakistan, Iran also has a vision of what it wants in Afghanistan. It has always wanted a zone of influence. Increasingly, it is expanding its attention to get the support of the Sunni population. However, the GOA does not see this activity as destabilizing so far - it can be controlled. Rassoul noted also that Iran-Afghanistan relations will depend on Iran,s international position. The Iranians are preparing themselves for a confrontation. To that end, they are revitalizing old contacts, reactivating intelligence networks, and spending money. Dr. Rassoul added that at the Munich Conference on Security Policy (9-11 Feb 07) Iran,s Foreign Minister invited him to go to Iran and he agreed. Ministry of Defense -------------- ¶6. (C) In a February 14 meeting, MOD Wardak told the delegation that he considered the Strategic Partnership to be a very important step forward in the long-term relationship. He said that Afghanistan continues to rely very heavily on its bilateral relationship with the U.S. and that he is not yet confident of NATO, due to the complex decisionmaking, caveats, changing minds, and involvement of capitals in the NATO policy process. With regard to Afghan National Army (ANA) force development, Wardak said that the Afghan side is committed to fulfilling its part of the requirement, i.e. providing recruits, discipline, transparency, good leadership, and improving retention and reenlistment rates. He acknowledged the need for the GOA to take on ANA sustainability in the long-term, but said during the transitional period the Afghan government will share the burden commensurate with the development of the national economy. He pointed out that an international contribution to sustainment would be cheaper than the cost of international deployment to Afghanistan, as well as saving soldiers, lives. He reiterated that the long-term aim of the ANA has to be that it can independently neutralize any internal or external threat. He noted that the U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership is not a treaty arrangement, and cited the U.S.-Republic of Korea relationship (Treaty of Mutual Defense) as an option for empowering the Afghan military while dealing with a common threat, although he believed it may be unfeasible. ¶7. (C) MOD Wardak used this opportunity to present a proposal to move control of the Afghan Border Police back to the Ministry of Defense. The Afghan Border Police (ABP),Wardak explained, initially resided in the MOD, until responsibility was assigned to the Ministry of Interior after the ANA was limited to 70,000 members at the 2002 Bonn Conference. However, the ABP has shown itself to be incapable of enforcing a 5,500 km border. (Note: while MOD Wardak supports the ANA taking on this task, others in the ANA leadership fear that incorporating ABP personnel into ANA ranks would seriously dilute the professionalism and capability of the ANA. Adding an additional 18,000 ANA to the proposed 70,000 objective is also KABUL 00000662 003 OF 003 not realistic within the needed timeframe. MOI and CSTC-A are working on revitalizing the ABP recruitment and training program to alleviate some of the problems associated with the border police. End note.) ¶8. (C) In response to PDASD Shinn,s question about the role of Pakistan, MOD Wardak said that he has heard a lot from Westerners about how Pakistan will cooperate. He said that Afghanistan has no objection if Pakistan is willing to cooperate. However he is totally opposed to the theory that there are rogue elements within ISI. ISI is part of the Pakistani military chain of command and its officers are regular army officers on detail assignments. He believes that the Pakistanis are playing a double game, and that they are uniting with "other regional countries" to gain influence. However, he said, the GOA does not want to create complications if they do not actually exist. If the U.S. is able to ensure Pakistan,s sincerity, the Afghans will do everything they can to support a cooperative relationship. Ministry of Interior -------------- ¶9. (C) MOI Zarar focused his remarks on the reform of the MOI and the Afghan National Police (ANP). He noted that there has been some progress since reform began in earnest in late 2005. The Probation Board process was important in gaining the trust of the people and selecting professional cadres. The MOI replaced 40 ANP Generals who were local powerbrokers. Phase III rank reform will close out local powers and bring big changes to the district level. The rank reform program is bringing an institutional framework to the ANP. Through it, the MOI will be able to increase capability, quality, and capacity of ANP officers. Zarar noted that two significant obstacles remain that will take time to resolve: 1) There is a lack of qualified professional personnel in the ANP; and 2) The MOI needs to create a system to support the institution. The police force needs to operate on the basis of rule of law, and that takes time to develop. PDASD Shinn agreed with the Minister, noting that the U.S. is committed to a long-term relationship and that there needs to be long-term planning to build institutional strength. ¶10. (U) PDASD Shinn has cleared this cable. NEUMANN