PRT CHAGHCHARAN:THE COST OF ALLOWING NICE GUYS TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 000622 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT, EUR/PRM STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR HARRIMAN OSD FOR KIMMITT CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINS PREL AF SUBJECT: PRT CHAGHCHARAN:THE COST OF ALLOWING NICE GUYS TO FINISH LAST Classified By: Classified by Richard Norland for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) . ¶1. (C) Summary: The case of Ghor Province in Afghanistan's mountainous center suggests that major flows of assistance to areas of instability can have the unintended consequence of undermining government authority in ostensibly stable areas. Ghor province enjoys a generally benign security environment but is seriously underdeveloped. Given the need to address security concerns elsewhere, Ghor has received only a modest level of outside assistance, including from the PRT's lead country, Lithuania. This, combined with residents' chronic sense of abandonment as well as news of development projects going on elsewhere, is giving rise to resentment and criticism of government authorities. Particularly in Ghor's vulnerable south, poverty and the lack of development may also be opening up opportunities for the Taliban to exploit. Given its position both as part of Afghanistan's stable core and as a barrier to the northward spread of Taliban insecurity, Ghor's situation is prompting us to look more closely at whether investing a few additional development resources in Ghor and similarly placed "good guy" areas might be in the country's larger interest. End Summary. Deep Pockets vs. Deep Needs -------------- ¶2. (C) Rightly or wrongly, the country leading a PRT has come to be seen as the special benefactor of the province in which that PRT operates. Whether it is the Spanish in Badghis fixing Qala-i-Naw's city electric system, the Germans spending $7 million on bringing clean drinking water and paved streets to Kunduz City, or the U.S. military spending significant CERP funds on its many "hearts and minds" projects throughout eastern Afghanistan, people now look to the PRT lead countries to provide a certain boost to development in their provinces. Of course, our goal over time is to shift this burden toAfghan authorities. But, in the short term, what if a lead-country does not have the resources to meet these expectations, particularly when people constantly encounter media reports about development projects undertaken elsewhere in provinces where PRTs are led by countries with deep pockets? If Ghor Province is any indication, what can result is a range of negative emotions from annoyance to outright anger, a questioning of government authority, and even a decision to withhold support. ¶3. (C) At his very first meeting with Ghor residents, in an early November session with the Province's six Wolesi Jirga members, the Poloff at PRT Chaghcharan ran squarely into this phenomenon. Almost the first words out of the mouth of MP Imami Ghori was a request for help in replacing Lithuania as the lead country for PRT Chaghcharan. He complained about what he characterized as Afghanistan's poorest province being assigned one of Europe's poorest countries to lead its PRT. Since then, several other officials have made comments along similar lines, though usually couched more delicately in terms of Ghor's great needs and the wish that the PRT and its lead country were in a position to do more. ¶4. (SBU) Exacerbating the problem is the long-standing belief widely held by Ghor residents that their backward province is neglected and "forgotten." Whether through neglect or not, the province does have problems serious enough to leave all but the most optimistic open to a sense of grievance: extreme poverty, isolation, a propensity to drought, severe environmental degradation, a barely functioning economy, a lack of infrastructure (not one kilometer of paved road anywhere in a province that is much KABUL 00000622 002 OF 004 larger than Maryland),and a severe shortage of educated and trained people. Other negatives include widespread drug trafficking, the presence of entrenched, illicit power brokers, and a restricted reach of legitimate governmental authority. Ghor does, though, have some things going for it: a fairly benign security environment, a predominantly Tajik population traditionally at odds with the Taliban and currently still hopeful of a better future under democracy, a few competent and dedicated government officials, and a genuine thirst for education (this last despite the fact that less than 10 percent of its 390 schools even have a building). Some Assistance, But Even More Need -------------- ¶5. (SBU) It is inaccurate to suggest, as some Ghor residents do, that the province has received no assistance. Last year the Lithuanians spent about $500,000 on civil and CIMIC quick impact projects, and their development budget for Ghor is expected to increase to about $2,000,000 this year. This is in addition to the sizable costs the Lithuanians shoulder for fielding and maintaining PRT Chaghcharan, costs which are slated to increase substantially with their assumption at the end of this year of those PRT support costs still being covered by the U.S. The Lithuanians are also working hard to snare as much as possible of the 10 million euros available from the EC over the next three years for rule of law and alternative livelihoods projects in provinces with EU member-led PRTs. ¶6. (SBU) For its part, USAID remains one of Ghor's few consistent sources of outside help, though that agency is now shifting out of the quick impact project (QIP) work that Ghor still desperately needs. USAID expenditures to date have included about $300,000 in QIPs, $2 million in funding for seven World Vision-managed clinics (costs now assumed by the EC),about $2 million for reconstruction of 58 kms. of compacted gravel road adjacent to the provincial capital, and $2 million in support for a Catholic Relief Services drought relief and winterization project. Recent travel around the province also suggests that World Food Program emergency food aid, supported by significant U.S. contributions, has had the desired impact. Ghor has also received a bit less than $400,000 in U.S. military CERP funds (for a school dormitory, a hospital pharmacy, and a girls' school),provided by the former U.S. PRT in Herat in ¶2005. The Anger is Palpable -------------- ¶7. (C) In the face of Ghor's huge developmental deficit and the word being picked up of funds and projects going to other provinces, Ghor residents feel shortchanged. At practically every meeting with a PRT representative, people use the chance to roll out their often lengthy wish lists. While that is perhaps only to be expected, of concern is the number of times meetings with Ghor officials and residents have actually taken on a bitter, angry tone. Frustrated by recurring typhoid cases in his district's snow-bound north, the visibly incensed director of the government clinic in Lal told PRT visitors in late December he was sick and tired of people like them coming by to make their set speeches when no one, he contended, was doing a thing to sink the wells and build the local clinics that would end the typhoid outbreaks. The chairman of Ghor's Provincial Council was practically rude during Poloff's introductory call, castigating the PRT for its failure to emulate PRTs elsewhere in contributing to local development. ¶8. (C) In a mid-December session with PRT Chaghcharan's commander, Momeni tribal chief Arbab Somad, holed up in his KABUL 00000622 003 OF 004 village redoubt in the remote southeastern tip of Daulina district, made no bones of his disdain for the provincial authorities, given the lack of development aid. With no clinic, school building, police station, or decent road within hours of his area, he scornfully declared his unwillingness to contribute a single man for ANA or ANP duty unless and until the government provides him with some concrete benefit. (Note: This is the same individual who issued a threat to a previous PRT patrol, which arrived at his village empty-handed, that he might just put out the welcome mat for Taliban insurgents to spend the winter in his fiefdom. The current PRT commander received a somewhat more cordial reception, owing, perhaps, to the two doctors who were accompanying him. End Note.) An Opening for the Insurgents -------------- ¶9. (C) Both the Commander of PRT Chaghcharan and top provincial authorities are especially worried about Ghor's southernmost districts, scene last year of a rocket attack on a police station, a sniper fire incident targeting Croatian troops, and a number of attempted school burnings. Seemingly confirming those concerns, in the absence of the district administrator and police chief, the PRT's early January patrol team to Pasaband found itself sitting across from the deputy chief of police as their most authoritative interlocutor, an individual provincial authorities are trying to transfer because of his alleged Taliban sympathies. In a subsequent visit to next-door Taiwara (where a local mullah was murdered last year, reportedly for opposing a Taliban propaganda campaign),the PRT patrol encountered an almost belligerent district administrator sharply focused on denouncing the absence of development in his area. He warned darkly that "hungry men are angry men" and asked why people should support the government when schools and clinics remain so scarce. Talk of "equality" rings hollow, he declared, when huge resources flow to certain areas while others are ignored.Like every other critic encountered recently, he stressed the relative lack of security incidents in Ghor to date and the traditionally friendly attitude of the people toward the current government; but, he went on, how are people to remain loyal when they continue to see resources showered on areas beset with opposition violence. ¶10. (C) Further south, in Zarni village on the border with Farah Province, the chief elder was even blunter. "Don't bother taking notes", he told the PRT visitors, "if there is going to be no tangible outcome". He complained angrily that villages like his which are surrounded by Taliban-infected territory yet support the government are left cut off, vulnerable, and without assistance while neighboring areas of armed resistance are provided major resources. He insisted he was not expecting a great deal of aid, for example on a par with that accorded Pashtuns to the south. "After all", he pointed out, "President Karzai is a Pashtun. But why help only the Pashtuns? Is the PRT too on the side of the Pashtuns"? ¶11. (C) Comment: The kinds of complaints being heard in Ghor are neither unprecedented nor unique to Ghor. Also, a case might be made that given Ghor's predominantly Tajik makeup and traditional hostility to the Taliban, continuing the current, relatively low level of assistance to Ghor may not have particularly far-reaching consequences at a time when assistance resources are needed elsewhere. On the other hand, frustration, anger, and perhaps at some point outright alienation can undermine the already delicate base of provincial government authority in an environment still populated with the likes of Arbab Somad and other alternative KABUL 00000622 004 OF 004 centers of arms- and tribal-based power. Particularly in Ghor's south, lack of development can lead to more than disenchantment. Some local authorities as well as the provincial NDS director suggest that poverty can turn into - and at times has already turned into - a willingness to sell information and even commit terrorist acts for money. Until now, Ghor has functioned as part of Afghanistan's stable core and as a barrier to Taliban expansion to the north. Most resources must certainly continue to flow to areas of major insecurity. But the plight of Ghor and perhaps similar parts of the country raises the question of whether putting even just a few more assistance dollars in the hands of especially disadvantaged "good guys," people who generally support the authorities and refrain from violence, might be in the larger interest of Afghanistan - and the United States. Embassy will actively explore possible avenues of support involving USAID, the U.S. military and ISAF partners. NEUMANN